210 research outputs found
New Key Recovery Attacks on Minimal Two-Round Even-Mansour Ciphers
Chen et al. proved that two variants of the two-round n-bit
Even-Mansour ciphers are secure up to 22n/3 queries against distinguish-
ing attacks. These constructions can be regarded as minimal two-round
Even-Mansour ciphers delivering security beyond the birthday bound,
since removing any component from the ciphers causes security to drop
back to 2n/2 queries. On the other hand, for the minimal two-round con-
structions, the proved lower bounds on the product of data and time
complexities (DT) against the other attacks including key recovery at-
tacks is 2n. However, an attack requiring DT close to the lower bound
has not been known yet, and thus its tightness is not clear. In this pa-
per, we propose new key recovery attacks on the two minimal two-round
Even-Mansour ciphers by using the advanced meet-in-the-middle tech-
nique. In particular, we introduce novel matching techniques called partial
invariable pair and matching with input-restricted public permutation
, which enable us to compute one of permutations without knowing
a part of the key information. Moreover, we present two improvements of
the proposed attack: one significantly reduces data complexity and the
other reduces time complexity by dynamically finding partial invariant
pairs. Compared with the previously known attacks, when blocksize is
64 bits, our attacks drastically reduce the required data from 245 to 226
with keeping time complexity required by the previous attacks, though
our attack requires chosen plaintexts. Importantly, the previous attacks
never break the birthday barrier of data complexity due to the usage
of multicollisions in the internal state. Furthermore, by increasing time
complexity up to 262, the required data is further reduced to 28, and
DT = 270 which is close to the proved lower bound 264. We show that
our data-optimized attack on the minimal two-round Even-Mansour ci-
phers requires DT = 2n+6 in general cases. This implies that adding
one round does not sufficiently improve the security against key recovery
attacks of the Even-Mansour ciphers
Algorithmes quantiques pour la cryptanalyse et cryptographie symétrique post-quantique
Modern cryptography relies on the notion of computational security. The level of security given by a cryptosystem is expressed as an amount of computational resources required to break it. The goal of cryptanalysis is to find attacks, that is, algorithms with lower complexities than the conjectural bounds.With the advent of quantum computing devices, these levels of security have to be updated to take a whole new notion of algorithms into account. At the same time, cryptography is becoming widely used in small devices (smart cards, sensors), with new cost constraints.In this thesis, we study the security of secret-key cryptosystems against quantum adversaries.We first build new quantum algorithms for k-list (k-XOR or k-SUM) problems, by composing exhaustive search procedures. Next, we present dedicated cryptanalysis results, starting with a new quantum cryptanalysis tool, the offline Simon's algorithm. We describe new attacks against the lightweight algorithms Spook and Gimli and we perform the first quantum security analysis of the standard cipher AES.Finally, we specify Saturnin, a family of lightweight cryptosystems oriented towards post-quantum security. Thanks to a very similar structure, its security relies largely on the analysis of AES.La cryptographie moderne est fondée sur la notion de sécurité computationnelle. Les niveaux de sécurité attendus des cryptosystèmes sont exprimés en nombre d'opérations ; une attaque est un algorithme d'une complexité inférieure à la borne attendue. Mais ces niveaux de sécurité doivent aujourd'hui prendre en compte une nouvelle notion d'algorithme : le paradigme du calcul quantique. Dans le même temps,la délégation grandissante du chiffrement à des puces RFID, objets connectés ou matériels embarqués pose de nouvelles contraintes de coût.Dans cette thèse, nous étudions la sécurité des cryptosystèmes à clé secrète face à un adversaire quantique.Nous introduisons tout d'abord de nouveaux algorithmes quantiques pour les problèmes génériques de k-listes (k-XOR ou k-SUM), construits en composant des procédures de recherche exhaustive.Nous présentons ensuite des résultats de cryptanalyse dédiée, en commençant par un nouvel outil de cryptanalyse quantique, l'algorithme de Simon hors-ligne. Nous décrivons de nouvelles attaques contre les algorithmes Spook et Gimli et nous effectuons la première étude de sécurité quantique du chiffrement AES. Dans un troisième temps, nous spécifions Saturnin, une famille de cryptosystèmes à bas coût orientés vers la sécurité post-quantique. La structure de Saturnin est proche de celle de l'AES et sa sécurité en tire largement parti
On Quantum Slide Attacks
At Crypto 2016, Kaplan et al. proposed the first quantum exponential acceleration of a classical symmetric cryptanalysis technique: they showed that, in the superposition query model, Simon’s algorithm could be applied to accelerate the slide attack on the alternate-key cipher. This allows to recover an n-bit key with O(n) quantum time and queries. In this paper we propose many other types of quantum slide attacks, inspired by classical techniques including sliding with a twist, complementation slide and mirror slidex. These slide attacks on Feistel networks reach up to two round self-similarity with modular additions inside branch or key-addition operations. With only XOR operations, they reach up to four round self-similarity, with a cost at most quadratic in the block size. Some of these variants combined with whitening keys (FX construction)can also be successfully attacked. Furthermore, we show that some quantum slide attacks can be composed with other quantum attacks to perform efficient key-recoveries even when the round function is a strong function classically. Finally, we analyze the case of quantum slide attacks exploiting cycle-finding, that were thought to enjoy an exponential speed up in a paper by Bar-On et al. in2015, where these attacks were introduced. We show that the speed-up is smaller than expected and less impressive than the above variants, but nevertheless provide improved complexities on the previous known quantum attacks in the superpositionmodel for some self-similar SPN and Feistel constructions
Brute-Force Cryptanalysis with Aging Hardware: Controlling Half the Output of SHA-256
This paper describes a "three-way collision" on SHA-256 truncated to 128 bits. More precisely, it gives three random-looking bit strings whose hashes by SHA-256 maintain a non-trivial relation: their XOR starts with 128 zero bits. They have been found by brute-force, without exploiting any cryptographic weakness in the hash function itself. This shows that birthday-like computations on 128 bits are becoming increasingly feasible, even for academic teams without substantial means. These bit strings have been obtained by solving a large instance of the three-list generalized birthday problem, a difficult case known as the 3XOR problem. The whole computation consisted of two equally challenging phases: assembling the 3XOR instance and solving it. It was made possible by the combination of: 1) recent progress on algorithms for the 3XOR problem, 2) creative use of "dedicated" hardware accelerators, 3) adapted implementations of 3XOR algorithms that could run on massively parallel machines. Building the three lists required 2 67.6 evaluations of the compression function of SHA-256. They were performed in 7 calendar months by two obsolete secondhand bitcoin mining devices, which can now be acquired on eBay for about 80e. The actual instance of the 3XOR problem was solved in 300 CPU years on a 7-year old IBM Bluegene/Q computer, a few weeks before it was scrapped. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first explicit 128-bit collision-like result for SHA-256. It is the first bitcoin-accelerated cryptanalytic computation and it is also one of the largest public ones
The QARMA Block Cipher Family. Almost MDS Matrices Over Rings With Zero Divisors, Nearly Symmetric Even-Mansour Constructions With Non-Involutory Central Rounds, and Search Heuristics for Low-Latency S-Boxes
This paper introduces QARMA, a new family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers targeted at applications such as memory encryption, the generation of very short tags for hardware-assisted prevention of software exploitation, and the construction of keyed hash functions. QARMA is inspired by reflection ciphers such as PRINCE, to which it adds a tweaking input, and MANTIS. However, QARMA differs from previous reflector constructions in that it is a three-round Even-Mansour scheme instead of a FX-construction, and its middle permutation is non-involutory and keyed. We introduce and analyse a family of Almost MDS matrices defined over a ring with zero divisors that allows us to encode rotations in its operation while maintaining the minimal latency associated to {0, 1}-matrices. The purpose of all these design choices is to harden the cipher against various classes of attacks. We also describe new S-Box search heuristics aimed at minimising the critical path. QARMA exists in 64- and 128-bit block sizes, where block and tweak size are equal, and keys are twice as long as the blocks. We argue that QARMA provides sufficient security margins within the constraints determined by the mentioned applications, while still achieving best-in-class latency. Implementation results on a state-of-the art manufacturing process are reported. Finally, we propose a technique to extend the length of the tweak by using, for instance, a universal hash function, which can also be used to strengthen the security of QARMA
Preparing Symmetric Crypto for the Quantum World
International audienc
Quantum Period Finding against Symmetric Primitives in Practice
International audienceWe present the first complete descriptions of quantum circuits for the offline Simon's algorithm, and estimate their cost to attack the MAC Chaskey, the block cipher PRINCE and the NIST lightweight finalist AEAD scheme Elephant. These attacks require a reasonable amount of qubits, comparable to the number of qubits required to break RSA-2048. They are faster than other collision algorithms, and the attacks against PRINCE and Chaskey are the most efficient known to date. As Elephant has a key smaller than its state size, the algorithm is less efficient and its cost ends up very close to or above the cost of exhaustive search. We also propose an optimized quantum circuit for boolean linear algebra as well as complete reversible implementations of PRINCE, Chaskey, spongent and Keccak which are of independent interest for quantum cryptanalysis. We stress that our attacks could be applied in the future against today's communications, and recommend caution when choosing symmetric constructions for cases where long-term security is expected
A Salad of Block Ciphers
This book is a survey on the state of the art in block cipher design and analysis.
It is work in progress, and it has been for the good part of the last three years -- sadly, for various reasons no significant change has been made during the last twelve months.
However, it is also in a self-contained, useable, and relatively polished state, and for this reason
I have decided to release this \textit{snapshot} onto the public as a service to the cryptographic community, both in order to obtain feedback, and also as a means to give something back to the community from which I have learned much.
At some point I will produce a final version -- whatever being a ``final version\u27\u27 means in the constantly evolving field of block cipher design -- and I will publish it. In the meantime I hope the material contained here will be useful to other people
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