Co-Identification and Fictional Names

Stacie Friend raises a problem of 'co-identification' involving fictional names such as 'Hamlet' or 'Odysseus': how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are 'about the same object', on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke-inspired 'name-centric' approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans-inspired 'info-centric' approach, which she prefers. The approach is motivated by her rejection of descriptivist ways of dealing with the problem. In this paper, I rely on the presuppositional, reference-fixing form of descriptivism I favor for the semantics of names, and I explain how it helps us deal with Friend's problem, which I take to concern primarily the semantic contribution of names to ascriptions of representational content to fictions. The result is a form of the 'name-centric' sort of approach that Friend rejects, which can (I'll argue) stand her criticisms

Type theoretic semantics for semantic networks: an application to natural language engineering

Semantic Networks have long been recognised as an important tool for natural language processing. This research has been a formal analysis of a semantic network using constructive type theory. The particular net studied is SemNet, the internal knowledge representation for LOLITA(^1): a large scale natural language engineering system. SemNet has been designed with large scale, efficiency, integration and expressiveness in mind. It supports many different forms of plausible and valid reasoning, including: epistemic reasoning, causal reasoning and inheritance. The unified theory of types (UTT) integrates two well known type theories, Coquand-Huet's (impredicative) calculus of constructions and Martin-Lof's (predicative) type theory. The result is a strong and expressive language which has been used for formalization of mathematics, program specification and natural language. Motivated by the computational and richly expressive nature of UTT, this research has used it for formalization and semantic analysis of SemNet. Moreover, because of applications to software engineering, type checkers/proof assistants have been built. These tools are ideal for organising and managing the analysis of SemNet. The contribution of the work is twofold. First the semantic model built has led to improved and deeper understanding of SemNet. This is important as many researchers that work on different aspects of LOLITA, now have a clear and un- ambigious interpertation of the meaning of SemNet constructs. The model has also been used to show soundess of the valid reasoning and to give a reasonable semantic account of epistemic reasoning. Secondly the research contributes to NLE generally, both because it demonstrates that UTT is a useful formalization tool and that the good aspects of SemNet have been formally presented

Direct Reference and Empty Names

The purpose of my thesis is to explore and assess recent efforts by Direct Reference Theorists to explain the phenomenon of empty names. Direct Reference theory is, roughly, the theory that the meaning of a singular term (proper name, demonstrative, etc.) is simply its referent. Certain sentences, such as negative existentials ( Santa does not exist ), and sentences in contexts of fiction ( Holmes lived on Baker Street ), present the following challenge to DR Theory: Given that the semantic value of a name is simply its referent, how are we to explain the significance and truth-evaluability of such sentences? There have been various approaches DR Theorists have taken to address this problem, including the Pragmatic Strategy, Pretense Theory, Abstract Object Theory, and the Metalinguistic Strategy. All of these views are analyzed and assessed according to their various strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, overall, a Metalinguistic Strategy, supplemented by the notion of pretense, best deals with negative existentials and normal-subject predicate occurrences of empty names, Abstract Object Theory best deals with empty names in meta-fictional contexts, and Pretense Theory best deals with empty names in object-fictional contexts

The computer comprehension of systematic metaphor

Digitisation of this thesis was sponsored by Arcadia Fund, a charitable fund of Lisbet Rausing and Peter Baldwin

Fictional Characters and Their Discontents: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of Fictional Entities

In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and how to explain truths of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street” and “Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle” have been subject to much debate. The main aim of my thesis is to wrestle with key proponents of the abstractionist view that fictional entities are abstract objects that exist (van Inwagen 1977, 2018, Thomasson 1999 and Salmon 1998) as well as Walton’s (1990) pretense view, which denies the existence of such entities. In the process, I propose modifications to these views to deal with problems they face and show how the modifications better account for the philosophical data. Key abstractionists (van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999) make a strict distinction between discourse within fiction, in which statements about literary characters cannot be literally true, and discourse about fiction, as it occurs in literary criticism, where statements about fictional characters can be literally true. Fictional objects are postulated to account for the truth of the latter. This runs into trouble because statements thought to be literally true are not literal. (Yagisawa 2001, Friend 2002) I provide a uniform analysis to account for the truth of statements involving fictional characters by appealing to a presupposition involving a metaphor in both contexts. The presupposition is that there is an x such that x is fictional; x is likened to a real person; and x is and ought to be treated/counted as a real person for all relevant intents and purposes. More generally, I adopt Everett and Schroeder’s (2015) realist view that fictional characters are ideas constituted by mental representations. This, to me, better accounts for how fictional characters are created within the world’s causal nexus (unlike non-spatiotemporal entities in abstractionism), among other things. One key challenge they face is to explain how ideas can possess properties such as being a detective. I present a fine-grained version of their view, according to which the mental representations constituting fictional entities encode mind-dependent properties. Moreover, I explain how reference to such representations is possible, using Bencivenga’s (1983) Neo-Kantian view of reference and Karttunen’s (1976) view on discourse referents. Finally, I suggest that the identity of fictional characters is interest-relative. The constant, and sometimes radical, change of properties that, fictional characters can undergo is taken to be a consequence of the fact that unified mental representations are bundles of simpler mental representations. As change occurs, simpler representations are replaced by others. A key theme that runs through the thesis is that neither fictionality nor pretense is relevant to the semantics of fictional sentences—a claim bolstered by Matravers’ (2014) arguments. Whether or not my account works, this claim, as well as the new philosophical data I bring up, are some of the challenges I pose to the heart of established views

From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 2)

We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.” With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation of the formal dynamics essential to either. In this paper, we describe in detail Tani’s research program, in order to make the clearest case for artificial consciousness in these systems. In the next paper, the third in the series, we will return to Boltuc’s naturalistic non-reductionism in light of the neurorobotics models introduced (alongside some others), and evaluate them more completely