442,201 research outputs found
Using Cross-Lingual Explicit Semantic Analysis for Improving Ontology Translation
Semantic Web aims to allow machines to make inferences using the explicit conceptualisations contained in ontologies. By pointing to ontologies, Semantic Web-based applications are able to inter-operate and share common information easily. Nevertheless, multilingual semantic applications are still rare, owing to the fact that most online ontologies are monolingual in English. In order to solve this issue, techniques for ontology localisation and translation are needed. However, traditional machine translation is difficult to apply to ontologies, owing to the fact that ontology labels tend to be quite short in length and linguistically different from the free text paradigm. In this paper, we propose an approach to enhance machine translation of ontologies based on exploiting the well-structured concept descriptions contained in the ontology. In particular, our approach leverages the semantics contained in the ontology by using Cross Lingual Explicit Semantic Analysis (CLESA) for context-based disambiguation in phrase-based Statistical Machine Translation (SMT). The presented work is novel in the sense that application of CLESA in SMT has not been performed earlier to the best of our knowledge
Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?
Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth
of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under
any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of
general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be
interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical
truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical,
Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of
Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts
of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a
constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version
is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht
This is simply what I do: Peirce's real generality meets Wittgenstein's rule-following?
Wittgensteinâs discussion of rule-following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called âthe most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to dateâ. But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirceâs distinctive scientific hierarchy. Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context, pertains to general predication.
Rule-following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: âHow is it that I can project rules?â, and, âWhat is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?â. In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgensteinâs famous public account of rule-following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgensteinâs remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripkeâs reading of him as a sceptic
Wittgensteinâs Remarks on Technology and Mental Mechanisms
This article provides a survey of Wittgensteinâs remarks in which he discusses various kinds of technology. I argue that throughout his career, his use of technological examples displays a thematic unity: technologies are invoked in order to illustrate a certain mechanical conception of the mind. I trace how his use of such examples evolved as his views on the mind and on meaning changed. I also discuss an important and somewhat radical anti-mechanistic strain in his later thought and suggest that Wittgensteinâs attitude to mechanistic explanations in psychology was ultimately quite ambivalent
The Concept of Mechanism in Biology
The concept of mechanism in biology has three distinct meanings. It may refer to a philosophical thesis about the nature of life and biology (âmechanicismâ), to the internal workings of a machine-like structure (âmachine mechanismâ), or to the causal explanation of a particular phenomenon (âcausal mechanismâ). In this paper I trace the conceptual evolution of âmechanismâ in the history of biology, and I examine how the three meanings of this term have come to be featured in the philosophy of biology, situating the new âmechanismic programâ in this context. I argue that the leading advocates of the mechanismic program (i.e., Craver, Darden, Bechtel, etc.) inadvertently conflate the different senses of âmechanismâ. Specifically, they all inappropriately endow causal mechanisms with the ontic status of machine mechanisms, and this invariably results in problematic accounts of the role played by mechanism-talk in scientific practice. I suggest that for effective analyses of the concept of mechanism, causal mechanisms need to be distinguished from machine mechanisms, and the new mechanismic program in the philosophy of biology needs to be demarcated from the traditional concerns of mechanistic biolog
Universal Intelligence: A Definition of Machine Intelligence
A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows
what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider
artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper
we approach this problem in the following way: We take a number of well known
informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and
extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to
produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe
that this equation formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the
broadest reasonable sense. We then show how this formal definition is related
to the theory of universal optimal learning agents. Finally, we survey the many
other tests and definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for
machines.Comment: 50 gentle page
In defense of mechanism
In Life Itself and in Essays on Life Itself, Robert Rosen (1991, 2000) argued that machines were, in principle, incapable of modeling the defining feature of living systems, which he claimed to be the existence of closed causal loops. Rosen's argument has been used to support critiques of computational models in ecological psychology. This article shows that Rosen's attack on mechanism is fundamentally misconceived. It is, in fact, of the essence of a mechanical system that it contains closed causal loops. Moreover, Rosen's epistemology is based on a strong form of indirect realism and his arguments, if correct, would call into question some of the fundamental principles of ecological psychology
A Formal Measure of Machine Intelligence
A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows
what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider
artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper
we approach this problem in the following way: We take a number of well known
informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and
extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to
produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe
that this measure formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the
broadest reasonable sense.Comment: 8 two-column page
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