Electricity Internal Market in the European Union: What to do next?

Like in the US, the EU “internal electricity market” remains unfinished and its construction can stall, fracturing into “national blocks” separated by permanent “border effects”. This is exactly what this paper seeks to avoid in the expected life of the current European Commission (2005-2009). It identifies the critical factors: national and EU market designs, industry structure and competition policy, deeper regional cooperation between TSOs and Regulators. It suggests 8 priority actions and 12 secondary improvements to sustain the dynamics of the construction of an EU set of open r egional markets with limited “border effects”, and explains the rationale for these recommendations

Auctions and trading in energy markets -- an economic analysis

Auctions and trading in energy markets -- an economic analysi

Market Design for Generation Adequacy: Healing Causes rather than Symptoms

Keywords JEL Classification This paper argues that electricity market reform – particularly the need for complementary mechanisms to remunerate capacity – need to be analysed in the light of the local regulatory and institutional environment. If there is a lack of investment, the priority should be to identify the roots of the problem. The lack of demand side response, short-term reliability management procedures and uncompetitive ancillary services procurement often undermine market reflective scarcity pricing and distort long-term investment incentives. The introduction of a capacity mechanism should come as an optional supplement to wholesale and ancillary markets improvements. Priority reforms should focus on encouraging demand side responsiveness and reducing scarcity price distortions introduced by balancing and congestion management through better dialog between network engineers and market operators. electricity market, generation adequacy, market design, capacity mechanis

The British model in Britain: failing slowly

In 1990, Britain became the first developed country to reorganise its electricity industry to run on competitive lines. The British reforms are widely regarded as the benchmark for other reforms and the model used provides the basis for reforms of electricity and other network industries around the world. The factors behind this perception of success are major reductions in the real price of electricity with no apparent reduction in service quality. This paper examines whether the high reputation of the British reforms is justified and whether these good results can be maintained. It concludes that the reputation is not justified and that serious problems are beginning to emerge. The central question that must be asked is: have the British reforms resulted in the creation of efficient markets at the wholesale and retail level? On this criterion, the reforms have failed. The wholesale market remains illusory. Obscure long-term contracts, privileged access to the market and self-dealing within integrated generator/retailers have dominated wholesale purchases leaving the spot markets with minimal liquidity and unreliable prices. The failure to develop an efficient wholesale market places the onus on consumers to impose competitive forces on electricity companies by switching regularly. Small consumers will not do this and they are paying too much for their power. For the future, there is a serious risk that the electricity industry will become a weakly regulated oligopoly with a veneer of competition

Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Prices in Europe

This paper analyses the interdependencies existing in the European electricity prices. The results of a multivariate dynamic analysis of weekly median prices reveal the presence of strong integration (but not perfect integration) among the markets considered in the sample and the existence of a common trend among electricity prices and oil prices. This implies that there are no long-run arbitrage opportunities. The latter result appears to be relevant also in the context of the discussion of efficient hedging instruments to be used by medium-long term investors.European electricity prices, Cointegration, Interdependencies, Equilibrium Correction model, Oil prices

Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate

Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising powermarkets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with respect to cross-border issues

Introducing Competition in the French Electricity Supply Industry: The Destabilisation of a Public Hierarchy in an Open Institutional Environment

The French electricity supply industry is characterized by a vertically integrated monopoly and public ownership and when the government introduced market rules, it was with the aim of preserving the integration of the public incumbent as a national champion. This had two paradoxical effects in favour of competition development and the building of safeguards for entrants

Electricity Liberalisation in Britain: the quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design

Britain was the exemplar of electricity market reform, demonstrating the importance of ownership unbundling and workable competition in generation and supply. Privatisation created de facto duopolies that supported increasing price-cost margins and induced excessive (English) entry. Concentration was ended by trading horizontal for vertical integration in subsequent mergers. Competition arrived just as the Pool was replaced by New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) intended to address its claimed shortcomings. NETA cost over £700 million, and had ambiguous market impacts. Prices fell dramatically as a result of (pre-NETA) competition, generating companies withdrew plant, causing fears about security of supply and a subsequent widening of price-cost margins.electricity, liberalisation, market design, market power