What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil

This paper analyzes the effect of the gender of local policymakers on policy outcomes. Analyzing a rich dataset from Brazilian municipalities and using a regression discontinuity design, we find that municipalities ruled by female mayors have better health outcomes, receive more federal discretionary transfers, and have lower corruption. Additionally, male mayors hire more temporary public employees than their female counterparts when they are allowed to run for re-election, and when municipal elections are approaching. These findings suggest that male mayors may promote more political patronage than female mayors and that men and women may respond differently to local election incentives

Runoff vs. plurality:the effects of the electoral system on local and central government behaviour

Plurality and runoff systems oer very different incentives to parties and coalition of voters, and demand different political strategies from potential candidates and chief executives. Italian mayors and city councils are elected with a different electoral system according to the locality's population, while municipalities are otherwise treated identically in terms of funding and powers. We exploit this institutional feature to test how the presence of different electoral systems affects the central government decisions on grants, and the local government decisions on local taxes. We find evidence that the upper-tier governments favour runoff-elected mayors, and that runoff-elected mayors levy lower taxes. This is broadly consistent with the literature on runoff and plurality rule electoral systems

Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of Political Misalignment. LEQS Paper No. 139/2018 December 2018

We document a strong political cycle in bank credit and industry outcomes in Turkey. In line with theories of tactical redistribution, state-owned banks systematically adjust their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province based on electoral competition and political alignment of incumbent mayors. This effect only exists in corporate lending as opposed to consumer loans. It creates credit constraints for firms in opposition areas, which suffer drops in employment and sales but not firm entry. There is substantial misallocation of financial resources as provinces and industries with high initial efficiency suffer the greatest constraints

Your Schools,Your Voice: The Impact of Mayoral Control on Community Participation in Schools

Teachers Unite, a membership organization of public school teachers working for social justice, developed this report -- with the research support of the Community Development Project at the Urban Justice Center -- in order to explore the impact of mayoral control on democratic participation in schools. Surveys and focus groups with teachers, Your schools, Your voice parents, and students, combined with a review of relevant laws, policies, and structures, revealed that teachers want decision-making power and the ability to provide feedback regarding the mayor's major decisions; however, the current participation mechanisms prevent this from happening effectively. At a time when teachers are criticized for being self-interested, many teachers stand with parents and students in the desire to create a school system where democratic participation is valued and the voice of the entire community is heard. When teachers are included in decision-making about schools, their work in the classroom will improve, thus leading to a better learning environment for their students. This report shows how the subsequent loss of power and accountability and lack of participation impact the New York City school system. By looking at the current school governance bodies, the programs initiated under mayoral control, and the views of teachers, parents, and students, this report documents how mayoral control devalues those directly impacted by the school system and proposes recommendations that can positively create the change the system needs

Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance

This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.decentralization, electoral incentives, conditional cash transfer, impact evaluation

The Dynamic Effects of Information on Political Corruption: Theory and Evidence from Puerto Rico

Does the disclosure of information about corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? We use publicly released routine audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico to answer this question. We first develop a political agency model where voters re-elect incumbents based on their performance while in office. We show that, because voters cannot directly observe incumbents’ actions, an incumbent whose reputation improved in the previous term is likely to engage in more rent-seeking activities in a future term. Guided by this model, we use longitudinal data on audit results to examine the long-term consequences of providing information to voters on levels of political corruption. We find that municipal corruption levels in subsequent audits are on average the same in municipalities audited preceding the previous election and those not audited then. In spite of this, mayors in municipalities audited preceding the previous election have higher re-election rates, suggesting that audits enable voters to select more competent politicians. We conclude that short-term information dissemination policies do not necessarily align politicians’ long-term actions with voter preferences as politicians exploit their reputational gains by extracting more rents from office.corruption; information; political agency; dynamic incentives

Menino Survey of Mayors 2018 Results

Report on research findings.The 2018 Menino Survey of Mayors represents the fifth scientifically rigorous and nationally representative survey of American mayors released by the Boston University Initiatives on Cities and supported by Citi Community Development and The Rockefeller Foundation. The Survey, based on interviews with 110 sitting mayors conducted in 2018, reveals mayoral views on economic development—including corporate recruitment, financial incentives, the sharing economy, and social mobility—as well as public health, housing, and intergovernmental relations.Citi Community Development and The Rockefeller Foundatio

Does Gender Matter for Political Leadership? The Case of U.S. Mayors

What are the consequences of electing a female leader for policy and political outcomes? We answer this question in the context of U.S. cities, where women’s participation in mayoral elections increased from negligible numbers in 1970 to about one-third of the elections in the 2000’s. We use a novel data set of U.S. mayoral elections from 1950 to 2005, and apply a regression discontinuity design to deal with the endogeneity of female candidacy to city characteristics. In contrast to most research on the influence of female leadership, we find no effect of gender of the mayor on policy outcomes related to the size of local government, the composition of municipal spending and employment, or crime rates. While female mayors do not implement different policies, they do appear to have higher unobserved political skills, as they have a 6-7 percentage point higher incumbent effect than a comparable male. But we find no evidence of political spillovers: exogenously electing a female mayor does not change the long run political success of other female mayoral candidates in the same city or of female candidates in local congressional elections.

Does Opportunism Pay Off?

This article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial accounts by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large and detailed dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, which covers the municipal elections that took place from 1979 to 2001, we clearly show that increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. Our results also indicate that the political payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country.Voting functions, opportunism, local governments, elections, Portugal.