Net Neutrality as Global Principle for Internet Governance

This paper discusses the concept of network neutrality (NN) and explores its relevance to global Internet governance. The paper identifies three distinct ways in which the concept of network neutrality might attain a status as a globally applicable principle for Internet governance. The paper concludes that the concept of a "neutral" Internet has global applicability in a variety of contexts relevant to Internet governance

The iPhone and the DMCA: Locking the Hands of Consumers

On August 24, 2007, less than two months after its initial release for sale, the Apple iPhone was unlocked, untethering the phones from the AT&T cellular network. Because AT&T has exclusive rights to provide coverage for the iPhone until the year 2010, hackers and computer enthusiasts worked feverishly to be the first to use the iPhone on a network other than AT&T. Although the practice of cell phone unlocking has been occurring for years, the tremendous public interest surrounding the launch of the iPhone focused attention on the issue like never before. Wireless carriers can use software locks, hardware locks, or both to disable a handset from being used on any network except the one for which it was purchased. Most handset makers, such as Motorola and Nokia, manufacture almost identical versions of their phones for different networks, making, for example, a new T-Mobile customer purchase a different version of the same phone he used on the AT&T network. As a result, most customers choose phones based on the network they plan to use. The practice of linking a specific cell phone handset to a particular network did not, of course, originate with Apple and AT&T. T-Mobile, Verizon, and Sprint also lock handsets to prevent them from working on competitors\u27 networks. A network provider may sometimes unlock a customer\u27s handset so that the customer can take the phone overseas to use on a foreign network, but generally, providers operate according to a business model that subsidizes expensive handsets and locks customers into multi-year contractual commitments. The iPhone, for instance, will not appear on networks other than AT&T, nor will AT&T unlock it for use overseas. If consumers want iPhones, they must use the AT&T network and be willing to use locked phones, with all their inherent limitations

Platform rules : a case study of Samsung’s failure in the smartphone platform industry

By investigating Samsung’s platform strategies, organizational culture and control mechanisms in the Android ecosystem, this research provides a balanced view on the global smartphone platform industry. In addition, this dissertation provides both empirical evidence and critical explanations by exploring the challenges of global leading manufacturer Samsung, especially Samsung’s Media Solution Center (hereinafter, MSC) which was in charge of software and platform services of the company. In the literature review and methodology chapter, this study reviews 1) how successful platform providers actually control other platform participants, 2) how they develop platform ecosystems and extend their businesses, 3) how a fast follower strategy which is considered a typical strategy of Samsung Electronics affects business performance, and 4) how cultural elements of organizations affect the performance of a company, especially an ICT firm. This research poses three research questions: RQ 1: How did Samsung’s platform strategies such as the fast follower strategy affect MSC’s platform services? RQ 2: How did the platform governance and control mechanisms in the global smartphone industry influence Samsung’s platform services? And RQ 3: How did the organizational culture of Samsung and MSC influence Samsung’s platform businesses? The research relies on interviews with 25 platform experts who once designed and worked on platform services such as Samsung Apps or Bada in Samsung’s MSC. This study basically explores business experiences of Samsung’s MSC whose challenges were not successful. Since Samsung’s attempts to control a platform failed, this research is in part a study of failure. In this it deviates from the typical study that pays much attention to the winner’s position or experience rather than that of a loser. Based on the interview data, this research provides significant findings. First, Samsung’s strategy of being the fastest follower generated positive network effects for the Google Play Store instead of Samsung’s platforms. Second, Google tightly controlled its competitors’ platform services in diverse (somewhat unfair) ways in order to maintain its dominance. Lastly, Samsung’s hierarchical and micromanaging organizational culture exerted negative influence on MSC’s platform services.Radio-Television-Fil

Competition and Regulation in the Retail Broadband Sector: a Holistic Approach for Pricing Policies

[eng] This thesis analyses the pricing policies used by operators when they establish broadband tariffs. The studies draw on datasets that combine broadband plans’ characteristics and tariffs with other sources of data at country level to reflect the market structure and regulation activity. The pricing models in this dissertation share the common thread of using three groups of variables to explain the level of broadband prices: 1- the characteristics of the broadband service, 2- the operators’ commercial strategies, and 3- the market structure and regulatory policies implemented. The pricing models are estimated using the following econometric techniques: pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with country and time fixed effects, and two stage least squares (2SLS, instrumental variable techniques). The level of broadband prices concerns both national governments and international organisations, and this dissertation contributes to provide some guidance to regulators and competition authorities, helping them in the implementation of policies so as to foster competition in the market and ultimately stimulate the diffusion of broadband services. The first thesis chapter analyses the determinants of broadband Internet access prices in a group of 15 EU countries between 2008 and 2011. Using a rich panel data set of broadband plans, it is shown how downstream speed (Mbps) increases prices, and that the price per Mbps of cable modem and fibre technologies is lower than that of xDSL. Operators’ marketing strategies are also analysed as it is shown how much prices rise when the broadband service is offered in a bundle with voice telephony and/or television, and how much they fall when download volume caps are included. The most insightful results of this study are provided by a group of metrics that represent the situation of competition and entry patterns in the broadband market. It is found that consumer segmentation positively affects prices. Moreover, broadband prices are higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream access and lower in countries where there is an intensive use of direct access (local loop unbundling). However, there is not a significant impact of inter-platform competition on prices. The second chapter analyses the strategies adopted by mobile operators when they set the prices of broadband plans. It is explained that operators design multi-tier price schemes in order to segment consumers according to their preferences. Operators usually offer only a few unlimited usage contracts and three-part tariffs for data limited plans. In the later case, the tariff includes an access fee, a usage allowance (the number of GB that consumers can use for free), and a penalty system for the case in which consumers exceed the contracted allowance. The empirical model shows that the prices of usage based contracts are lower than those of unlimited contracts, and that the monthly price depends on the type of penalty included in the plan. The prices also depend on other characteristics of the service such as the provided technology, the download speed and the telephone call allowances. It is also explained that most plans bundle mobile broadband plans with smartphones. This type of plans last longer and might be more expensive than the plans that only include the SIM card. Specifically, it is shown that the monthly price of the broadband service is more expensive when the plan includes an iPhone or a Samsung. Moreover, it is found that the monthly prices are higher when the plan includes a discount for the acquisition of the smarthphone. Finally, this chapter also studies the effects of market structure and entry regulation on prices and shows that mobile virtual operators have helped to reduce prices. The third chapter studies the mobile broadband market in Spain. The mobile broadband service has experienced a strong expansion in Spain, reaching a penetration of over 70% of the population at the beginning of 2014. This growth can be explained by the benefits that offer the third and the fourth generation of mobile technology, and by the continuous price reductions. In spite of this, prices in Spain are still higher than the European average. This chapter explains the process of technological innovation that has allowed the emergence of mobile broadband, and its launch in Spain. New commercial strategies used by mobile operators, such as bundling and plans that include fixed and mobile services are examined. The analysis shows that the presence of mobile virtual network operators and bundling have been effective in fostering competition and reducing prices. It is also discussed how technological convergence between fixed and mobile services has promoted restructuring and market concentration

Dynamic technological capability (DTC) model for the next generation of technology evolution

The central question of this thesis is how should the managers and technologists of technological organisations decide on how to invest in the co-evolution of technologies and adapt their influences to the evolution of their organisational capabilities by knowing the benefits, opportunities, costs and risks of such an investment? In the context of this research the main drivers are recognized as: - Variation in the accuracy and quality of technology - Changing market and instability in the demand for technology - Huge cost with less revenue from the technology - Increasing influence of regulations The issue of particular interest within this question includes creating a solution method for decision makers so that they can create value for their organisations by making a less risky investment decision in technology evolution, under the conditions that will be relevant to the next generation of technologies. The research work uses a case study approach within the context of the UK mobile industry in order to answer the basic and problem-oriented questions, by which; 1. the characteristics of the future technological evolutions within which the next generation of technologies must be operated are identified. 2. related theories are identified in respect of the value creation for organisations with evolving capabilities in response to the dynamic environment. 3. emphasis is placed upon the contribution of the technology co-evolution towards the evolution of organisational capabilities, as a result of a critical view of the concept of dynamic capabilities. 4. a basis is developed for the need of a solution method, consistent with the characteristics of the next generation of technologies, which respond to the current limitation of the theory of the dynamic capabilities, that must be overcome to achieve new requirements of the technology evolution. The output from the research work includes: I. A new framework, which exploits distinct technological roles: component, product and applications, support and infrastructure and integrates these technological capabilities from internal and external industries, following the four stages evolutionary cycle, including variation/reconfiguration, selection/search/learning, replication/leveraging, retention/integration. In this research, this new framework is called an evolutionary framework. II. A new set of 52 factors which are organized with respect to their clusters: technological evolution (TE), organisational evolution (OE), resource evolution (RE); their drivers: accuracy and quality of technology, market demand for technology, cost of technology, self and governmental regulations; and their merits: benefits, opportunities, costs, risks. In this research, this new set of factors is called an evaluation method. The fusion of the above concept and method places a new model, called the Dynamic Technological Capability model, within the context of technological organisations such as the UK mobile operators. The basis of the DTC model is that the exogenous industries are forcing the technology co-evolution, even if the previous generation of technologies remained unsuccessful in the dynamic market. To overcome the problems of making a less risky investment decision in the next generation of technology under such circumstances, the decision makers must have a model through which they can take measures of the investment decisions in the form of the benefits, opportunities, costs and risks values before making any investment decision. These novel aspects of the DTC model are illustrated by applying it to the UK mobile operators: Vodafone, Orange and O2, for the process of making an investment decision in the next generation of Location Based Services (LBS), called Assisted-Global Positioning System (A-GPS) technology

Epic Games v. Apple: Tech-Tying and the Future of Antitrust

Antitrust and “Big Tech” firms are under renewed scrutiny, in part due to the dispute between Epic Games and Apple. This lawsuit strikes at the heart of the growing phenomenon of “tech-tying,” a form of vertical integration in digital aftermarkets where monopolistic tech firms condition the use of their operating systems on the added use of other complimentary software or services. Judicial attitude toward claims of tying has shifted considerably over recent decades, resulting in lax enforcement against vertical integration arrangements. This Comment argues that Apple’s conduct constitutes “tech-tying” and that competitors should be permitted to enter the aftermarkets of both iOS app distribution and iOS in-app payments processing. Antitrust laws must evolve from its industrial-era origins to account for today’s high-tech industry by expanding to protect competition