304 research outputs found
Quantum Search for Scaled Hash Function Preimages
We present the implementation of Grover's algorithm in a quantum simulator to
perform a quantum search for preimages of two scaled hash functions, whose
design only uses modular addition, word rotation, and bitwise exclusive or. Our
implementation provides the means to assess with precision the scaling of the
number of gates and depth of a full-fledged quantum circuit designed to find
the preimages of a given hash digest. The detailed construction of the quantum
oracle shows that the presence of AND gates, OR gates, shifts of bits and the
reuse of the initial state along the computation, require extra quantum
resources as compared with other hash functions based on modular additions, XOR
gates and rotations. We also track the entanglement entropy present in the
quantum register at every step along the computation, showing that it becomes
maximal at the inner core of the first action of the quantum oracle, which
implies that no classical simulation based on Tensor Networks would be of
relevance. Finally, we show that strategies that suggest a shortcut based on
sampling the quantum register after a few steps of Grover's algorithm can only
provide some marginal practical advantage in terms of error mitigation.Comment: 24 pages, 14 figure
Cryptanalysis against Symmetric-Key Schemes with Online Classical Queries and Offline Quantum Computations
In this paper, quantum attacks against symmetric-key schemes are presented in which adversaries only make classical queries but use quantum computers for offline computations.
Our attacks are not as efficient as polynomial-time attacks making quantum superposition queries, while our attacks use the realistic model and overwhelmingly improve the classical attacks.
Our attacks convert a type of classical meet-in-the-middle attacks into quantum ones. The attack cost depends on the number of available qubits and the way to realize the quantum hardware. The tradeoff between data complexity and time complexity against the problem of cardinality is and in the best and worst case scenarios to the adversary respectively, while the classic attack requires .
This improvement is meaningful from an engineering aspect because several existing schemes claim beyond-birthday-bound security for by limiting the maximum to be below according to the classical tradeoff . Those schemes are broken if quantum offline computations are performed by adversaries.
The attack can be applied to many schemes such as a tweakable block-cipher construction TDR, a dedicated MAC scheme Chaskey, an on-line authenticated encryption scheme McOE-X, a hash function based MAC H-MAC and a permutation based MAC keyed-sponge.
The idea is then applied to the FX-construction to discover new tradeoffs in the classical query model
Breaking Category Five SPHINCS+ with SHA-256
SPHINCS is a stateless hash-based signature scheme that has been selected for standardization as part of the NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization process. Its security proof relies on the distinct-function multi-target second-preimage resistance (DM-SPR) of the underlying keyed hash function. The SPHINCS submission offered several instantiations of this keyed hash function, including one based on SHA-256. A recent observation by Sydney Antonov on the PQC mailing list demonstrated that the construction based on SHA-256 did not have DM-SPR at NIST category five, for several of the parameter sets submitted to NIST; however, it remained an open question whether this observation leads to a forgery attack. We answer this question in the affirmative by giving a complete forgery attack that reduces the concrete classical security of these parameter sets by approximately 40 bits of security.
Our attack works by applying Antonov\u27s technique to the {WOTS} public keys in {\SPHINCS}, leading to a new one-time key that can sign a very limited set of hash values. From that key, we construct a slightly altered version of the original hypertree with which we can sign arbitrary messages, yielding signatures that appear valid
Security analysis of NIST-LWC contest finalists
Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Informatics EngineeringTraditional cryptographic standards are designed with a desktop and server environment in mind, so, with the
relatively recent proliferation of small, resource constrained devices in the Internet of Things, sensor networks,
embedded systems, and more, there has been a call for lightweight cryptographic standards with security,
performance and resource requirements tailored for the highly-constrained environments these devices find
themselves in.
In 2015 the National Institute of Standards and Technology began a Standardization Process in order to select
one or more Lightweight Cryptographic algorithms. Out of the original 57 submissions ten finalists remain, with
ASCON and Romulus being among the most scrutinized out of them.
In this dissertation I will introduce some concepts required for easy understanding of the body of work, do
an up-to-date revision on the current situation on the standardization process from a security and performance
standpoint, a description of ASCON and Romulus, and new best known analysis, and a comparison of the two,
with their advantages, drawbacks, and unique traits.Os padrões criptográficos tradicionais foram elaborados com um ambiente de computador e servidor em mente.
Com a proliferação de dispositivos de pequenas dimensões tanto na Internet of Things, redes de sensores e
sistemas embutidos, apareceu uma necessidade para se definir padrões para algoritmos de criptografia leve, com
prioridades de segurança, performance e gasto de recursos equilibrados para os ambientes altamente limitados
em que estes dispositivos operam.
Em 2015 o National Institute of Standards and Technology lançou um processo de estandardização com o
objectivo de escolher um ou mais algoritmos de criptografia leve. Das cinquenta e sete candidaturas originais
sobram apenas dez finalistas, sendo ASCON e Romulus dois desses finalistas mais examinados.
Nesta dissertação irei introduzir alguns conceitos necessários para uma fácil compreensão do corpo deste
trabalho, assim como uma revisão atualizada da situação atual do processo de estandardização de um ponto
de vista tanto de segurança como de performance, uma descrição do ASCON e do Romulus assim como as
suas melhores análises recentes e uma comparação entre os dois, frisando as suas vantagens, desvantagens e
aspectos únicos
Nostradamus goes Quantum
In the Nostradamus attack, introduced by Kelsey and Kohno (Eurocrypt 2006), the adversary has to commit to a hash value y of an iterated hash function H such that, when later given a message prefix P, the adversary is able to find a suitable suffix explanation S with H(P||S)=y. Kelsey and Kohno show a herding attack with evaluations of the compression function of H (with n bits output and state), locating the attack between preimage attacks and collision search in terms of complexity. Here we investigate the security of Nostradamus attacks for quantum adversaries. We present a quantum herding algorithm for the Nostradamus problem making approximately compression function evaluations, significantly improving over the classical bound. We also prove that quantum herding attacks cannot do better than evaluations for random compression functions, showing that our algorithm is (essentially) optimal. We also discuss a slightly less tight bound of roughly for general Nostradamus attacks against random compression functions, where s is the maximal block length of the adversarially chosen suffix S
AIM: Symmetric Primitive for Shorter Signatures with Stronger Security (Full Version)
Post-quantum signature schemes based on the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm are recently attracting significant attention as their security solely depends on the one-wayness of the underlying primitive, providing diversity for the hardness assumption in post-quantum cryptography. Recent MPCitH-friendly ciphers have been designed using simple algebraic S-boxes operating on a large field in order to improve the performance of the resulting signature schemes. Due to their simple algebraic structures, their security against algebraic attacks should be comprehensively studied.
In this paper, we refine algebraic cryptanalysis of power mapping based S-boxes over binary extension fields, and cryptographic primitives based on such S-boxes. In particular, for the Gröbner basis attack over , we experimentally show that the exact number of Boolean quadratic equations obtained from the underlying S-boxes is critical to correctly estimate the theoretic complexity based on the degree of regularity. Similarly, it turns out that the XL attack might be faster when all possible quadratic equations are found and used from the S-boxes. This refined cryptanalysis leads to more precise algebraic analysis of cryptographic primitives based on algebraic S-boxes.
Considering the refined algebraic cryptanalysis, we propose a new one-way function, dubbed , as an MPCitH-friendly symmetric primitive with high resistance to algebraic attacks. The security of is comprehensively analyzed with respect to algebraic, statistical, quantum, and generic attacks. is combined with the BN++ proof system, yielding a new signature scheme, dubbed . Our implementation shows that outperforms existing signature schemes based on symmetric primitives in terms of signature size and signing time
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