Combinatorial Games with a Pass: A dynamical systems approach

By treating combinatorial games as dynamical systems, we are able to address a longstanding open question in combinatorial game theory, namely, how the introduction of a "pass" move into a game affects its behavior. We consider two well known combinatorial games, 3-pile Nim and 3-row Chomp. In the case of Nim, we observe that the introduction of the pass dramatically alters the game's underlying structure, rendering it considerably more complex, while for Chomp, the pass move is found to have relatively minimal impact. We show how these results can be understood by recasting these games as dynamical systems describable by dynamical recursion relations. From these recursion relations we are able to identify underlying structural connections between these "games with passes" and a recently introduced class of "generic (perturbed) games." This connection, together with a (non-rigorous) numerical stability analysis, allows one to understand and predict the effect of a pass on a game.Comment: 39 pages, 13 figures, published versio

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned

Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major search engines auction off online advertising. There are, however, some basic problems for which the traditional optimal mechanism design approach is ill-suited --- either because it makes overly strong assumptions, or because it advocates overly complex designs. The thesis of this paper is that approximately optimal mechanisms allow us to reason about fundamental questions that seem out of reach of the traditional theory. This survey has three main parts. The first part describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm --- how it works, and what we aim to learn by applying it. The second and third parts of the survey cover two case studies, where we instantiate the general design paradigm to investigate two basic questions. In the first example, we consider revenue maximization in a single-item auction with heterogeneous bidders. Our goal is to understand if complexity --- in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge --- is an essential feature of good auctions for this problem, or alternatively if there are simpler auctions that are near-optimal. The second example considers welfare maximization with multiple items. Our goal here is similar in spirit: when is complexity --- in the form of high-dimensional bid spaces --- an essential feature of every auction that guarantees reasonable welfare? Are there interesting cases where low-dimensional bid spaces suffice?Comment: Based on a talk given by the author at the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), June 201

Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey

There has been a remarkable increase in work at the interface of computer science and game theory in the past decade. In this article I survey some of the main themes of work in the area, with a focus on the work in computer science. Given the length constraints, I make no attempt at being comprehensive, especially since other surveys are also available, and a comprehensive survey book will appear shortly.Comment: To appear; Palgrave Dictionary of Economic

Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial auctions

This paper analyzes individually-rational ex post equilibrium in the VC (Vickrey-Clarke) combinatorial auctions. If $\Sigma$ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in $\Sigma$. The $\Sigma$-VC combinatorial auctions (multi-good auctions) obtained in this way are known to be individually-rational truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VC auctions, in which the buyers restrict themselves to bids on bundles in $\Sigma$, because it is rational for them to do so. That is, it may be that when the buyers report their valuation of the bundles in $\Sigma$, they are in an equilibrium. We fully characterize those $\Sigma$ that induce individually rational equilibrium in every VC auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling equilibrium. The number of bundles in $\Sigma$ represents the communication complexity of the equilibrium. A special case of bundling equilibrium is partition-based equilibrium, in which $\Sigma$ is a field, that is, it is generated by a partition. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium, focusing in particular on partition-based equilibrium

Open-ended Learning in Symmetric Zero-sum Games

Zero-sum games such as chess and poker are, abstractly, functions that evaluate pairs of agents, for example labeling them `winner' and `loser'. If the game is approximately transitive, then self-play generates sequences of agents of increasing strength. However, nontransitive games, such as rock-paper-scissors, can exhibit strategic cycles, and there is no longer a clear objective -- we want agents to increase in strength, but against whom is unclear. In this paper, we introduce a geometric framework for formulating agent objectives in zero-sum games, in order to construct adaptive sequences of objectives that yield open-ended learning. The framework allows us to reason about population performance in nontransitive games, and enables the development of a new algorithm (rectified Nash response, PSRO_rN) that uses game-theoretic niching to construct diverse populations of effective agents, producing a stronger set of agents than existing algorithms. We apply PSRO_rN to two highly nontransitive resource allocation games and find that PSRO_rN consistently outperforms the existing alternatives.Comment: ICML 2019, final versio

Dagstuhl Reports : Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2011

Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Internet (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 11061) : Simone Fischer-Hübner, Chris Hoofnagle, Kai Rannenberg, Michael Waidner, Ioannis Krontiris and Michael Marhöfer Self-Repairing Programs (Dagstuhl Seminar 11062) : Mauro Pezzé, Martin C. Rinard, Westley Weimer and Andreas Zeller Theory and Applications of Graph Searching Problems (Dagstuhl Seminar 11071) : Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud, Stephan Kreutzer and Dimitrios M. Thilikos Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Sequence Processing (Dagstuhl Seminar 11081) : Maxime Crochemore, Lila Kari, Mehryar Mohri and Dirk Nowotka Packing and Scheduling Algorithms for Information and Communication Services (Dagstuhl Seminar 11091) Klaus Jansen, Claire Mathieu, Hadas Shachnai and Neal E. Youn