Proving soundness of combinatorial Vickrey auctions and generating verified executable code

Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable code from the formally defined auction. This removes a source of error in implementing the auction design. We intend to use formal methods to verify new auction designs. Here, our contribution is to introduce and demonstrate the use of formal methods for auction verification in the familiar setting of a well-known auction

An Introduction to Mechanized Reasoning

Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help discover new theorems. Computer scientists have applied mechanized reasoning to economic problems but -- to date -- this work has not yet been properly presented in economics journals. We introduce mechanized reasoning to economists in three ways. First, we introduce mechanized reasoning in general, describing both the techniques and their successful applications. Second, we explain how mechanized reasoning has been applied to economic problems, concentrating on the two domains that have attracted the most attention: social choice theory and auction theory. Finally, we present a detailed example of mechanized reasoning in practice by means of a proof of Vickrey's familiar theorem on second-price auctions

Five AI Challenges in Strategyproof Computing

Computational systems are now distributed by default, and designed, owned and used by multiple self-interested parties. In the face of this growing system complexity, we need a unifying design paradigm, that supports continued innovation and competition while promoting easy deployment, operation, and use. Focusing on the central problem of resource allocation---the arbitration of shared resources among the competing demands of users---we introduce a paradigm of strategyproof computing, a vision in which individual users can treat other resources as their own. We layout the benefits of strategyproof computing, and identify five AI challenges in making this vision a reality.Engineering and Applied Science

Distributed Agent-Based Online Auction System

This paper concerns the design and development of a distributed agent-based online system for English auctions. The proposed system is composed of two parts: an Agent-based Auction Server and a Web-based Graphical User Interface. The first part of our work brought about the advantages introduced by the multi-agent systems technology to the high-level of abstraction, modularity and performance of the server architecture and its implementation. On the server side, bids submitted by auction participants are handled by a hierarchical organization of agents that can be efficiently distributed on a computer network. This approach avoids the bottlenecks of bid processing that might occur during periods of heavy bidding, like for example snipping. We present experimental results that show a significant improvement of the server throughput compared with the architecture where a single auction manager agent is used for coordinating the participants for each active auction that is registered with the server. The second part of our work involved analysis of external functionalities, implementation and usability of a prototype online auction system that incorporates the Agent-based Auction Server. Our solution is outlined in terms of information flow management and its relation to the functionalities of the system. The main outcome of this part of the work is a clean specification of the information exchanges between the agent and non-agent software components of the system. Special attention is also given to the interoperability, understood here as successful integration of the different data communication protocols and software technologies that we employed for the implementation of the system