An Observation Concerning Porte’s Rule in Modal Logic

It is well known that no consistent normal modal logic contains (as theorems) both ◊A and ◊¬A (for any formula A). Here we observe that this claim can be strengthened to the following: for any formula A, either no consistent normal modal logic contains ◊A, or else no consistent normal modal logic contains ◊¬A

A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax

In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his 1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a [standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical predicate calculus QC. The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment, identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel - and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type theories. The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation (incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic

Automated Synthesis of Tableau Calculi

This paper presents a method for synthesising sound and complete tableau calculi. Given a specification of the formal semantics of a logic, the method generates a set of tableau inference rules that can then be used to reason within the logic. The method guarantees that the generated rules form a calculus which is sound and constructively complete. If the logic can be shown to admit finite filtration with respect to a well-defined first-order semantics then adding a general blocking mechanism provides a terminating tableau calculus. The process of generating tableau rules can be completely automated and produces, together with the blocking mechanism, an automated procedure for generating tableau decision procedures. For illustration we show the workability of the approach for a description logic with transitive roles and propositional intuitionistic logic.Comment: 32 page

Comparing and evaluating extended Lambek calculi

Lambeks Syntactic Calculus, commonly referred to as the Lambek calculus, was innovative in many ways, notably as a precursor of linear logic. But it also showed that we could treat our grammatical framework as a logic (as opposed to a logical theory). However, though it was successful in giving at least a basic treatment of many linguistic phenomena, it was also clear that a slightly more expressive logical calculus was needed for many other cases. Therefore, many extensions and variants of the Lambek calculus have been proposed, since the eighties and up until the present day. As a result, there is now a large class of calculi, each with its own empirical successes and theoretical results, but also each with its own logical primitives. This raises the question: how do we compare and evaluate these different logical formalisms? To answer this question, I present two unifying frameworks for these extended Lambek calculi. Both are proof net calculi with graph contraction criteria. The first calculus is a very general system: you specify the structure of your sequents and it gives you the connectives and contractions which correspond to it. The calculus can be extended with structural rules, which translate directly into graph rewrite rules. The second calculus is first-order (multiplicative intuitionistic) linear logic, which turns out to have several other, independently proposed extensions of the Lambek calculus as fragments. I will illustrate the use of each calculus in building bridges between analyses proposed in different frameworks, in highlighting differences and in helping to identify problems.Comment: Empirical advances in categorial grammars, Aug 2015, Barcelona, Spain. 201