8,007 research outputs found

    SHOULD THE PUBLIC SECTOR CONDUCT GENOMICS R&D?

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    The nature of the observed market structure and R&D competition in genomics research is used as the basis for a comparative analysis of research under a mixed oligopoly, pure oligopoly and monopoly when the timing of the innovation outcome is uncertain (as in an R&D race), the winner-take-all assumption is relaxed and the profits in later stages are a function of the R&D expenditures of prior stages. The sufficient conditions under which a mixed oligopoly performs more R&D than the pure oligopoly and monopoly markets are derived and are shown to be a function of a) that public firm's objective is strictly greater than in the winning state then in the losing state, b) profits for the winning and losing private firms in the private duopoly are equal, post innovation, and c) the objective function of the firms in the mixed duopoly are increasing in research faster than they are for firms in the other two cases. It is suggested that when these conditions are met, the public firm can play a role in increasing the level of research in genomics.Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

    Persistence of Monopoly, Innovation, and R-and-D Spillovers: Static versus Dynamic Analysis

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    We build a dynamic duopoly model that accounts for the empirical observation of monopoly persistence in the long run. More specifically, we analyze the conditions under which it is optimal for the market leader in an initially duopoly setup to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment, ("strategic predation" strategy) that eventually leads to exit of the follower firm. The follower is assumed to benefit from the innovative activities of the leader through R&D spillovers. The novel feature of our approach is that we introduce explicit dynamic model and contrast it with its static counterpart. Contrary to the predictions of the static model, strategic predation that leads to persistence of monopoly is in general optimal strategy to pursue in a dynamic framework when spillovers are not largedynamic duopoly, R&D spillovers, persistence of monopoly, strategic predation, accommodation

    Preemptive Search and R&D Clustering Revisited

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    The results obtained by Cardon and Sasaki (1998) on R&D clustering are derived under the specific assumption that firms only can own one patent. When multiple patents are allowed, R&D clustering will come about more frequently if search costs are substantial.R&D clustering; persistence of monopoly

    A duopoly preemption game with two alternative stochastic investment choices

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    This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There are two alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets a monopoly benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to invest gets information based on what happens with the first investor, as well as cost reduction benefits. We describe the payoff functions for both the leader and follower firm. Then, we present a stochastic control game where the firms can choose when to invest, and hence influence whether they become the leader or the follower. In order to solve this problem, we combine techniques from optimal stopping and game theory. For a specific choice of parametres, we show that no pure symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. However, an asymmetric equilibrium is characterized. In this equilibrium, two disjoint intervals of market demand level give rise to preemptive investment behavior of the firms, while the firms otherwise are more reluctant to be the first mover

    Preemptive search and R&D clustering revisited.

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    The results obtained by Cardon and Sasaki (1998) on R&D clustering are derived under the specific assumption that firms only can own one patent. When multiple patents are allowed, R&D clustering will come about more frequently if search costs are substantial.R&D clustering; Persistence of monopoly;

    Auctioning Process Innovations when Losersā€™ Bids Determine Royalty Rates

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    We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firmsā€™ bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid influences the beliefs of the innovator who uses that information to set the royalty rate. We derive conditions for existence of a separating equilibrium, explain why a sufficiently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism

    Fragmented property rights and R&D competition

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    Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firmsā€™ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies multiple simultaneous R&D contests for complementary patents and how they interact with patent portfolios that firms may have acquired already. We also consider how this interaction and the intensity of the contests depends on the type of patent trade regimes and the product market equilibria that result from these regimes. We solve for the contest equilibria and show that the multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that considerably reduces the overall contest effort

    Better Late Than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology

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    After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D a new product undergoes a process of change, improvement and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic behavior of firms in this development phase of R&D. We emphasize that a key dimension to this competition is the innovations that lead to product differentiation and quality improvement. In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogeneously the level and diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm enters early with a low quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators, contrary to the predictions of the hypothesis.

    Sequential Choice and R&D Racing

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    This paper develops a framework to analyze how choices are made when R&D competition occurs between two firms, and the aggressiveness-time tradeoffs have to be resolved in multiple stages. At issue is the way in which resources are used at each stage, i.e. are aggressiveness problems undertaken and solved (slowly) or are quick solutions adopted in an effort to get the product to market faster? We first analyze why differently positioned firms choose different targets. We focus on this translation between ex ante asymmetries between firms and ex post asymmetries in the equilibrium outcomes. Our second focus is on understanding the implications of the tradeoff between the level of aggressiveness and time spent on each stage in a multi-stage process.Innovation, Race, Competition, Strategy, Industrial Economics
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