Aspects of opening play

In this paper, we study opening play in games. We show experiments using minimax and a semi-random player. In the experiment, we let each semi-random player use an opening-book, created by different player. Results show evidence for the following statements. The game length increases. Expert player against an intermediate player should not use an opening book in a tournament match. Some opening books are good for novices and some opening books are bad for novices. The game outcome will approach the outcome of the game when the opening book was created, and if a grandmaster creates the opening book then the outcome will be the same as the grandmaster’s

On the Complexity of the Mis\`ere Version of Three Games Played on Graphs

We investigate the complexity of finding a winning strategy for the mis\`ere version of three games played on graphs : two variants of the game $\text{NimG}$, introduced by Stockmann in 2004 and the game $\text{Vertex Geography}$ on both directed and undirected graphs. We show that on general graphs those three games are $\text{PSPACE}$-Hard or Complete. For one $\text{PSPACE}$-Hard variant of $\text{NimG}$, we find an algorithm to compute an effective winning strategy in time $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{|V(G)|}.|E(G)|)$ when $G$ is a bipartite graph

How do we remember the past in randomised strategies?

Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system depends on the decisions of both players, supplemented by chance. In this work, we focus on the notion of randomised strategy. More specifically, we show that three natural definitions may lead to very different results: in the most general cases, an almost-surely winning situation may become almost-surely losing if the player is only allowed to use a weaker notion of strategy. In more reasonable settings, translations exist, but they require infinite memory, even in simple cases. Finally, some traditional problems becomes undecidable for the strongest type of strategies

What differentiates professional poker players from recreational poker players? A qualitative interview study

The popularity of poker (and in particular online poker) has increasingly grown worldwide in recent years. Some of the factors that may explain this increased popularity include: (i) an increasing number of celebrities endorsing and playing poker, (ii) an increased number of televised poker tournaments, (iii) 24/7 access of poker via the internet, and (iv) the low stakes needed to play online poker. This increase in the popularity of poker has led to the increased incidence of the ‘professional poker player’. However, very little empirical research has been carried out into this relatively new group of gamblers. This research comprised a grounded theory study involving the analysis of data from three professional poker players, one semi-professional poker player and five recreational poker players. Results showed that all players believed that poker was a game of skill. The central theme as to what distinguishes professional poker players from recreational players was that professional poker players were much more disciplined in their gambling behaviour. They treated their poker playing as work, and as such were more likely to be logical and controlled in their behaviour, took less risks, and were less likely to chase losses. Recreational players were more likely to engage in chasing behaviour, showed signs of lack of control, took more risks, and engaged in gambling while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Also of importance was the number of games and time spent playing online. Recreational players only played one or two games at a time, whereas professional poker players were much more likely to engage in multitable poker online, and played longer sessions, thus increasing the potential amount of winnings. Playing poker for a living is very possible for a minority of players but it takes a combination of talent, dedication, patience, discipline and disposition to succeed

Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.Fil: Niella, Tamara. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; ArgentinaFil: Stier, Nicolas. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin