6,003 research outputs found
Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend
Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) from one dimension to
higher dimensions. In this model, Pareto efficiency is incompatible with
individual rationality and strategy-proofness (Konishi et al., 2001).
Therefore, we consider two weaker efficiency properties: coordinatewise
efficiency and pairwise efficiency. We show that these two properties both (i)
are compatible with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, and (ii)
help us to identify two specific mechanisms. To be more precise, on various
domains of preference profiles, together with other well-studied properties
(individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness), coordinatewise
efficiency and pairwise efficiency respectively characterize two extensions of
the top-trading-cycles mechanism (TTC): the coordinatewise top-trading-cycles
mechanism (cTTC) and the bundle top-trading-cycles mechanism (bTTC). Moreover,
we propose several variations of our efficiency properties, and we find that
each of them is either satisfied by cTTC or bTTC, or leads to an impossibility
result (together with individual rationality and strategy-proofness).
Therefore, our characterizations can be primarily interpreted as a
compatibility test: any reasonable efficiency property that is not satisfied by
cTTC or bTTC could be considered incompatible with individual rationality and
strategy-proofness. For multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences,
our characterization of bTTC constitutes the first characterization of an
extension of the prominent TTC mechanis
Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs
Multi-type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences
We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random
priority (MRP) as extensions of the well known PS and RP mechanisms to the
multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) with partial preferences. In our
setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who
have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each
type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no
mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding
this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents'
preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency,
sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies
ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategy-proofness, and upper invariance, recovering the
properties of PS and RP
Dynamic refugee matching
Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and easy-to-implement alternative. Our mechanism can be adopted in any dynamic refugee matching problem given locality-specific quotas and that asylum seekers map into specific categories. Any matching selected by the proposed mechanism is Pareto efficient, and envy between localities is bounded by a single asylum seeker. Our simulations show that the proposed mechanism outperforms uninformed mechanisms even in presence of severe misclassification error in the estimation of asylum seeker categories
The Mobility Case for Regionalism
In the discourse of local government law, the idea that a mobile populace can “vote with its feet” has long served as a justification for devolution and decentralization. Tracing to Charles Tiebout’s seminal work in public finance, the legal-structural prescription that follows is that a diversity of independent and empowered local governments can best satisfy the varied preferences of residents metaphorically shopping for bundles of public services, regulatory environment, and tax burden. This localist paradigm generally presumes that fragmented governments are competing for residents within a given metropolitan area. Contemporary patterns of mobility, however, call into question this foundational assumption. People today move between — and not just within — metropolitan regions, domestically and even internationally. This is particularly so for a subset of residents — high human-capital knowledge workers and the so-called “creative class” — that is prominently coveted in this interregional competition. These modern mobile residents tend to evaluate the policy bundles that drive their locational decisions on a regional scale, weighing the comparative merits of metropolitan areas against each other. And local governments are increasingly recognizing that they need to work together at a regional scale to compete for these residents.This Article argues that this intermetropolitan mobility provides a novel justification for regionalism that counterbalances the strong localist tendency of the traditional Tieboutian view of local governance. Contrary to the predominant assumption in the legal literature, competition for mobile residents is as much an argument for regionalism as it has been for devolution and decentralization. In an era of global cities vying for talent, the mobility case for regionalism has significant doctrinal consequences for debates in local government law and public finance, including the scope of local authority, the nature of regional equity, and the structure of metropolitan collaboration
The Mobility Case for Regionalism
In the discourse of local government law, the idea that a mobile populace can “vote with its feet” has long served as a justification for devolution and decentralization. Tracing to Charles Tiebout’s seminal work in public finance, the legal-structural prescription that follows is that a diversity of independent and empowered local governments can best satisfy the varied preferences of residents metaphorically shopping for bundles of public services, regulatory environment, and tax burden. This localist paradigm generally presumes that fragmented governments are competing for residents within a given metropolitan area. Contemporary patterns of mobility, however, call into question this foundational assumption. People today move between — and not just within — metropolitan regions, domestically and even internationally. This is particularly so for a subset of residents — high human-capital knowledge workers and the so-called “creative class” — that is prominently coveted in this interregional competition. These modern mobile residents tend to evaluate the policy bundles that drive their locational decisions on a regional scale, weighing the comparative merits of metropolitan areas against each other. And local governments are increasingly recognizing that they need to work together at a regional scale to compete for these residents.This Article argues that this intermetropolitan mobility provides a novel justification for regionalism that counterbalances the strong localist tendency of the traditional Tieboutian view of local governance. Contrary to the predominant assumption in the legal literature, competition for mobile residents is as much an argument for regionalism as it has been for devolution and decentralization. In an era of global cities vying for talent, the mobility case for regionalism has significant doctrinal consequences for debates in local government law and public finance, including the scope of local authority, the nature of regional equity, and the structure of metropolitan collaboration
Resources, Capabilities, and Routines in Public Organization
States, state agencies, multilateral agencies, and other non-market actors are relatively under-studied in the strategic entrepreneurship literature. While important contributions examining public decision makers have been made within the agency-theoretic and transaction-cost traditions, there is little research that builds on resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and behavioral approaches to organizations. Yet public organizations can be usefully characterized as stocks of physical, organizational, and human resources; they interact with other organizations in pursuing a type of competitive advantage; they can possess excess capacity, and may grow and diversify in part according to Penrosean (dynamic) capabilities and behavioral logic. Public organizations may be managed as stewards of resources, capabilities, and routines. This paper shows how resource-based, (dynamic) capabilities, and behavioral approaches shed light on the nature and governance of public organizations and suggests a research agenda for public entrepreneurship that reflects insights gained from applying strategic management theory to public organization.
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