34,590 research outputs found

    Learning scalable and transferable multi-robot/machine sequential assignment planning via graph embedding

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    Can the success of reinforcement learning methods for simple combinatorial optimization problems be extended to multi-robot sequential assignment planning? In addition to the challenge of achieving near-optimal performance in large problems, transferability to an unseen number of robots and tasks is another key challenge for real-world applications. In this paper, we suggest a method that achieves the first success in both challenges for robot/machine scheduling problems. Our method comprises of three components. First, we show a robot scheduling problem can be expressed as a random probabilistic graphical model (PGM). We develop a mean-field inference method for random PGM and use it for Q-function inference. Second, we show that transferability can be achieved by carefully designing two-step sequential encoding of problem state. Third, we resolve the computational scalability issue of fitted Q-iteration by suggesting a heuristic auction-based Q-iteration fitting method enabled by transferability we achieved. We apply our method to discrete-time, discrete space problems (Multi-Robot Reward Collection (MRRC)) and scalably achieve 97% optimality with transferability. This optimality is maintained under stochastic contexts. By extending our method to continuous time, continuous space formulation, we claim to be the first learning-based method with scalable performance among multi-machine scheduling problems; our method scalability achieves comparable performance to popular metaheuristics in Identical parallel machine scheduling (IPMS) problems

    Rational bidding using reinforcement learning: an application in automated resource allocation

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    The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational resources is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic resource provisioning and usage of computational resources, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a framework for supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation and the generation of bids. Secondly, we introduce a consumer-side reinforcement learning bidding strategy which enables rational behavior by the generation and selection of bids. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare this bidding strategy against a truth-telling bidding strategy for two kinds of market mechanisms – one centralized and one decentralized

    Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising

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    The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.Comment: WSDM 201

    Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services

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    The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms

    Learning optimization models in the presence of unknown relations

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    In a sequential auction with multiple bidding agents, it is highly challenging to determine the ordering of the items to sell in order to maximize the revenue due to the fact that the autonomy and private information of the agents heavily influence the outcome of the auction. The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we demonstrate how to apply machine learning techniques to solve the optimal ordering problem in sequential auctions. We learn regression models from historical auctions, which are subsequently used to predict the expected value of orderings for new auctions. Given the learned models, we propose two types of optimization methods: a black-box best-first search approach, and a novel white-box approach that maps learned models to integer linear programs (ILP) which can then be solved by any ILP-solver. Although the studied auction design problem is hard, our proposed optimization methods obtain good orderings with high revenues. Our second main contribution is the insight that the internal structure of regression models can be efficiently evaluated inside an ILP solver for optimization purposes. To this end, we provide efficient encodings of regression trees and linear regression models as ILP constraints. This new way of using learned models for optimization is promising. As the experimental results show, it significantly outperforms the black-box best-first search in nearly all settings.Comment: 37 pages. Working pape

    Inference in classifier systems

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    Classifier systems (Css) provide a rich framework for learning and induction, and they have beenı successfully applied in the artificial intelligence literature for some time. In this paper, both theı architecture and the inferential mechanisms in general CSs are reviewed, and a number of limitations and extensions of the basic approach are summarized. A system based on the CS approach that is capable of quantitative data analysis is outlined and some of its peculiarities discussed
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