Online Learning of Aggregate Knowledge about Non-linear Preferences Applied to Negotiating Prices and Bundles

In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some key insights about, as well as a procedure for, locating mutually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation. The essence of our approach lies in combining aggregate (anonymous) knowledge of customer preferences with current data about the ongoing negotiation process. The developed procedure either works with already obtained aggregate knowledge or, in the absence of such knowledge, learns the relevant information online. We conduct computer experiments with simulated customers that have_nonlinear_ preferences. We show how, for various types of customers, with distinct negotiation heuristics, our procedure (with and without the necessary aggregate knowledge) increases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and the Pareto efficiency of the deals reached compared to a benchmark.Comment: 10 pages, 5 eps figures, ACM Proceedings documentclass, Published in "Proc. 6th Int'l Conf. on Electronic Commerce ICEC04, Delft, The Netherlands," M. Janssen, H. Sol, R. Wagenaar (eds.). ACM Pres

Polylogical fallacies: Are there any?

Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants (di-logue). What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for (poly-logues)? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man

Online learning of aggregate knowledge about non-linear preferences applied to negotiating prices and bundles

In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some key insights about, as well as a procedure for, locating mutually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation. The essence of our approach lies in combining aggregate (anonymous) knowledge of customer preferences with current data about the ongoing negotiation process. The developed procedure either works with already obtained aggregate knowledge or, in the absence of such knowledge, learns the relevant information online. We conduct computer experiments with simulated customers that have emph{nonlinear} preferences. We show how, for various types of customers, with distinct negotiation heuristics, our procedure (with and without the necessary aggregate knowledge) increases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and the Pareto efficiency of the deals reached compared to a benchmar

Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking.

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their pro- ductivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent- seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between "redistributive rent-seeking"and "productive rent-seeking" situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the "lost treasure" effect), since valuable rents are left unex- ploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases.Rent-seeking, rent dissipation, Tullock' s paradox.

Cartels That Vote: Agricultural Marketing Boards and Induced Voting Behavior

Our goal in this research project is to understand the behavior of administrative committees authorized to restrict volume. Understanding this behavior is interesting in its own right and in addition may clarify how other cartels operate. Like every cartel, these administrative committees must grapple with difficult collective choice problems; however, they are not burdened with the enforcement problems that beset the typical cartel. Administrative committees afford students of cartel behavior three advantages: (1) their collective choice mechanism (majority-rule voting) is explicity, (2) their meetings are open to the public, and (3) their public records reveal how each committee member voted on each proposed volume restriction (no matter whether it passed or failed).Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100660/1/ECON134.pd

Nano-drug Clinical Trials: Informed Consent and Risk Management Through Blockchain

Drug bearing nano-shells that can be utilized for targeted drug delivery have been shown to enhance the therapeutic index by increasing the dug concentration in diseased tissue and reducing the toxicity in normal tissue.  The controllability of the drug bearing shell size provides predictability measure for the amount of drug payload per shell which improves the administration of the therapeutic dose.  The FDA approved different formulations for clinical use in metastatic and recurrent breast cancer, among other diseases.  At the moment, some of these formulations are the subject of international clinical trials.  Informed consent is legally mandated in administering drug bearing nano-shells.  The risks of the new formulations, as with all new technologies, are not well known and are continue to be a subject of intensive research, thus exacerbating the existing informed consent legal issues, thus exacerbating the existing informed consent legal issues.  This short essay focuses on proposing a framework to mitigate liabilities administering a new formulation on nano-enabled drug carriers particularly when uncertainties of the benefits and damages are not fully known.