The logic of preference and decision supporting systems

In this thesis we are exploring some models for von Wright's preference logic. Given (initial) set of axioms and a set of formulae, some of them valid, some of them problematic (in the sense that it is not always intuitively clear should they be valid or not), we investigated some matrix semantics for those formulae including semantics in relevance logics (first degree entailment and RM3), various many--valued (Kleene's, {\L}ukasiewicz's, \dots) and/or paraconsistent logics, in Sugihara matrix, and one interpretation for preference relation using modal operators L and M. In each case, we also investigated dependence results between various formulae. Opposite problem (i.e.\ searching for a logic that satisfies given constraints) is also addressed. At the end, a {\tt LISP} program is presented that implements von Wright's logic as a decision supporting system, i.e.\ that decides for a given set of preferences, what alternatives (world--situation) should we choose, according to von Wright's preference logic system

Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations: Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972

Articles by Ian Mueller, Ronald Zirin, Norman Kretzmann, John Corcoran, John Mulhern, Mary Mulhern,Josiah Gould, and others. Topics: Aristotle's Syllogistic, Stoic Logic, Modern Research in Ancient Logic

On the notion of negation in certain non-classical propositional logics

The purpose of this study is to investigate some aspects of how negation functions in certain non-classical propositional logics. These include the intuitionistic system developed by Heyting, the minimal calculus proposed by Johansson, and various intermediate logics between the minimal and the classical systems. Part I contains the new results which can be grouped into two classes: extension-criteria results and infinite chain results. In the first group criteria are given for answering the question: when do formulae added to the axioms of the minimal calculus as extra axioms extend the minimal calculus to various known intermediate logics? One of the results in this group (THEOREM 1 in Chapter II, Section 1) is a generalization of a result of Jankov. In the second group certain intermediate logics are defined which form infinite chains between well-known logical systems. One of the results here (THEOREM 1 in Chapter II, Section 2) is a generalization of a result of McKay. In Part II the new results are discussed from the viewpoint of negation. It is rather difficult, however, to draw definite conclusions which are acceptable to all. For these depend on, and are closely bound up with, certain basic philosophical presuppositions which are neither provable, nor disprovable in a strict sense. Taking an essentially classical position, it is argued that the logics appearing in the defined infinite chains are such that they diverge only in the vicinity of negation, and the notions of negation in them are simply ordered in a sense which is specified during the discussion. In Appendix I a number of conjectures are formulated in connection with the new results.<p

Modality and inquiry

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2008.Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-125).The possibilities we consider or eliminate in inquiry are epistemic possibilities. This dissertation is mainly about what it is to say or believe that something is possible in this sense. Chapter 1 ('Epistemic Contradictions') describes a new puzzle about epistemic modals and uses it to explore their logic and semantics. Chapter 2 ('Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality') situates the work of chapter 1 into a larger picture of content and communication, developing a broadly expressivist account of the language of epistemic modality. Chapter 3 ('Content and Modal Resolution') argues that states of belief should be understood as relativized to an inquiry, understood formally as a certain way of dividing up logical space.Seth Yalcin.Ph.D

LDS - Labelled Deductive Systems: Volume 1 - Foundations

Traditional logics manipulate formulas. The message of this book is to manipulate pairs; formulas and labels. The labels annotate the formulas. This sounds very simple but it turned out to be a big step, which makes a serious difference, like the difference between using one hand only or allowing for the coordinated use of two hands. Of course the idea has to be made precise, and its advantages and limitations clearly demonstrated. `Precise' means a good mathematical definition and `advantages demonstrated' means case studies and applications in pure logic and in AI. To achieve that we need to address the following: \begin{enumerate} \item Define the notion of {\em LDS}, its proof theory and semantics and relate it to traditional logics. \item Explain what form the traditional concepts of cut elimination, deduction theorem, negation, inconsistency, update, etc.\ take in {\em LDS}. \item Formulate major known logics in {\em LDS}. For example, modal and temporal logics, substructural logics, default, nonmonotonic logics, etc. \item Show new results and solve long-standing problems using {\em LDS}. \item Demonstrate practical applications. \end{enumerate} This is what I am trying to do in this book. Part I of the book is an intuitive presentation of {\em LDS} in the context of traditional current views of monotonic and nonmonotonic logics. It is less oriented towards the pure logician and more towards the practical consumer of logic. It has two tasks, addressed in two chapters. These are: \begin{itemlist}{Chapter 1:} \item [Chapter1:] Formally motivate {\em LDS} by starting from the traditional notion of `What is a logical system' and slowly adding features to it until it becomes essentially an {\em LDS}. \item [Chapter 2:] Intuitively motivate {\em LDS} by showing many examples where labels are used, as well as some case studies of familiar logics (e.g.\ modal logic) formulated as an {\em LDS}. \end{itemlist} The second part of the book presents the formal theory of {\em LDS} for the formal logician. I have tried to avoid the style of definition-lemma-theorem and put in some explanations. What is basically needed here is the formulation of the mathematical machinery capable of doing the following. \begin{itemize} \item Define {\em LDS} algebra, proof theory and semantics. \item Show how an arbitrary (or fairly general) logic, presented traditionally, say as a Hilbert system or as a Gentzen system, can be turned into an {\em LDS} formulation. \item Show how to obtain a traditional formulations (e.g.\ Hilbert) for an arbitrary {\em LDS} presented logic. \item Define and study major logical concepts intrinsic to {\em LDS} formalisms. \item Give detailed study of the {\em LDS} formulation of some major known logics (e.g.\ modal logics, resource logics) and demonstrate its advantages. \item Translate {\em LDS} into classical logic (reduce the `new' to the `old'), and explain {\em LDS} in the context of classical logic (two sorted logic, metalevel aspects, etc). \end{itemize} \begin{itemlist}{Chapter 1:} \item [Chapter 3:] Give fairly general definitions of some basic concepts of {\em LDS} theory, mainly to cater for the needs of the practical consumer of logic who may wish to apply it, with a detailed study of the metabox system. The presentation of Chapter 3 is a bit tricky. It may be too formal for the intuitive reader, but not sufficiently clear and elegant for the mathematical logician. I would be very grateful for comments from the readers for the next draft. \item [Chapter 4:] Presents the basic notions of algebraic {\em LDS}. The reader may wonder how come we introduce algebraic {\em LDS} in chapter 3 and then again in chapter 4. Our aim in chapter 3 is to give a general definition and formal machinery for the applied consumer of logic. Chapter 4 on the other hand studies {\em LDS} as formal logics. It turns out that to formulate an arbitrary logic as an {\em LDS} one needs some specific labelling algebras and these need to be studied in detail (chapter 4). For general applications it is more convenient to have general labelling algebras and possibly mathematically redundant formulations (chapter 3). In a sense chapter 4 continues the topic of the second section of chapter 3. \item [Chapter 5:] Present the full theory of {\em LDS} where labels can be databases from possibly another {\em LDS}. It also presents Fibred Semantics for {\em LDS}. \item [Chapter 6:] Presents a theory of quantifers for {\em LDS}. The material for this chapter is still under research. \item [Chapter 7:] Studies structured consequence relations. These are logical system swhere the structure is not described through labels but through some geometry like lists, multisets, trees, etc. Thus the label of a wff $A$ is implicit, given by the place of $A$ in the structure. \item [Chapter 8:] Deals with metalevel features of {\em LDS} and its translation into two sorted classical logic. \end{itemlist} Parts 3 and 4 of the book deals in detail with some specific families of logics. Chapters 9--11 essentailly deal with substructural logics and their variants. \begin{itemlist}{Chapter10:} \item [Chapter 9:] Studies resource and substructural logics in general. \item [Chapter 10:] Develops detailed proof theory for some systems as well as studying particular features such as negation. \item [Chapter 11:] Deals with many valued logics. \item [Chapter 12:] Studies the Curry Howard formula as type view and how it compres with labelling. \item [Chapter 13:] Deals with modal and temporal logics. \end{itemlist} Part 5 of the book deals with {\em LDS} metatheory. \begin{itemlist}{Chapter15:} \item [Chapter 14:] Deals with labelled tableaux. \item [Chapter 15:] Deals with combining logics. \item [Chapter 16:] Deals with abduction. \end{itemlist

Computers and relevant logic : a project in computing matrix model structures for propositional logics

I present and discuss four classes of algorithm designed as solutions to the problem of generating matrix representations of model structures for some non-classical propositional logics. I then go on to survey the output from implementations of these algorithms and finally exhibit some logical investigations suggested by that output. All four algorithms traverse a search tree depthfirst. In the case of the first and fourth methods the tree is fixed by imposing a lexicographic order on possible matrices, while the second and third create their search tree dynamically as the job progresses. The first algorithm is a simple "backtrack" with some pruning of the tree in response to refutations of possible matrices. The fourth, the most efficient we have for time, maximises the amount of pruning while keeping the same basic form. The second, which uses a large number of special properties of the logics in question, and so requires some logical and algebraic knowledge on the part of the programmer, finds the matrices at the tips of branches only, while the third, due to P.A. Pritchard, is far easier to program and tests a matrix at every node of the search tree. The logics with which I am concerned are in the "relevant" group first seriously investigated by A.R. Anderson and N.D. Belnap (see their Entailment: the logic of relevance and necessity, 1975). The most surprising observation in my preliminary survey of the numbers of matrices validating such systems is that the typical models are not much like the models normally taken as canonical for the logics. In particular the proportion of inconsistent models (validating some cases of the scheme 'A & ~A') is much higher than might have been expected. Among the logical investigations already suggested by the quasi-empirical data now available in the form of matrices are some work on the system R-W, including my theorem, proved in chapter 2.3, that with the law of excluded middle it suffices to trivialise naive set theory, and the little-noticed subject of Ackermann constants (sentential constants) in these logics. The formula which collapses naive set theory in R-W plus A v ~A is the most damaging set-theoretic antinomy known. The theorem that there are at least 3088 Ackermann constants in the logic R (chapter 2.4) could not reasonably have been proved without the aid of a computer. My major conclusion is that this work on applications of computers in logical research has reached a point where we are able not only to relieve logicians of some drudgery, but to suggest theorems and insights of new and possibly important kinds

Arguments for the existence of God in Anselm's Proslogion chapter II and III

Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.II starts from the contention that `lq when a Fool hears `something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. This is a special feature of the Pros.II argument which distinguishes the argument from other ontological arguments set up by, for example, Descartes and Leibniz. This is also the context which makes semantics necessary for evaluation of the argument. It is quite natural to ask `lq What is understood by the Fool, and what is in his mind? It is essential for a proper consideration of the argument to identify the object which is understood by the Fool, and so, is in his mind. A semantics gives answers to the questions of `lq What the Fool understands? and `lq What is in the Fool's mind? If we choose a semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it makes an effective guide to identify the object. It is a necessary condition for a proper evaluation of the Pros.II argument to fix our universe of discourse, especially since, in the argument, we are involved in such talk about existing objects as Anselm's contention that `when a Fool hears `something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. The ontology to which a semantic theory commits us will be accepted as our scope of objects when we introduce our semantic theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, and this ontological boundary constrains us to identify the object in a certain way. Consistent application of an ontology, most of all, is needed for the evaluation of the logical validity of an argument. If we take Frege's three-level semantics, we are ontologically committed to intensional entities, like meaning, as well as extensional entities. Sluga contends that Frege's anti-psychologism for meanings should not be interpreted as vindicating reification of intensional entities in relation to Frege's contextualism, that Frege's anti-psychologism with his contextualism is nothing but a linguistic version of Kantian philosophy for the transcendental unity of a judgement. There is, however, another possible interpretation of Frege's contextualism. According to Dummett, the significance of Frege's contextualism must be understood as a way of explanation for a word's having meaning. If Dummett's view is cogent, we could say that Frege's contextualism does not prevent our interpreting his semantics as being committed to intensional entities. We need not worry that Frege's over all semantics, especially with his contextualism, would internally deny the ontological interpretation of his theory. We see Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Pros.II is an invalid argument if we introduce Frege's three-level semantics, i.e. if we acknowledge meanings of words as entities in our universe of discourse. We can also employ extensional semantics for the interpretation of the Pros.II argument. According to extensionalists, like Quine and Kripke, we need not assume intensional entities, like meaning, to be part of our ontological domain. They argue that we can employ our language well enough without assuming intensional entities. If we choose extensional semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it commits us only to extensional entities as objects in the Universe of our interpretation. In Sections 1.4 and 1.5, I show that extensional semantics makes the Pros.II argument a valid argument for the existence of God. `lq Necessary existence is the central concept of Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.III. It has been said that, even if the argument is formally valid, it cannot stand as a valid argument for the existence of God, since `lq necessary existence is an absurd concept like `lq round square. And further that even if there is a meaningful combination of concepts for `lq necessary existence, it cannot quality as a subject of an a priori argument. As objections to the interpretations which make the Pros.III argument valid, it has been argued that even if there is a concept of `lq necessary existence which is meaningful and there is another concept of `lq necessary existence which is suitable as a subject of an a priori argument, there is no concept of `lq necessary existence which is meaningful and at the same time suitable as a subject of an a priori argument. In Chap.2 and Chap.3, I try to show that there can be concepts of `lq necessary existence which are proof against these objections. Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogian Chap.II and Chap.III are logically valid arguments on some logical principles. Some fideists, K. Barth, for example, argue that Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogion are not proofs for the existence of God even if they are logically valid arguments. I raise the question how this attitude could be possible, in Chap.4 and Chap.5. Barth's fideistic interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion arguments does not find any flaw in the validity of the arguments, and it accepts the meaningfulness and truth of the premises even to the fool in Proslogion. If this is the case, i.e. if Barth's interpretation accepts the validity of the arguments and the truth of the premises, I raise the question, how can the arguments not be interpreted as proofs for the existence of God? How is it possible that the function of the arguments is not that of proving the existence of God? According to Wittgensteinian fideism, premises in the arguments should not be intelligible to those who do not believe in God's existence already, and so the real function of the arguments is the elucidation, the understanding of believer's belief, rather than proving articles of belief to unbelievers. Barth's fideistic interpretation of the arguments, however, fully recognizes the meaningfulness and truth of the premises in the arguments as well as the validity of the arguments. I argue that there could be a justification for the Barthian fideism. As Malcolm notices, there are still atheists who understand Anselm's arguments as valid, but the only possibility for the people who recognize the validity of Anselm's arguments still to remain atheists has been thought to be to challenge the truth of premises employed in the arguments. Now, of the atheistic possibility, we can change the direction of our attention, that is, to the question about the function of a logically valid argument itself. What has not been thought of in relation to Anselm's arguments is the significance of logical truth or the logical validity of an argument. We have not asked such questions as `lq What does a logical truth say? and `lq What does a logically valid argument guarantee with true premises? Let us assume that even the premises are accepted by atheists. Do they all convert to theism? If that were so, the disagreement between atheist and believer over the ontological arguments should turn only on the truth of premises. If that is not so, there is some point in raising this other question. If there are people who, recognizing the premises and validity of an argument, are still reluctant to accept the conclusion, we have reason to question the function of a valid argument. I argue that there is a way of being consistently reasonable while accepting the premises and the validity of the ontological arguments and yet remaining an atheist or an agnostic

Taking Our Actual Constitution Seriously

In this review, by concentrating on the general aim of Dworkin\u27s book, I hope to contribute to the discussion this book is sure to generate. What does the moral reading of our Constitution amount to, and what alternative do we have to endorsing such a reading? I ask these questions from what I would call a jurisprudentialperspective. For, while I do teach Jurisprudence, I do not teach Constitutional Law, other than some constitutional law themes that find their way into my Property and Wills & Trusts courses. Accordingly, I am not well placed to review the details orthe nuances of developments after Roe v. Wade,2 or the progeny spawned by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 two cases that dominate Parts I and II, respectively, of the book. But this personal limitation leaves me room perhaps for a more considered review of Dworkin\u27s main thrust in this book, which is directed toward makinghis view of the Constitution credible, or palatable, to his reader. Dworkin\u27s theory of how to read the Constitution is, after all, central to his argument