Probabilistic and Epistemic Model Checking for Multi-Agent Systems

Model checking is a formal technique widely used to verify security and communication protocols in epistemic multi-agent systems against given properties. Qualitative properties such as safety and liveliness have been widely analysed in the literature. However, systems also have quantitative and uncertain (i.e., probabilistic) properties such as degree of reliability and reachability, which still need further attention from the model checking perspective. In this dissertation, we analyse such properties and present a new method for probabilistic model checking of epistemic multi-agent systems specified by a new probabilistic-epistemic logic PCTLK. We model multiagent systems distributed knowledge bases using probabilistic interpreted systems. We also define transformations from those interpreted systems into discrete-time Markov chains and from PCTLK formulae to PCTL formulae, an existing extension of CTL with probabilities. By so doing, we are able to convert the PCTLK model checking problem into the PCTL one. We address the problem of verifying probabilistic properties and epistemic properties in concurrent probabilistic systems as well. We then prove that model checking a formula of PCTLK in concurrent probabilistic systems is PSPACE-complete. Furthermore, we represent models associated with PCTLK logic symbolically with Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDDs). Finally, we make use of PRISM, the model checker of PCTL without adding new computation cost. Dining cryptographers protocol is implemented to show the applicability of the proposed technique along with performance analysis and comparison in terms of execution time and state space scalability with MCK, an existing epistemic-probabilistic model checker, and MCMAS, a model checker for multi-agent systems. Another example, NetBill protocol, is also implemented with PRISM to verify probabilistic epistemic properties and to evaluate the complexity of this verification

Comparing BDD and SAT based techniques for model checking Chaum's Dining Cryptographers Protocol

We analyse different versions of the Dining Cryptographers protocol by means of automatic verification via model checking. Specifically we model the protocol in terms of a network of communicating automata and verify that the protocol meets the anonymity requirements specified. Two different model checking techniques (ordered binary decision diagrams and SAT-based bounded model checking) are evaluated and compared to verify the protocols

Verifying Security Properties in Unbounded Multiagent Systems

We study the problem of analysing the security for an unbounded number of concurrent sessions of a cryptographic protocol. Our formal model accounts for an arbitrary number of agents involved in a protocol-exchange which is subverted by a Dolev-Yao attacker. We define the parameterised model checking problem with respect to security requirements expressed in temporal-epistemic logics. We formulate sufficient conditions for solving this problem, by analysing several finite models of the system. We primarily explore authentication and key-establishment as part of a larger class of protocols and security requirements amenable to our methodology. We introduce a tool implementing the technique, and we validate it by verifying the NSPK and ASRPC protocols

Verification of the TESLA protocol in MCMAS-X

We present MCMAS-X, an extension of the OBDD-based model checker MCMAS for multi-agent systems, to explicit and deductive knowledge. We use MCMAS-X to verify authentication properties in the TESLA secure stream protocol

Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications

Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes, thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN) paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial