Automated Algorithmic Machine-to-Machine Negotiation for Lane Changes Performed by Driverless Vehicles at the Edge of the Internet of Things

This dissertation creates and examines algorithmic models for automated machine-to-machine negotiation in localized multi-agent systems at the edge of the Internet of Things. It provides an implementation of two such models for unsupervised resource allocation for the application domain of autonomous vehicle traffic as it pertains to lane changing and speed setting selection. The first part concerns negotiation via abstract argumentation. A general model for the arbitration of conflict based on abstract argumentation is outlined and then applied to a scenario where autonomous vehicles on a multi-lane highway use expert systems in consultation with private objectives to form arguments and use them to compete for lane positions. The conflict resolution component of the resulting argumentation framework is augmented with social voting to achieve a community supported conflict-free outcome. The presented model heralds a step toward independent negotiation through automated argumentation in distributed multi-agent systems. Many other cyber-physical environments embody stages for opposing positions that may benefit from this type of tool for collaboration. The second part deals with game-theoretic negotiation through mechanism design. It outlines a mechanism providing resource allocation for a fee and applies it to autonomous vehicle traffic. Vehicular agents apply for speed and lane assignments with sealed bids containing their private feasible action valuations determined within the context of their governing objective. A truth-inducing mechanism implementing an incentive-compatible strategyproof social choice functions achieves a socially optimal outcome. The model can be adapted to many application fields through the definition of a domain-appropriate operation to be used by the allocation function of the mechanism. Both presented prototypes conduct operations at the edge of the Internet of Things. They can be applied to agent networks in just about any domain where the sharing of resources is required. The social voting argumentation approach is a minimal but powerful tool facilitating the democratic process when a community makes decisions on the sharing or rationing of common-pool assets. The mechanism design model can create social welfare maximizing allocations for multiple or multidimensional resources

Scientific Argumentation as a Foundation for the Design of Inquiry-Based Science Instruction

Despite the attention that inquiry has received in science education research and policy, a coherent means for implementing inquiry in the classroom has been missing [1]. In recent research, scientific argumentation has received increasing attention for its role in science and in science education [2]. In this article, we propose that organizing a unit of instruction around building a scientific argument can bring inquiry practices together in the classroom in a coherent way. We outline a framework for argumentation, focusing on arguments that are central to science—arguments for the best explanation. We then use this framework as the basis for a set of design principles for developing a sequence of inquiry-based learning activities that support students in the construction of a scientific argument. We show that careful analysis of the argument that students are expected to build provides designers with a foundation for selecting resources and designing supports for scientific inquiry. Furthermore, we show that creating multiple opportunities for students to critique and refine their explanations through evidence-based argumentation fosters opportunities for critical thinking, while building science knowledge and knowledge of the nature of science

Arguing Using Opponent Models

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Justifying Inference to the Best Explanation as a Practical Meta-Syllogism on Dialectical Structures

This article discusses how inference to the best explanation (IBE) can be justified as a practical meta-argument. It is, firstly, justified as a *practical* argument insofar as accepting the best explanation as true can be shown to further a specific aim. And because this aim is a discursive one which proponents can rationally pursue in--and relative to--a complex controversy, namely maximising the robustness of one's position, IBE can be conceived, secondly, as a *meta*-argument. My analysis thus bears a certain analogy to Sellars' well-known justification of inductive reasoning (Sellars 1969); it is based on recently developed theories of complex argumentation (Betz 2010, 2011)

Applying Abstract Argumentation Theory to Cooperative Game Theory

We apply ideas from abstract argumentation theory to study cooperative game theory. Building on Dung's results in his seminal paper, we further the correspondence between Dung's four argumentation semantics and solution concepts in cooperative game theory by showing that complete extensions (the grounded extension) correspond to Roth's subsolutions (respectively, the supercore). We then investigate the relationship between well-founded argumentation frameworks and convex games, where in each case the semantics (respectively, solution concepts) coincide; we prove that three-player convex games do not in general have well-founded argumentation frameworks.Comment: 15 pages, 1 tabl