A Spatially Extended Model for Residential Segregation

In this paper we analyze urban spatial segregation phenomenon in terms of the income distribution over a population, and inflationary parameter weighting the evolution of housing prices. For this, we develop a discrete, spatially extended model based in a multi--agent approach. In our model, the mobility of socioeconomic agents is driven only by the housing prices. Agents exchange location in order to fit their status to the cost of their housing. On the other hand, the price of a particular house changes depends on the status of its tenant, and on the neighborhood mean lodging cost, weighted by a control parameter. The agent's dynamics converges to a spatially organized configuration, whose regularity we measured by using an entropy--like indicator. With this simple model we found a nontrivial dependence of segregation on both, the initial inequality of the socioeconomic agents and the inflationary parameter. In this way we supply an explanatory model for the segregation--inequality thesis putted forward by Douglas Massey.Comment: 17 pages, 11 figures. email: [email protected], [email protected]

Stay by thy neighbor? Social organization determines the efficiency of biodiversity markets with spatial incentives

Market-based conservation instruments, such as payments, auctions or tradable permits, are environmental policies that create financial incentives for landowners to engage in voluntary conservation on their land. But what if ecological processes operate across property boundaries and land use decisions on one property influence ecosystem functions on neighboring sites? This paper examines how to account for such spatial externalities when designing market-based conservation instruments. We use an agent-based model to analyze different spatial metrics and their implications on land use decisions in a dynamic cost environment. The model contains a number of alternative submodels which differ in incentive design and social interactions of agents, the latter including coordinating as well as cooperating behavior of agents. We find that incentive design and social interactions have a strong influence on the spatial allocation and the costs of the conservation market.Comment: 11 pages, 6 figure