WiLiTV: A Low-Cost Wireless Framework for Live TV Services

With the evolution of HDTV and Ultra HDTV, the bandwidth requirement for IP-based TV content is rapidly increasing. Consumers demand uninterrupted service with a high Quality of Experience (QoE). Service providers are constantly trying to differentiate themselves by innovating new ways of distributing content more efficiently with lower cost and higher penetration. In this work, we propose a cost-efficient wireless framework (WiLiTV) for delivering live TV services, consisting of a mix of wireless access technologies (e.g. Satellite, WiFi and LTE overlay links). In the proposed architecture, live TV content is injected into the network at a few residential locations using satellite dishes. The content is then further distributed to other homes using a house-to-house WiFi network or via an overlay LTE network. Our problem is to construct an optimal TV distribution network with the minimum number of satellite injection points, while preserving the highest QoE, for different neighborhood densities. We evaluate the framework using realistic time-varying demand patterns and a diverse set of home location data. Our study demonstrates that the architecture requires 75 - 90% fewer satellite injection points, compared to traditional architectures. Furthermore, we show that most cost savings can be obtained using simple and practical relay routing solutions

Optimizing Emergency Transportation through Multicommodity Quickest Paths

In transportation networks with limited capacities and travel times on the arcs, a class of problems attracting a growing scientific interest is represented by the optimal routing and scheduling of given amounts of flow to be transshipped from the origin points to the specific destinations in minimum time. Such problems are of particular concern to emergency transportation where evacuation plans seek to minimize the time evacuees need to clear the affected area and reach the safe zones. Flows over time approaches are among the most suitable mathematical tools to provide a modelling representation of these problems from a macroscopic point of view. Among them, the Quickest Path Problem (QPP), requires an origin-destination flow to be routed on a single path while taking into account inflow limits on the arcs and minimizing the makespan, namely, the time instant when the last unit of flow reaches its destination. In the context of emergency transport, the QPP represents a relevant modelling tool, since its solutions are based on unsplittable dynamic flows that can support the development of evacuation plans which are very easy to be correctly implemented, assigning one single evacuation path to a whole population. This way it is possible to prevent interferences, turbulence, and congestions that may affect the transportation process, worsening the overall clearing time. Nevertheless, the current state-of-the-art presents a lack of studies on multicommodity generalizations of the QPP, where network flows refer to various populations, possibly with different origins and destinations. In this paper we provide a contribution to fill this gap, by considering the Multicommodity Quickest Path Problem (MCQPP), where multiple commodities, each with its own origin, destination and demand, must be routed on a capacitated network with travel times on the arcs, while minimizing the overall makespan and allowing the flow associated to each commodity to be routed on a single path. For this optimization problem, we provide the first mathematical formulation in the scientific literature, based on mixed integer programming and encompassing specific features aimed at empowering the suitability of the arising solutions in real emergency transportation plans. A computational experience performed on a set of benchmark instances is then presented to provide a proof-of-concept for our original model and to evaluate the quality and suitability of the provided solutions together with the required computational effort. Most of the instances are solved at the optimum by a commercial MIP solver, fed with a lower bound deriving from the optimal makespan of a splittable-flow relaxation of the MCQPP

Bottleneck Routing Games with Low Price of Anarchy

We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their paths. However, the Nash equilibria of such games are inefficient since the price of anarchy can be very high and proportional to the size of the network. In order to obtain smaller price of anarchy we introduce {\em exponential bottleneck games} where the utility costs of the players are exponential functions of their congestions. We find that exponential bottleneck games are very efficient and give a poly-log bound on the price of anarchy: $O(\log L \cdot \log |E|)$, where $L$ is the largest path length in the players' strategy sets and $E$ is the set of edges in the graph. By adjusting the exponential utility costs with a logarithm we obtain games whose player costs are almost identical to those in regular bottleneck games, and at the same time have the good price of anarchy of exponential games.Comment: 12 page

Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids

We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost that is a nondecreasing and convex function of the total allocation of that resource. This general model of resource allocation generalizes both singleton congestion games with integer-splittable demands and matroid congestion games with player-specific costs. As our main result, we show that in such general resource allocation problems a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by giving a pseudo-polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium.Comment: 17 page

Energy management in communication networks: a journey through modelling and optimization glasses

The widespread proliferation of Internet and wireless applications has produced a significant increase of ICT energy footprint. As a response, in the last five years, significant efforts have been undertaken to include energy-awareness into network management. Several green networking frameworks have been proposed by carefully managing the network routing and the power state of network devices. Even though approaches proposed differ based on network technologies and sleep modes of nodes and interfaces, they all aim at tailoring the active network resources to the varying traffic needs in order to minimize energy consumption. From a modeling point of view, this has several commonalities with classical network design and routing problems, even if with different objectives and in a dynamic context. With most researchers focused on addressing the complex and crucial technological aspects of green networking schemes, there has been so far little attention on understanding the modeling similarities and differences of proposed solutions. This paper fills the gap surveying the literature with optimization modeling glasses, following a tutorial approach that guides through the different components of the models with a unified symbolism. A detailed classification of the previous work based on the modeling issues included is also proposed

On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Integer-Splittable Weighted Congestion Games

We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integer–splittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and network routing, where agents have to allocate multiple tasks and can assign a number of tasks to a particular selected resource. Specifically, in an ISWCG, an agent has a certain total demand (aka weight) that it needs to satisfy, and can do so by requesting one or more integer units of each resource from an element of a given collection of feasible subsets. Each resource is associated with a unit–cost function of its level of congestion; as such, the cost to an agent for using a particular resource is the product of the resource unit–cost and the number of units the agent requests.While general ISWCGs do not admit PSNE [(Rosenthal, 1973b)], the restricted subclass of these games with linear unit–cost functions has been shown to possess a potential function [(Meyers, 2006)], and hence, PSNE. However, the linearity of costs may not be necessary for the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. Thus, in this paper we prove that PSNE always exist for a larger class of convex and monotonically increasing unit–costs. On the other hand, our result is accompanied by a limiting assumption on the structure of agents’ strategy sets: specifically, each agent is associated with its set of accessible resources, and can distribute its demand across any subset of these resources.Importantly, we show that neither monotonicity nor convexity on its own guarantees this result. Moreover, we give a counterexample with monotone and semi–convex cost functions, thus distinguishing ISWCGs from the class of infinitely–splittable congestion games for which the conditions of monotonicity and semi–convexity have been shown to be sufficient for PSNE existence [(Rosen, 1965)]. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the finite improvement path property (FIP) does not hold for convex increasing ISWCGs. Thus, in contrast to the case with linear costs, a potential function argument cannot be used to prove our result. Instead, we provide a procedure that converges to an equilibrium from an arbitrary initial strategy profile, and in doing so show that ISWCGs with convex increasing unit–cost functions are weakly acyclic

Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property

We introduce a class of finite strategic games with the property that every deviation of a coalition of players that is profitable to each of its members strictly decreases the lexicographical order of a certain function defined on the set of strategy profiles. We call this property the Lexicographical Improvement Property (LIP) and show that it implies the existence of a generalized strong ordinal potential function. We use this characterization to derive existence, efficiency and fairness properties of strong Nash equilibria. We then study a class of games that generalizes congestion games with bottleneck objectives that we call bottleneck congestion games. We show that these games possess the LIP and thus the above mentioned properties. For bottleneck congestion games in networks, we identify cases in which the potential function associated with the LIP leads to polynomial time algorithms computing a strong Nash equilibrium. Finally, we investigate the LIP for infinite games. We show that the LIP does not imply the existence of a generalized strong ordinal potential, thus, the existence of SNE does not follow. Assuming that the function associated with the LIP is continuous, however, we prove existence of SNE. As a consequence, we prove that bottleneck congestion games with infinite strategy spaces and continuous cost functions possess a strong Nash equilibrium