On Verifying Complex Properties using Symbolic Shape Analysis

One of the main challenges in the verification of software systems is the analysis of unbounded data structures with dynamic memory allocation, such as linked data structures and arrays. We describe Bohne, a new analysis for verifying data structures. Bohne verifies data structure operations and shows that 1) the operations preserve data structure invariants and 2) the operations satisfy their specifications expressed in terms of changes to the set of objects stored in the data structure. During the analysis, Bohne infers loop invariants in the form of disjunctions of universally quantified Boolean combinations of formulas. To synthesize loop invariants of this form, Bohne uses a combination of decision procedures for Monadic Second-Order Logic over trees, SMT-LIB decision procedures (currently CVC Lite), and an automated reasoner within the Isabelle interactive theorem prover. This architecture shows that synthesized loop invariants can serve as a useful communication mechanism between different decision procedures. Using Bohne, we have verified operations on data structures such as linked lists with iterators and back pointers, trees with and without parent pointers, two-level skip lists, array data structures, and sorted lists. We have deployed Bohne in the Hob and Jahob data structure analysis systems, enabling us to combine Bohne with analyses of data structure clients and apply it in the context of larger programs. This report describes the Bohne algorithm as well as techniques that Bohne uses to reduce the ammount of annotations and the running time of the analysis

Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device Access to Cryptographic Credentials

Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure services, but storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if they are used from multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized location, like an Internet-accessible server, raises serious security concerns (e.g. server compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a well-known solution for protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments, and are now becoming available on commodity server platforms. Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE is straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and show that it enables new desirable functionality. We describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key Store (CKS), an online service for securely generating, storing, and using personal cryptographic keys. Using remote attestation, users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the CKS, and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding typical risks of password-based authentication like password theft or phishing. In addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-based access controls for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users for a specified time and/or a limited number of uses; and iii) audit all key usages via a secure audit log. We have implemented a proof of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this into GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude as using locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.Comment: Extended version of a paper to appear in the 3rd Workshop on Security, Privacy, and Identity Management in the Cloud (SECPID) 201

Probabilistic Bisimulation for Parameterized Systems (Technical Report)

Probabilistic bisimulation is a fundamental notion of process equivalence for probabilistic systems. Among others, it has important applications including formalizing the anonymity property of several communication protocols. There is a lot of work on verifying probabilistic bisimulation for finite systems. This is however not the case for parameterized systems, where the problem is in general undecidable. In this paper we provide a generic framework for reasoning about probabilistic bisimulation for parameterized systems. Our approach is in the spirit of software verification, wherein we encode proof rules for probabilistic bisimulation and use a decidable first-order theory to specify systems and candidate bisimulation relations, which can then be checked automatically against the proof rules. As a case study, we show that our framework is sufficiently expressive for proving the anonymity property of the parameterized dining cryptographers protocol and the parameterized grades protocol, when supplied with a candidate regular bisimulation relation. Both of these protocols hitherto could not be verified by existing automatic methods. Moreover, with the help of standard automata learning algorithms, we show that the candidate relations can be synthesized fully automatically, making the verification fully automated