Disjoint Logics

We will present all the mixed and impure disjoint three-valued logics based on the Strong Kleene schema. Some, but not all of them, are (inferentially) empty logics, while one of them is trivial. We will compare them regarding their relative strength. We will also provide a recipe for building philosophical interpretations for each of these logics, and show why the kind of permeability that characterises them is not such a bad feature. Finally, we will present a three-side sequent system for most of these logics

Disjoint logics

We will present all the mixed and impure disjoint three-valued logics based on the Strong Kleene schema. Some, but not all of them, are (inferentially) empty logics, while one of them is trivial. We will compare them regarding their relative strength. We will also provide a recipe for building philosophical interpretations for each of these logics, and show why the kind of permeability that characterises them is not such a bad feature. Finally, we will present a three-side sequent system for most of these logics.Fil: Pailos, Federico Matias. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentin

Paradox, arithmetic and nontransitive logic

This dissertation is concerned with motivating, developing and defending nontransitive theories of truth over Peano Arithmetic. Its main goal is to show that such a nontransitive theory of truth is the only theory capable of maintaining all functional roles of the truth predicate: the substitutional and the quantificational roles. By the substitutional roles we mean that the theory ought to prove p iff it proves that p is true and that it proves all instances of the T-schema p iff 'p' is true. A theory fulfils the quantificational role if its axioms governing the truth-predicate are strong enough to mimick as much second-order quantification as possible. Where the literature on classical theories of truth has focused primarily on the fulfilment of the quantificational role, the nonclassical literature is very much obsessed with the substitutional roles. The problem of having a theory of truth fulfilling both the substitutional and quantificational (or already just the full substitutional) role are paradoxes of truth such as the Liar. Where the Liar is a sentence which informally says about itself that it is not true, we can show that it is both true and not true, which typically allows us to conclude any formula whatsoever. This problem is overcome in the current approach by blocking the use of transitivity principles under certain conditions

Fortaleza y estabilidad

In this paper, I present two presumed alternative definitions of metavalidity for metainferences: Local and Global. I defend the latter, first, by arguing that it is not too weak with respect to metainference-cases, and that local metavalidity is in fact too strong with respect to types. Second, I show that although regarding metainference-schemas Local metavalidity is always stable, Global metavalidity is also stable when the language satisfies reasonable expressibility criteria (and that in fact, both concepts collapse in those cases).En este artículo, considero dos presuntas definiciones alternativas de validez metainferencial: local y global. Defiendo esta última, en primer lugar, argumentando que no es demasiado débil respecto de las metainferencias-caso, y que la validez local es de hecho demasiado fuerte respecto de las metainferencias-tipo. En segundo lugar, muestro que, si bien respecto de esquemas la metavalidez local es siempre estable, la metavalidez global también lo es, siempre y cuando el lenguaje satisfaga criterios razonables de expresabilidad (y que, de hecho, ambas nociones colapsan en esos casos)

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the Quinean view that logical theories have no special epistemological status, in particular, they are not self-evident or justified a priori. Instead, logical theories are continuous with scientific theories, and knowledge about logic is as hard-earned as knowledge of physics, economics, and chemistry. Once we reject apriorism about logic, however, we need an alternative account of how logical theories are justified and revised. A number of authors have recently argued that logical theories are justified by abductive argument (e.g. Gillian Russell, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson). This paper explores one crucial question about the abductive strategy: what counts as evidence for a logical theory? I develop three accounts of evidential confirmation that an anti-exceptionalist can accept: (1) intuitions about validity, (2) the Quine-Williamson account, and (3) indispensability arguments. I argue, against the received view, that none of the evidential sources support classical logic

Mathematical Fuzzy Logic in the Emerging Fields of Engineering, Finance, and Computer Sciences

Mathematical fuzzy logic (MFL) specifically targets many-valued logic and has significantly contributed to the logical foundations of fuzzy set theory (FST). It explores the computational and philosophical rationale behind the uncertainty due to imprecision in the backdrop of traditional mathematical logic. Since uncertainty is present in almost every real-world application, it is essential to develop novel approaches and tools for efficient processing. This book is the collection of the publications in the Special Issue “Mathematical Fuzzy Logic in the Emerging Fields of Engineering, Finance, and Computer Sciences”, which aims to cover theoretical and practical aspects of MFL and FST. Specifically, this book addresses several problems, such as:- Industrial optimization problems- Multi-criteria decision-making- Financial forecasting problems- Image processing- Educational data mining- Explainable artificial intelligence, etc