On the Automaticity and Ethics of Belief

Recently, philosophers have appealed to empirical studies to argue that whenever we think that p, we automatically believe that p (Millikan 2004; Mandelbaum 2014; Levy and Mandelbaum 2014). Levy and Mandelbaum (2014) have gone further and claimed that the automaticity of believing has implications for the ethics of belief in that it creates epistemic obligations for those who know about their automatic belief acquisition. I use theoretical considerations and psychological findings to raise doubts about the empirical case for the view that we automatically believe what we think. Furthermore, I contend that even if we set these doubts aside, Levy and Mandelbaum’s argument to the effect that the automaticity of believing creates epistemic obligations is not fully convincing

Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory

Originally published in 1987. Philosopher Maurice Mandelbaum offers a broad-ranging essay on the roles of chance, choice, purpose, and necessity in human events. He traces the many changes these concepts have undergone, from the analyses of Hobbes and Spinoza, through the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Mandelbaum examines two contrary tendencies in the history of social theories. Some thinkers, he shows, have explained the character of institutions in terms of their individual purposes, whereas others have stressed relationships of necessity among society's institutions. Mandelbaum discusses chance, choice, and necessity at length and reaches some provocative conclusions about the ways in which they are interwoven in human affairs

Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is a viable epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem

Whalesong

Woodman: all the news fit to print -- Olson picked to lead UAJ ski team -- Employment outlook -- Counselor's corner -- New compensation and benefit regulations draft copies available -- Student loan programs undergo many changes -- Special report -- The campus beat -- Student government -- Student art show & sale not to be missed -- Poetry corner -- UAJ offers year-end tax strategy seminar -- Student activities to organize UAJ basketball team for Ordway -- UAJ to sponsor racquetball meet -- Mandelbaum set to give seminars -- Tuxedo juntion: formal benefit for UAJ with all the trimmings -- Sail away: JDCC students build boa

Review of \u3cem\u3eOpen Moral Communities.\u3c/em\u3e Seymore J. Mandelbaum. Reviewed by Alice K. Johnson

Book review of Seymour J. Mandelbaum. Open Moral Communities. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. $30.00 hardcover

Modularist explanations of experience and other illusions

Debates about modularity invariably involve a crucial premise about how visual illusions are experienced. This paper argues that these debates are wrongheaded, and that experience of illusions is orthogonal to the core issue of the modularity hypothesis: informational encapsulation