Many-Valued Institutions for Constraint Specification

We advance a general technique for enriching logical systems with soft constraints, making them suitable for specifying complex software systems where parts are put together not just based on how they meet certain functional requirements but also on how they optimise certain constraints. This added expressive power is required, for example, for capturing quality attributes that need to be optimised or, more generally, for formalising what are usually called service-level agreements. More specifically, we show how institutions endowed with a graded semantic consequence can accommodate soft-constraint satisfaction problems. We illustrate our approach by showing how, in the context of service discovery, one can quantify the compatibility of two specifications and thus formalise the selection of the most promising provider of a required resource.Peer Reviewe

Mark versus Luke? Appropriate Methods for the Evaluation of Public Health Interventions

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a social decision making approach to evaluation can be generalised to interventions such as public health and national policies which have multiple objectives and impact on multiple constraints within and beyond the health sector. We demonstrate that a mathematical programming solution to this problem is possible, but the information requirements make it impractical. Instead we propose a simple compensation test for interventions with multiple and cross-sectoral effects. However, rather than compensation based on individual preferences, it can be based on the net benefits falling on different sectors. The valuation of outcomes is based on the shadow prices of the existing budget constraints, which are implicit in existing public expenditure and its allocation across different sectors. A ‘welfarist’ societal perspective is not sufficient; rather, a multiple perspective evaluation which accounts for costs and effects falling on each sector is required.cost-effectiveness analysis, decision rules, public health

The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

One of the central concerns about American policy-making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model, how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage - which cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, 1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, 2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and 3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.

A Systematic Approach to Constructing Families of Incremental Topology Control Algorithms Using Graph Transformation

In the communication systems domain, constructing and maintaining network topologies via topology control (TC) algorithms is an important cross-cutting research area. Network topologies are usually modeled using attributed graphs whose nodes and edges represent the network nodes and their interconnecting links. A key requirement of TC algorithms is to fulfill certain consistency and optimization properties to ensure a high quality of service. Still, few attempts have been made to constructively integrate these properties into the development process of TC algorithms. Furthermore, even though many TC algorithms share substantial parts (such as structural patterns or tie-breaking strategies), few works constructively leverage these commonalities and differences of TC algorithms systematically. In previous work, we addressed the constructive integration of consistency properties into the development process. We outlined a constructive, model-driven methodology for designing individual TC algorithms. Valid and high-quality topologies are characterized using declarative graph constraints; TC algorithms are specified using programmed graph transformation. We applied a well-known static analysis technique to refine a given TC algorithm in a way that the resulting algorithm preserves the specified graph constraints. In this paper, we extend our constructive methodology by generalizing it to support the specification of families of TC algorithms. To show the feasibility of our approach, we reneging six existing TC algorithms and develop e-kTC, a novel energy-efficient variant of the TC algorithm kTC. Finally, we evaluate a subset of the specified TC algorithms using a new tool integration of the graph transformation tool eMoflon and the Simonstrator network simulation framework.Comment: Corresponds to the accepted manuscrip

Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality

Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.labor regulation, informality

Enforcement of labor regulation and informality

Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.

Social Isolation and Inequality

There is an increasing interest in the concept of social exclusion and the related concept of social isolation and their potential role in understanding inequality. We examine the degree to which voluntary separation from social activities during adolescence affects adult wages. It is well-known that participation in high school athletic programs leads to higher adult wages. We present empirical evidence that this premium is not primarily due to selection on predetermined characteristics valued in the labor market.Decision making; Bayesian; Behavioral Economics

Social Isolation and Inequality

There is an increasing interest in the concept of social exclusion and the related concept of social isolation and their potential role in understanding inequality. We examine the degree to which voluntary separation from social activities during adolescence affects adult wages. It is well-known that participation in high school athletic programs leads to higher adult wages. We present empirical evidence that this premium is not primarily due to selection on predetermined characteristics valued in the labor market.Decision making; Bayesian; Behavioral Economics

Liquidity preference and information

This paper explores the link between anticipated information and a preference for liquidity in investment choices. Given a subjective ordering of investment portfolios by their liquidity, we identify a sufficient condition under which the prospect of finer resolution of uncertainty creates a preference for more liquid positions. We then show how this condition might arise naturally in some standard classes of sequential decision problems