98,403 research outputs found

    Multi-Agent Task Allocation in Complementary Teams: A Hunter and Gatherer Approach

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    Consider a dynamic task allocation problem, where tasks are unknowingly distributed over an environment. This paper considers each task comprised of two sequential subtasks: detection and completion, where each subtask can only be carried out by a certain type of agent. We address this problem using a novel nature-inspired approach called "hunter and gatherer". The proposed method employs two complementary teams of agents: one agile in detecting (hunters) and another skillful in completing (gatherers) the tasks. To minimize the collective cost of task accomplishments in a distributed manner, a game-theoretic solution is introduced to couple agents from complementary teams. We utilize market-based negotiation models to develop incentive-based decision-making algorithms relying on innovative notions of "certainty and uncertainty profit margins". The simulation results demonstrate that employing two complementary teams of hunters and gatherers can effectually improve the number of tasks completed by agents compared to conventional methods, while the collective cost of accomplishments is minimized. In addition, the stability and efficacy of the proposed solutions are studied using Nash equilibrium analysis and statistical analysis respectively. It is also numerically shown that the proposed solutions function fairly, i.e. for each type of agent, the overall workload is distributed equally.Comment: 15 pages, 12 figure

    Agent-Based Distributed Resource Allocation in Continuous Dynamic Systems

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    Intelligent agents and multiagent systems reveal new strategies to design highly flexible automation systems. There are first promising industrial applications of multiagent systems for the control of manufacturing, logistics, traffic or multi-robot systems. One reason for the success of most of these applications is their nature as some form of a distributed resource allocation problem which can be addressed very well by multiagent systems. Resource allocation problems solved by agents can be further categorized into static or dynamic problems. In static problems, the allocations do not depend on time and many resource allocation problem of practical interest can be solved using these static considerations, even in discrete-event systems like manufacturing or logistic systems. However, problems especially in highly dynamic environments cannot be addressed by this pure static approach since the allocations, i.e. the decision variables, depend on time and previous states of the considered system. These problems are hardly considered in the relevant agent literature and if, most often only discrete-event systems are considered. This work focuses on agent-based distributed dynamic resource allocation problems especially in continuous production systems or other continuous systems. Based on the current states of the distributed dynamic system, continuous-time allocation trajectories must be computed in real-time. Designing multiagent systems for distributed resource allocation mainly comprises the design of the local capabilities of the single agents and the interaction mechanisms that makes them find the best or at least a feasible allocation without any central control. In this work, the agents are designed as two-level entities: while the low-level functions are responsible for the real-time allocation of the resources in the form of closed-loop feedback control, the high-level functionalities realize the deliberative capabilities such as long-term planning and negotiation of the resource allocations. Herein, the resource allocation problem is considered as a distributed optimization problem under certain constraints. The agents play the role of local optimizers which then have to coordinate their local solutions to an overall consistent solution. It is shown in this contribution that the described approach can be interpreted as a market-based allocation scheme based on balancing of supply and demand of the resources using a virtual price. However, the agents calculate and negotiate complete supply and demand trajectories using model-based predictions which also leads to the calculation of a price trajectory. This novel approach does not only consider the dynamic behaviour of the distributed system but also combines control tasks and resource allocation in a very consistent way. The approach is demonstrated using two practical applications: a heating system and an industrial sugar extraction process

    Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

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    We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.National Science Foundation (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, and CNS-0520166); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and COLCIENCIAS–Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la Tecnología “Francisco Jose ́ de Caldas”

    Decentralized dynamic task allocation for UAVs with limited communication range

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    We present the Limited-range Online Routing Problem (LORP), which involves a team of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with limited communication range that must autonomously coordinate to service task requests. We first show a general approach to cast this dynamic problem as a sequence of decentralized task allocation problems. Then we present two solutions both based on modeling the allocation task as a Markov Random Field to subsequently assess decisions by means of the decentralized Max-Sum algorithm. Our first solution assumes independence between requests, whereas our second solution also considers the UAVs' workloads. A thorough empirical evaluation shows that our workload-based solution consistently outperforms current state-of-the-art methods in a wide range of scenarios, lowering the average service time up to 16%. In the best-case scenario there is no gap between our decentralized solution and centralized techniques. In the worst-case scenario we manage to reduce by 25% the gap between current decentralized and centralized techniques. Thus, our solution becomes the method of choice for our problem

    Market-Based Task Allocation Mechanisms for Limited Capacity Suppliers

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    This paper reports on the design and comparison of two economically-inspired mechanisms for task allocation in environments where sellers have finite production capacities and a cost structure composed of a fixed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost. Such mechanisms are required when a system consists of multiple self-interested stakeholders that each possess private information that is relevant to solving a system-wide problem. Against this background, we first develop a computationally tractable centralised mechanism that finds the set of producers that have the lowest total cost in providing a certain demand (i.e. it is efficient). We achieve this by extending the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to allow for multi-attribute bids and by introducing a novel penalty scheme such that producers are incentivised to truthfully report their capacities and their costs. Furthermore our extended mechanism is able to handle sellers' uncertainty about their production capacity and ensures that individual agents find it profitable to participate in the mechanism. However, since this first mechanism is centralised, we also develop a complementary decentralised mechanism based around the continuous double auction. Again because of the characteristics of our domain, we need to extend the standard form of this protocol by introducing a novel clearing rule based around an order book. With this modified protocol, we empirically demonstrate (with simple trading strategies) that the mechanism achieves high efficiency. In particular, despite this simplicity, the traders can still derive a profit from the market which makes our mechanism attractive since these results are a likely lower bound on their expected returns
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