Rational coordination of crowdsourced resources for geo-temporal request satisfaction

Existing mobile devices roaming around the mobility field should be considered as useful resources in geo-temporal request satisfaction. We refer to the capability of an application to access a physical device at particular geographical locations and times as GeoPresence, and we pre- sume that mobile agents participating in GeoPresence-capable applica- tions should be rational, competitive, and willing to deviate from their routes if given the right incentive. In this paper, we define the Hitch- hiking problem, which is that of finding the optimal assignment of re- quests with specific spatio-temporal characteristics to competitive mobile agents subject to spatio-temporal constraints. We design a mechanism that takes into consideration the rationality of the agents for request sat- isfaction, with an objective to maximize the total profit of the system. We analytically prove the mechanism to be convergent with a profit com- parable to that of a 1/2-approximation greedy algorithm, and evaluate its consideration of rationality experimentally.Supported in part by NSF Grants; #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

The Control of Porting in Two-Sided Markets

A sizable literature has grown up in recent years focusing on two-sided markets in which economies of scale combined with complementarities between a platform and its associated ‘software’ or ‘services’ can generate indirect network effects (that is positive feedback between the number of consumers using that platform and the utility of an individual consumer). In this paper we introduce a model of ‘porting’ in such markets where porting denotes the conversion of ‘software’ or ‘services’ developed for one platform to run on another. Focusing on the case where a dominant platform exists we investigate the impact on equilibrium and the consequences for welfare of the ability to control porting. Specifically, we show that the welfare costs associated with the ‘control of porting’ may be more significant than those arising from pricing alone. This model and its associated results are of particular relevance because of the light they shed on debates about the motivations and effects of actions by a dominant platform owner. Recent examples of such debates include those about Microsoft’s behaviour both in relation to its operating system and its media player, Apple’s behaviour in relation to its DRM and iTunes platform, and Ebay’s use of the cyber-trespass doctrine to prevent access to its site

Strategic maritime container transport design in oligopolistic markets

AbstractThis paper considers the maritime container assignment problem in a market setting with two competing firms. Given a series of known, exogenous demands for service between pairs of ports, each company is free to design a liner service network serving a subset of the ports and demand, subject to the size of their fleets and the potential for profit. The model is designed as a three-stage complete information game: in the first stage, the firms simultaneously invest in their fleet; in the second stage, they individually design their networks and solve the route assignment problem with respect to the transport demand they expect to serve, given the fleet determined in the first stage; in the final stage, the firms compete in terms of freight rates on each origin-destination movement. The game is solved by backward induction. Numerical solutions are provided to characterize the equilibria of the game