A demand-driven approach for a multi-agent system in Supply Chain Management

This paper presents the architecture of a multi-agent decision support system for Supply Chain Management (SCM) which has been designed to compete in the TAC SCM game. The behaviour of the system is demand-driven and the agents plan, predict, and react dynamically to changes in the market. The main strength of the system lies in the ability of the Demand agent to predict customer winning bid prices - the highest prices the agent can offer customers and still obtain their orders. This paper investigates the effect of the ability to predict customer order prices on the overall performance of the system. Four strategies are proposed and compared for predicting such prices. The experimental results reveal which strategies are better and show that there is a correlation between the accuracy of the models' predictions and the overall system performance: the more accurate the prediction of customer order prices, the higher the profit. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents’ behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are

Virus Propagation in Multiple Profile Networks

Suppose we have a virus or one competing idea/product that propagates over a multiple profile (e.g., social) network. Can we predict what proportion of the network will actually get "infected" (e.g., spread the idea or buy the competing product), when the nodes of the network appear to have different sensitivity based on their profile? For example, if there are two profiles $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ in a network and the nodes of profile $\mathcal{A}$ and profile $\mathcal{B}$ are susceptible to a highly spreading virus with probabilities $\beta_{\mathcal{A}}$ and $\beta_{\mathcal{B}}$ respectively, what percentage of both profiles will actually get infected from the virus at the end? To reverse the question, what are the necessary conditions so that a predefined percentage of the network is infected? We assume that nodes of different profiles can infect one another and we prove that under realistic conditions, apart from the weak profile (great sensitivity), the stronger profile (low sensitivity) will get infected as well. First, we focus on cliques with the goal to provide exact theoretical results as well as to get some intuition as to how a virus affects such a multiple profile network. Then, we move to the theoretical analysis of arbitrary networks. We provide bounds on certain properties of the network based on the probabilities of infection of each node in it when it reaches the steady state. Finally, we provide extensive experimental results that verify our theoretical results and at the same time provide more insight on the problem

Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents’ behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are.Transparency; public information; private information; coordination; strategic complementarity

Fairness-aware Competitive Bidding Influence Maximization in Social Networks

Competitive Influence Maximization (CIM) has been studied for years due to its wide application in many domains. Most current studies primarily focus on the micro-level optimization by designing policies for one competitor to defeat its opponents. Furthermore, current studies ignore the fact that many influential nodes have their own starting prices, which may lead to inefficient budget allocation. In this paper, we propose a novel Competitive Bidding Influence Maximization (CBIM) problem, where the competitors allocate budgets to bid for the seeds attributed to the platform during multiple bidding rounds. To solve the CBIM problem, we propose a Fairness-aware Multi-agent Competitive Bidding Influence Maximization (FMCBIM) framework. In this framework, we present a Multi-agent Bidding Particle Environment (MBE) to model the competitors' interactions, and design a starting price adjustment mechanism to model the dynamic bidding environment. Moreover, we put forward a novel Multi-agent Competitive Bidding Influence Maximization (MCBIM) algorithm to optimize competitors' bidding policies. Extensive experiments on five datasets show that our work has good efficiency and effectiveness.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems (TCSS), 2023, early acces