Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science

A collection of papers presented at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science, University at Buffalo, July 1994, including the following papers: ** Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, Barry Smith ** The Bounds of Axiomatisation, Graham White ** Rethinking Boundaries, Wojciech Zelaniec ** Sheaf Mereology and Space Cognition, Jean Petitot ** A Mereotopological Definition of 'Point', Carola Eschenbach ** Discreteness, Finiteness, and the Structure of Topological Spaces, Christopher Habel ** Mass Reference and the Geometry of Solids, Almerindo E. Ojeda ** Defining a 'Doughnut' Made Difficult, N .M. Gotts ** A Theory of Spatial Regions with Indeterminate Boundaries, A.G. Cohn and N.M. Gotts ** Mereotopological Construction of Time from Events, Fabio Pianesi and Achille C. Varzi ** Computational Mereology: A Study of Part-of Relations for Multi-media Indexing, Wlodek Zadrozny and Michelle Ki

Categorical Ontology of Complex Systems, Meta-Systems and Theory of Levels: The Emergence of Life, Human Consciousness and Society

Single cell interactomics in simpler organisms, as well as somatic cell interactomics in multicellular organisms, involve biomolecular interactions in complex signalling pathways that were recently represented in modular terms by quantum automata with ‘reversible behavior’ representing normal cell cycling and division. Other implications of such quantum automata, modular modeling of signaling pathways and cell differentiation during development are in the fields of neural plasticity and brain development leading to quantum-weave dynamic patterns and specific molecular processes underlying extensive memory, learning, anticipation mechanisms and the emergence of human consciousness during the early brain development in children. Cell interactomics is here represented for the first time as a mixture of ‘classical’ states that determine molecular dynamics subject to Boltzmann statistics and ‘steady-state’, metabolic (multi-stable) manifolds, together with ‘configuration’ spaces of metastable quantum states emerging from complex quantum dynamics of interacting networks of biomolecules, such as proteins and nucleic acids that are now collectively defined as quantum interactomics. On the other hand, the time dependent evolution over several generations of cancer cells --that are generally known to undergo frequent and extensive genetic mutations and, indeed, suffer genomic transformations at the chromosome level (such as extensive chromosomal aberrations found in many colon cancers)-- cannot be correctly represented in the ‘standard’ terms of quantum automaton modules, as the normal somatic cells can. This significant difference at the cancer cell genomic level is therefore reflected in major changes in cancer cell interactomics often from one cancer cell ‘cycle’ to the next, and thus it requires substantial changes in the modeling strategies, mathematical tools and experimental designs aimed at understanding cancer mechanisms. Novel solutions to this important problem in carcinogenesis are proposed and experimental validation procedures are suggested. From a medical research and clinical standpoint, this approach has important consequences for addressing and preventing the development of cancer resistance to medical therapy in ongoing clinical trials involving stage III cancer patients, as well as improving the designs of future clinical trials for cancer treatments.\ud \ud \ud KEYWORDS: Emergence of Life and Human Consciousness;\ud Proteomics; Artificial Intelligence; Complex Systems Dynamics; Quantum Automata models and Quantum Interactomics; quantum-weave dynamic patterns underlying human consciousness; specific molecular processes underlying extensive memory, learning, anticipation mechanisms and human consciousness; emergence of human consciousness during the early brain development in children; Cancer cell ‘cycling’; interacting networks of proteins and nucleic acids; genetic mutations and chromosomal aberrations in cancers, such as colon cancer; development of cancer resistance to therapy; ongoing clinical trials involving stage III cancer patients’ possible improvements of the designs for future clinical trials and cancer treatments. \ud \u

Ontological foundations for structural conceptual models

In this thesis, we aim at contributing to the theory of conceptual modeling and ontology representation. Our main objective here is to provide ontological foundations for the most fundamental concepts in conceptual modeling. These foundations comprise a number of ontological theories, which are built on established work on philosophical ontology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of language and linguistics. Together these theories amount to a system of categories and formal relations known as a foundational ontolog

A semantic theory of a subset of qualifying "as" phrases in English

Landman (1989) introduced contemporary linguistics to the as-phrase. An as-phrase is a qualifier, introduced in English by "as." "John is corrupt as a judge," for instance, contains the as-phrase "as a judge." Philosophical discourse is full of examples of as-phrase sentences. Their presence can make it difficult to distinguish valid from invalid arguments, a perennial concern for philosophers. Landman proposed the first formal semantic theory of as-phrases, based on a set of seven intuitively-valid patterns of inference involving as-phrases. Szabó (2003), Jaeger (2003), Asher (2011) each attempt to improve upon Landman's theory. Chapter 1 reviews and criticizes a temporal account of as-phrase semantics, while tracing some precedents and motivations for my approach. Chapters 2-3 criticize Szabó's and Asher's theories. Szabó's theory shows problems handling the future tense and intensional contexts. Asher's complex theory solves these problems, but resorts to the obscure notions of relative identity and bare particulars. Chapter 4 argues that neither Szabó's nor Asher's theory is clearly superior, because implicitly, they focus on different classes of sentences, which I call "Type A" and "Type B." From John Bowers' syntactic research, I argue that the element common to Type A and Type B is Pr, a predication head pronounced "as" in some contexts. Chapter 5 develops a formal semantic theory tailored to Type A sentences that solves the problems of Szabó's theory while avoiding Asher's assumptions. On my approach, the semantic properties of Type A sentences resolve into an interaction among generic quantifiers, determiner-phrase interpretation, and one core quantifier based on a principal ultrafilter. It is the interaction-effects of these elements that give rise to the many unusual readings we find in these as-phrase sentences. This result supports my motivating view that linguistic research helps to solve semantic problems of philosophical interest

The Resemblance Structure of Natural Kinds: A Formal Model for Resemblance Nominalism

278 p.The aim of this thesis is to better understand the ways natural kinds are related to each other by species-genus relations and the ways in which the members of the kind are related to each other by resemblance relations, by making use of formal models of kinds. This is done by first analysing a Minimal Conception of Natural Kinds and then reconstructing it from the ontological assumptions of Resemblance Nominalism. The questions addressed are:(1) What is the external structure of kinds' In what ways are kinds related to each other by species-genus relations'(2) What is the internal structure of kinds' In what sense are the instances of a kind similar enough to each other'According to the Minimal Conception of Kinds, kinds have two components, a set of members of the kind (the extension) and a set of natural attributes common to these objects (the intension). Several interesting features of this conception are discussed by making use of the mathematical theory of concept lattices. First, such structures provide a model for contemporary formulations of syllogistic logic. Second, kinds are ordered forming a complete lattice that follows Kant's law of the duality between extension and intension, according to which the extension of a kind is inversely related to its intension. Finally, kinds are shown to have Aristotelian definitions in terms of genera and specific differences. Overall this results in a description of the specificity relations of kinds as an algebraic calculus.According to Resemblance Nominalism, attributes or properties are classes of similar objects. Such an approach faces Goodman's companionship and imperfect community problems. In order to deal with these, a specific nominalism, namely Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, is chosen. According to it, attributes are classes of objects resembling a given paradigm. A model for it is introduced by making use of the mathematical theory of similarity structures and of some results on the topic of quasianalysis. Two other models (the polar model and an order-theoretic model) are considered and shown to be equivalent to the previous one.The main result is that the class of lattices of kinds that a nominalist can recover uniquely by starting from these assumptions is that of complete coatomistic lattices. Several other related results are obtained, including a generalization of the similarity model that allows for paradigms with several properties and properties with several paradigms. The conclusion is that, under nominalist assumptions, the internal structure of kinds is fixed by paradigmatic objects and the external structure of kinds is that of a coatomistic lattice that satisfies the Minimal Conception of Kinds

The Resemblance Structure of Natural Kinds: A Formal Model for Resemblance Nominalism

278 p.The aim of this thesis is to better understand the ways natural kinds are related to each other by species-genus relations and the ways in which the members of the kind are related to each other by resemblance relations, by making use of formal models of kinds. This is done by first analysing a Minimal Conception of Natural Kinds and then reconstructing it from the ontological assumptions of Resemblance Nominalism. The questions addressed are:(1) What is the external structure of kinds' In what ways are kinds related to each other by species-genus relations'(2) What is the internal structure of kinds' In what sense are the instances of a kind similar enough to each other'According to the Minimal Conception of Kinds, kinds have two components, a set of members of the kind (the extension) and a set of natural attributes common to these objects (the intension). Several interesting features of this conception are discussed by making use of the mathematical theory of concept lattices. First, such structures provide a model for contemporary formulations of syllogistic logic. Second, kinds are ordered forming a complete lattice that follows Kant's law of the duality between extension and intension, according to which the extension of a kind is inversely related to its intension. Finally, kinds are shown to have Aristotelian definitions in terms of genera and specific differences. Overall this results in a description of the specificity relations of kinds as an algebraic calculus.According to Resemblance Nominalism, attributes or properties are classes of similar objects. Such an approach faces Goodman's companionship and imperfect community problems. In order to deal with these, a specific nominalism, namely Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, is chosen. According to it, attributes are classes of objects resembling a given paradigm. A model for it is introduced by making use of the mathematical theory of similarity structures and of some results on the topic of quasianalysis. Two other models (the polar model and an order-theoretic model) are considered and shown to be equivalent to the previous one.The main result is that the class of lattices of kinds that a nominalist can recover uniquely by starting from these assumptions is that of complete coatomistic lattices. Several other related results are obtained, including a generalization of the similarity model that allows for paradigms with several properties and properties with several paradigms. The conclusion is that, under nominalist assumptions, the internal structure of kinds is fixed by paradigmatic objects and the external structure of kinds is that of a coatomistic lattice that satisfies the Minimal Conception of Kinds

Subatomic quantification (Volume 6)

The goal of this book is to explore the relationship between the cognitive notion of parthood and various grammatical devices expressing this concept in natural language. The monograph aims to investigate syntactic constructions and lexical categories, e.g., partitives, whole-adjectives, and multipliers, encoding different kinds of part-whole structures both in Slavic and non-Slavic languages. It is envisioned to inspire radical rethinking of the ontology of models accounting for nominal semantics. Specifically, it provides novel evidence for a mereotopological approach to meaning, i.e., a theory of wholes that captures not only parthood but also topological relations holding between parts. This evidence comes from the phenomenon of subatomic quantification, i.e., quantification over parts of referents of concrete count nouns

Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science

The last two decades have seen two significant trends emerging within the philosophy of science: the rapid development and focus on the philosophy of the specialised sciences, and a resurgence of Aristotelian metaphysics, much of which is concerned with the possibility of emergence, as well as the ontological status and indispensability of dispositions and powers in science. Despite these recent trends, few Aristotelian metaphysicians have engaged directly with the philosophy of the specialised sciences. Additionally, the relationship between fundamental Aristotelian concepts—such as "hylomorphism", "substance", and "faculties"—and contemporary science has yet to receive a critical and systematic treatment. Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science aims to fill this gap in the literature by bringing together essays on the relationship between Aristotelianism and science that cut across interdisciplinary boundaries. The chapters in this volume are divided into two main sections covering the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of the life sciences. Featuring original contributions from distinguished and early-career scholars, this book will be of interest to specialists in analytical metaphysics and the philosophy of science

Metasemantics and fuzzy mathematics

The present thesis is an inquiry into the metasemantics of natural languages, with a particular focus on the philosophical motivations for countenancing degreed formal frameworks for both psychosemantics and truth-conditional semantics. Chapter 1 sets out to offer a bird's eye view of our overall research project and the key questions that we set out to address. Chapter 2 provides a self-contained overview of the main empirical findings in the cognitive science of concepts and categorisation. This scientific background is offered in light of the fact that most variants of psychologically-informed semantics see our network of concepts as providing the raw materials on which lexical and sentential meanings supervene. Consequently, the metaphysical study of internalistically-construed meanings and the empirical study of our mental categories are overlapping research projects. Chapter 3 closely investigates a selection of species of conceptual semantics, together with reasons for adopting or disavowing them. We note that our ultimate aim is not to defend these perspectives on the study of meaning, but to argue that the project of making them formally precise naturally invites the adoption of degreed mathematical frameworks (e.g. probabilistic or fuzzy). In Chapter 4, we switch to the orthodox framework of truth-conditional semantics, and we present the limitations of a philosophical position that we call "classicism about vagueness". In the process, we come up with an empirical hypothesis for the psychological pull of the inductive soritical premiss and we make an original objection against the epistemicist position, based on computability theory. Chapter 5 makes a different case for the adoption of degreed semantic frameworks, based on their (quasi-)superior treatments of the paradoxes of vagueness. Hence, the adoption of tools that allow for graded membership are well-motivated under both semantic internalism and semantic externalism. At the end of this chapter, we defend an unexplored view of vagueness that we call "practical fuzzicism". Chapter 6, viz. the final chapter, is a metamathematical enquiry into both the fuzzy model-theoretic semantics and the fuzzy Davidsonian semantics for formal languages of type-free truth in which precise truth-predications can be expressed