61 research outputs found

    Quantifying Privacy Loss of Human Mobility Graph Topology

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    Human mobility is often represented as a mobility network, or graph, with nodes representing places of significance which an individual visits, such as their home, work, places of social amenity, etc., and edge weights corresponding to probability estimates of movements between these places. Previous research has shown that individuals can be identified by a small number of geolocated nodes in their mobility network, rendering mobility trace anonymization a hard task. In this paper we build on prior work and demonstrate that even when all location and timestamp information is removed from nodes, the graph topology of an individual mobility network itself is often uniquely identifying. Further, we observe that a mobility network is often unique, even when only a small number of the most popular nodes and edges are considered. We evaluate our approach using a large dataset of cell-tower location traces from 1 500 smartphone handsets with a mean duration of 430 days. We process the data to derive the top−N places visited by the device in the trace, and find that 93% of traces have a unique top−10 mobility network, and all traces are unique when considering top−15 mobility networks. Since mobility patterns, and therefore mobility networks for an individual, vary over time, we use graph kernel distance functions, to determine whether two mobility networks, taken at different points in time, represent the same individual. We then show that our distance metrics, while imperfect predictors, perform significantly better than a random strategy and therefore our approach represents a significant loss in privacy

    Protecting privacy of semantic trajectory

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    The growing ubiquity of GPS-enabled devices in everyday life has made large-scale collection of trajectories feasible, providing ever-growing opportunities for human movement analysis. However, publishing this vulnerable data is accompanied by increasing concerns about individuals’ geoprivacy. This thesis has two objectives: (1) propose a privacy protection framework for semantic trajectories and (2) develop a Python toolbox in ArcGIS Pro environment for non-expert users to enable them to anonymize trajectory data. The former aims to prevent users’ re-identification when knowing the important locations or any random spatiotemporal points of users by swapping their important locations to new locations with the same semantics and unlinking the users from their trajectories. This is accomplished by converting GPS points into sequences of visited meaningful locations and moves and integrating several anonymization techniques. The second component of this thesis implements privacy protection in a way that even users without deep knowledge of anonymization and coding skills can anonymize their data by offering an all-in-one toolbox. By proposing and implementing this framework and toolbox, we hope that trajectory privacy is better protected in research

    Anonymization of Event Logs for Network Security Monitoring

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    A managed security service provider (MSSP) must collect security event logs from their customers’ network for monitoring and cybersecurity protection. These logs need to be processed by the MSSP before displaying it to the security operation center (SOC) analysts. The employees generate event logs during their working hours at the customers’ site. One challenge is that collected event logs consist of personally identifiable information (PII) data; visible in clear text to the SOC analysts or any user with access to the SIEM platform. We explore how pseudonymization can be applied to security event logs to help protect individuals’ identities from the SOC analysts while preserving data utility when possible. We compare the impact of using different pseudonymization functions on sensitive information or PII. Non-deterministic methods provide higher level of privacy but reduced utility of the data. Our contribution in this thesis is threefold. First, we study available architectures with different threat models, including their strengths and weaknesses. Second, we study pseudonymization functions and their application to PII fields; we benchmark them individually, as well as in our experimental platform. Last, we obtain valuable feedbacks and lessons from SOC analysts based on their experience. Existing works[43, 44, 48, 39] are generally restricting to the anonymization of the IP traces, which is only one part of the SOC analysts’ investigation of PCAP files inspection. In one of the closest work[47], the authors provide useful, practical anonymization methods for the IP addresses, ports, and raw logs

    Statistical properties and privacy guarantees of an original distance-based fully synthetic data generation method

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    Introduction: The amount of data generated by original research is growing exponentially. Publicly releasing them is recommended to comply with the Open Science principles. However, data collected from human participants cannot be released as-is without raising privacy concerns. Fully synthetic data represent a promising answer to this challenge. This approach is explored by the French Centre de Recherche en {\'E}pid{\'e}miologie et Sant{\'e} des Populations in the form of a synthetic data generation framework based on Classification and Regression Trees and an original distance-based filtering. The goal of this work was to develop a refined version of this framework and to assess its risk-utility profile with empirical and formal tools, including novel ones developed for the purpose of this evaluation.Materials and Methods: Our synthesis framework consists of four successive steps, each of which is designed to prevent specific risks of disclosure. We assessed its performance by applying two or more of these steps to a rich epidemiological dataset. Privacy and utility metrics were computed for each of the resulting synthetic datasets, which were further assessed using machine learning approaches.Results: Computed metrics showed a satisfactory level of protection against attribute disclosure attacks for each synthetic dataset, especially when the full framework was used. Membership disclosure attacks were formally prevented without significantly altering the data. Machine learning approaches showed a low risk of success for simulated singling out and linkability attacks. Distributional and inferential similarity with the original data were high with all datasets.Discussion: This work showed the technical feasibility of generating publicly releasable synthetic data using a multi-step framework. Formal and empirical tools specifically developed for this demonstration are a valuable contribution to this field. Further research should focus on the extension and validation of these tools, in an effort to specify the intrinsic qualities of alternative data synthesis methods.Conclusion: By successfully assessing the quality of data produced using a novel multi-step synthetic data generation framework, we showed the technical and conceptual soundness of the Open-CESP initiative, which seems ripe for full-scale implementation

    When the signal is in the noise: Exploiting Diffix's Sticky Noise

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    Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...
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