1,659 research outputs found
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some optimization goal. Nisan and Ronen [Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav. 35 166–196] consider the specific goal of makespan minimization, and show a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m. This large gap inspired many attempts that yielded positive results for several special cases, but very partial success for the general case: the lower bound was slightly increased to 2.61 by Christodoulou et al. [Christodoulou, G., E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovács. 2010. Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines. ACM Trans. Algorithms (TALG) 6(2) 1–18] and Koutsoupias and Vidali [Koutsoupias, E., A. Vidali. 2007. A lower bound of 1+phi for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Proc. 32nd Internat. Sympos. Math. Foundations Comput. Sci. (MFCS)], while the best upper bound remains unchanged. In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. Moreover, our proof yields similar optimal bounds for two other optimization goals: the sum of completion times and the lp norm of the schedule.United States-Israel Binational Science FoundationIsrael. Ministry of ScienceGoogle Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and Auction
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
Scheduling on related machines () is one of the most important
problems in the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Each machine is
controlled by a selfish agent and her valuation can be expressed via a single
parameter, her {\em speed}. In contrast to other similar problems, Archer and
Tardos \cite{AT01} showed that an algorithm that minimizes the makespan can be
truthfully implemented, although in exponential time. On the other hand, if we
leave out the game-theoretic issues, the complexity of the problem has been
completely settled -- the problem is strongly NP-hard, while there exists a
PTAS \cite{HS88,ES04}.
This problem is the most well studied in single-parameter algorithmic
mechanism design. It gives an excellent ground to explore the boundary between
truthfulness and efficient computation. Since the work of Archer and Tardos,
quite a lot of deterministic and randomized mechanisms have been suggested.
Recently, a breakthrough result \cite{DDDR08} showed that a randomized truthful
PTAS exists. On the other hand, for the deterministic case, the best known
approximation factor is 2.8 \cite{Kov05,Kov07}.
It has been a major open question whether there exists a deterministic
truthful PTAS, or whether truthfulness has an essential, negative impact on the
computational complexity of the problem. In this paper we give a definitive
answer to this important question by providing a truthful {\em deterministic}
PTAS
Welfare Maximization and Truthfulness in Mechanism Design with Ordinal Preferences
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the
preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to
specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when
agents can compare outcomes, but aren't able to evaluate precise utilities for
them. Such a situation arises in diverse contexts including voting and matching
markets.
Our paper addresses two issues that arise in ordinal mechanism design. To
design social welfare maximizing mechanisms, one needs to be able to
quantitatively measure the welfare of an outcome which is not clear in the
ordinal setting. Second, since the impossibility results of Gibbard and
Satterthwaite~\cite{Gibbard73,Satterthwaite75} force one to move to randomized
mechanisms, one needs a more nuanced notion of truthfulness.
We propose {\em rank approximation} as a metric for measuring the quality of
an outcome, which allows us to evaluate mechanisms based on worst-case
performance, and {\em lex-truthfulness} as a notion of truthfulness for
randomized ordinal mechanisms. Lex-truthfulness is stronger than notions
studied in the literature, and yet flexible enough to admit a rich class of
mechanisms {\em circumventing classical impossibility results}. We demonstrate
the usefulness of the above notions by devising lex-truthful mechanisms
achieving good rank-approximation factors, both in the general ordinal setting,
as well as structured settings such as {\em (one-sided) matching markets}, and
its generalizations, {\em matroid} and {\em scheduling} markets.Comment: Some typos correcte
Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency
In a generalized network design (GND) problem, a set of resources are
assigned to multiple communication requests. Each request contributes its
weight to the resources it uses and the total load on a resource is then
translated to the cost it incurs via a resource specific cost function. For
example, a request may be to establish a virtual circuit, thus contributing to
the load on each edge in the circuit. Motivated by energy efficiency
applications, recently, there is a growing interest in GND using cost functions
that exhibit (dis)economies of scale ((D)oS), namely, cost functions that
appear subadditive for small loads and superadditive for larger loads.
The current paper advances the existing literature on approximation
algorithms for GND problems with (D)oS cost functions in various aspects: (1)
we present a generic approximation framework that yields approximation results
for a much wider family of requests in both directed and undirected graphs; (2)
our framework allows for unrelated weights, thus providing the first
non-trivial approximation for the problem of scheduling unrelated parallel
machines with (D)oS cost functions; (3) our framework is fully combinatorial
and runs in strongly polynomial time; (4) the family of (D)oS cost functions
considered in the current paper is more general than the one considered in the
existing literature, providing a more accurate abstraction for practical energy
conservation scenarios; and (5) we obtain the first approximation ratio for GND
with (D)oS cost functions that depends only on the parameters of the resources'
technology and does not grow with the number of resources, the number of
requests, or their weights. The design of our framework relies heavily on
Roughgarden's smoothness toolbox (JACM 2015), thus demonstrating the possible
usefulness of this toolbox in the area of approximation algorithms.Comment: 39 pages, 1 figure. An extended abstract of this paper is to appear
in the 50th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC 2018
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