Bank lending networks, experience, reputation, and borrowing costs.

We investigate the network structure of syndicated lending markets and evaluate the impact of lenders’ network centrality, considered as measures of their experience and reputation, on borrowing costs. We show that the market for syndicated loans is a “small world” characterized by large local density and short social distances between lenders. Such a network structure allows for better information and resources flows between banks thus enhancing their social capital. We then show that lenders’ experience and reputation play a significant role in reducing loan spreads and thus increasing borrower’s wealth.agency costs, bank syndicate, experience, loan syndication, reputation, small world, social network analysis.

Dynamic Learning, Herding and Guru Effects in Networks

It has been widely accepted that herding is the consequence of mimetic responses by agents interacting locally on a communication network. In extant models, this communication network linking agents, by and large, has been assumed to be fixed. In this paper we allow it to evolve endogenously by enabling agents to adaptively modify the weights of their links to their neighbours by reinforcing �good� advisors and breaking away from �bad� advisors with the latter being replaced randomly from the remaining agents. The resulting network not only allows for herding of agents, but crucially exhibits realistic properties of socio-economic networks that are otherwise difficult to replicate: high clustering, short average path length and a small number of highly connected agents, called "gurus". These properties are now well understood to characterize �small world networks� of Watts and Strogatz (1998).

Word-of-mouth interaction and the organization of behaviour

We present a discrete choice model based on agent interaction. The framework combines the features of two well-known models of word-of-mouthcommunication (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995 and Bala and Goyal, 2001).Interaction structure is a regular periodic lattice with decision-makers interacting only with immediate neighbours. We investigate the long-runequilibrium) behaviour of the resulting system and show that for a largerange of initial conditions clustering in economic behaviour emerges andpersists inde?nitely. The setup allows for the analysis of multi-option environments. For these environments we derive the distribution of optionpopularity in equilibrium.word-of-mouth, inertia, clustering, choice.

Knowledge flows and the geography of networks. A strategic model of small worlds formation.

This paper aims to demonstrate that the strategic approach of network formation can generate networks that share the main structural properties of most real social networks. We introduce a spatialized variation of the Connections model (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996) in which agents balance the benefits of forming links resulting from imperfect knowledge flows through bonds against their costs which increase with geographic distance. We show that, for intermediary levels of knowledge transferability, our time-inhomogeneous process selects networks which exhibit high clustering, short average distances and, when the costs of link formation are normally distributed across agents, skewed degree distributions.Strategic network formation ; Time-inhomogeneous process ; Knowledge flows ; Small worlds ; Monte Carlo simulations.

A strategic model of complex networks formation.

This paper introduces a spatialized variation of the Connections model of Jackson and Wolinski (1996). Agents benefit from their direct and indirect connections in a communication network. They are arranged on a circle and bear costs for maintaining direct connections which are linearly increasing with geographic distance. In a dynamic setting, this model is shown to generate networks that exhibit the small world properties shared by many real social and economic networks.Strategic Network Formation, Pairwise Stability, Small World, Monte Carlo.

Bank lending networks, experience, reputation, and borrowing costs

We investigate the network structure of syndicated lending markets and evaluate the impact of lenders’ network centrality, considered as measures of their experience and reputation, on borrowing costs. We show that the market for syndicated loans is a “small world” characterized by large local density and short social distances between lenders. Such a network structure allows for better information and resources flows between banks thus enhancing their social capital. We then show that lenders’ experience and reputation play a significant role in reducing loan spreads and thus increasing borrower’s wealth.Agency costs, bank syndicate, experience, loan syndication, reputation, small world, social network analysis.