1,982 research outputs found
Logic of Negation-Complete Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Epistemic Deciders)
We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised
negation-complete and thus disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP)
from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant interactive
proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are
negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for
example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction property (like
Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are
ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense of
being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunctive
internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself
is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not
have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the negation completeness
of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-communality (for
singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a
standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on
LiiP's and then construct in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function.
LDiiP's agent-centric internalised notion of proof can also be viewed as a
negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and
yields a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of
S4-provability.Comment: Expanded Introduction. Added Footnote 4. Corrected Corollary 3 and 4.
Continuation of arXiv:1208.184
Logic of Intuitionistic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Perfect Knowledge Transfer)
We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of
internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive
proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic
non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs
effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communication
medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent), and only in that, that
consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus disjunctive
knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM's knowledge of the proof: If CM
knew my proof then CM would persistently and also disjunctively know that my
proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a lasting
transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (disjunctively knowable facts)
in the communication medium of multi-agent distributed systems via the
transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable intuitionistic proofs).
Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit
refinement of KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard
S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP,
and their internalised notions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short
internalised proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic
(originally proved by Goedel).Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667; extended start of Section 1 and 2.1;
extended paragraph after Fact 1; dropped the N-rule as primitive and proved
it derivable; other, non-intuitionistic family members: arXiv:1208.1842,
arXiv:1208.591
The price of inscrutability
In our reasoning we depend on the stability of language, the fact that its signs do not arbitrarily change in meaning from moment to moment.(Campbell, 1994, p.82)
Some philosophers offer arguments contending that ordinary names such as âLondonâ are radically indeterminate in reference. The conclusion of such arguments is that there is no fact of the matter whether âLondonâ refers to a city in the south of England, or whether instead it refers to
Sydney, Australia. Some philosophers have even suggested that we accept the conclusion of these arguments.
Such a position seems crazy to many; but what exactly goes wrong if one adopts such a view? This paper evaluates the theoretical costs incurred by one who endorses extreme inscrutability of reference (the âinscrutabilistâ). I show that there is one particular implication of extreme
inscrutability which pushes the price of inscrutabilism too high. An extension of the classic âpermutationâ arguments for extreme inscrutability allow us to establish what I dub âextreme indexical inscrutabilityâ. This result, I argue, unacceptably undermines the epistemology of inference.
The first half of the paper develops the background of permutation arguments for extreme inscrutability
of reference and evaluates some initial attempts to make trouble for the inscrutabilist.
Sections 1 and 2 describe the setting of the original permutation arguments for extreme inscrutability.
Sections 3 and 4 survey four potential objections to extreme inscrutability of reference,
including some recently raised in Vann McGeeâs excellent (2005a). Sections 5 sketches how the permutation arguments can be generalized to establish extreme indexical inscrutability; and shows how this contradicts a âstability principleââthat our words do not arbitrarily
change their reference from one moment to the nextâwhich I claim plays a vital role in the epistemology of inference.
The second half of the paper develops in detail the case for thinking that language is stable
in the relevant sense. In section 6, I use this distinction to call into question the epistemological
relevance of validity of argument types; Kaplanâs treatment of indexical validity partially resolves this worry, but there is a residual problem. In section 7, I argue that stability is exactly what is needed to bridge this final gap, and so secure the relevance of validity to good inferential practice. Section 8 responds to objections to this claim.
An appendix to the paper provides formal backing for the results cited in this paper, including a generalization of permutation arguments to the kind of rich setting required for a realistic semantics of natural language.1 Extreme indexical inscrutability results can be proved within
this setting. The first half of the paper shows that the inscrutabilist is committed to extreme indexical inscrutability, which implies that language not determinately âstableâ. The second half of the paper argues that good inference requires stability. The price of inscrutabilism, therefore, is to sever the connection between the validity of argument-forms and inferential practice: and this is too high a price to pay
Refinement Modal Logic
In this paper we present {\em refinement modal logic}. A refinement is like a
bisimulation, except that from the three relational requirements only `atoms'
and `back' need to be satisfied. Our logic contains a new operator 'all' in
addition to the standard modalities 'box' for each agent. The operator 'all'
acts as a quantifier over the set of all refinements of a given model. As a
variation on a bisimulation quantifier, this refinement operator or refinement
quantifier 'all' can be seen as quantifying over a variable not occurring in
the formula bound by it. The logic combines the simplicity of multi-agent modal
logic with some powers of monadic second-order quantification. We present a
sound and complete axiomatization of multi-agent refinement modal logic. We
also present an extension of the logic to the modal mu-calculus, and an
axiomatization for the single-agent version of this logic. Examples and
applications are also discussed: to software verification and design (the set
of agents can also be seen as a set of actions), and to dynamic epistemic
logic. We further give detailed results on the complexity of satisfiability,
and on succinctness
- âŠ