628 research outputs found
Logicism, Possibilism, and the Logic of Kantian Actualism
In this extended critical discussion of 'Kant's Modal Metaphysics' by Nicholas Stang (OUP 2016), I focus on one central issue from the first chapter of the book: Stangās account of Kantās doctrine that existence is not a real predicate. In Ā§2 I outline some background. In Ā§Ā§3-4 I present and then elaborate on Stangās interpretation of Kantās view that existence is not a real predicate. For Stang, the question of whether existence is a real predicate amounts to the question: ācould there be non-actual possibilia?ā (p.35). Kantās view, according to Stang, is that there could not, and that the very notion of non-actual or āmereā possibilia is incoherent. In Ā§5 I take a close look at Stangās master argument that Kantās Leibnizian predecessors are committed to the claim that existence is a real predicate, and thus to mere possibilia. I argue that it involves substantial logical commitments that the Leibnizian could reject. I also suggest that it is danger of proving too much. In Ā§6 I explore two closely related logical commitments that Stangās reading implicitly imposes on Kant, namely a negative universal free logic and a quantified modal logic that invalidates the Converse Barcan Formula. I suggest that each can seem to involve Kant himself in commitment to mere possibilia
Carnapās Principle of Tolerance and logical pluralism
Logical pluralism is the claim that there is more than one adequate logic. Many authors consider Carnap as one of the forerunners of logical pluralism. More than that, they claim that Carnapās Principle of Tolerance consists in one of the first explicit formulations a logical pluralism. Nonetheless, there is little detailed investigation to evaluate if the Principle of Tolerance necessarily implies a logical pluralism, and if so, of which kind. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Principle of Tolerance, as well as its context, and to investigate the relation between such principle and logical pluralism
Modal Ī©-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism
This essay examines the philosophical significance of -logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of -logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and -logical validity can be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal profiles of -logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, -logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal-computational account of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets
Buying Logical Principles with Ontological Coin: The Metaphysical Lessons of Adding epsilon to Intuitionistic Logic
We discuss the philosophical implications of formal results showing the con-
sequences of adding the epsilon operator to intuitionistic predicate logic. These
results are related to Diaconescuās theorem, a result originating in topos theory
that, translated to constructive set theory, says that the axiom of choice (an
āexistence principleā) implies the law of excluded middle (which purports to be
a logical principle). As a logical choice principle, epsilon allows us to translate
that result to a logical setting, where one can get an analogue of Diaconescuās
result, but also can disentangle the roles of certain other assumptions that are
hidden in mathematical presentations. It is our view that these results have not
received the attention they deserve: logicians are unlikely to read a discussion
because the results considered are āalready well known,ā while the results are
simultaneously unknown to philosophers who do not specialize in what most
philosophers will regard as esoteric logics. This is a problem, since these results
have important implications for and promise signif i cant illumination of contem-
porary debates in metaphysics. The point of this paper is to make the nature
of the results clear in a way accessible to philosophers who do not specialize in
logic, and in a way that makes clear their implications for contemporary philo-
sophical discussions. To make the latter point, we will focus on Dummettian discussions of realism and anti-realism.
Keywords: epsilon, axiom of choice, metaphysics, intuitionistic logic, Dummett,
realism, antirealis
Logicism, Ontology, and the Epistemology of Second-Order Logic
In two recent papers, Bob Hale has attempted to free second-order logic of the 'staggering existential assumptions' with which Quine famously attempted to saddle it. I argue, first, that the ontological issue is at best secondary: the crucial issue about second-order logic, at least for a neo-logicist, is epistemological. I then argue that neither Crispin Wright's attempt to characterize a `neutralist' conception of quantification that is wholly independent of existential commitment, nor Hale's attempt to characterize the second-order domain in terms of definability, can serve a neo-logicist's purposes. The problem, in both cases, is similar: neither Wright nor Hale is sufficiently sensitive to the demands that impredicativity imposes. Finally, I defend my own earlier attempt to finesse this issue, in "A Logic for Frege's Theorem", from Hale's criticisms
Logic, Logicism, and Intuitions in Mathematics
In this work I study the main tenets of the logicist philosophy of mathematics. I deal, basically, with two problems: (1) To what extent can one dispense with intuition in mathematics? (2) What is the appropriate logic for the purposes of logicism? By means of my considerations I try to determine the pros and cons of logicism. My standpoint favors the logicist line of thought
Many-valued logics. A mathematical and computational introduction.
2nd edition. Many-valued logics are those logics that have more than the two classical truth values, to wit, true and false; in fact, they can have from three to infinitely many truth values. This property, together with truth-functionality, provides a powerful formalism to reason in settings where classical logicāas well as other non-classical logicsāis of no avail. Indeed, originally motivated by philosophical concerns, these logics soon proved relevant for a plethora of applications ranging from switching theory to cognitive modeling, and they are today in more demand than ever, due to the realization that inconsistency and vagueness in knowledge bases and information processes are not only inevitable and acceptable, but also perhaps welcome.
The main modern applications of (any) logic are to be found in the digital computer, and we thus require the practical knowledge how to computerizeāwhich also means automateādecisions (i.e. reasoning) in many-valued logics. This, in turn, necessitates a mathematical foundation for these logics. This book provides both these mathematical foundation and practical knowledge in a rigorous, yet accessible, text, while at the same time situating these logics in the context of the satisfiability problem (SAT) and automated deduction.
The main text is complemented with a large selection of exercises, a plus for the reader wishing to not only learn about, but also do something with, many-valued logics
Ethics and economics in Karl Menger: how did social sciences cope with Hilbertism
This paper deals with the contributions made to the social sciences by the mathematician Karl Menger (1902-1985), the son of the more famous economist, Carl Menger. Mathematician and a logician, he focused on whether it was possible to explain the social order in formal terms.1 He stressed the need to find the appropriate means with which to treat them, avoiding recourse to historical descriptions, which are unable to yield social laws. He applied Hilbertism to economics and ethics in order to build an axiomatic and formalized model of the individual behavior and the dynamics of social groups.
Finding problems in knowledge bases using modal logics
In this paper I propose that it is suitable to consider some statements that an expert makes during knowledge elicitation as being statements in a modal logic. This approach gives us several advantages in finding inconsistencies between a knowledge base and an expert's intuition in her field. I illustrate this approach by using the modal logic VC, a logic of counterfactual conditionals. In an appendix, I give brief details of theorem proving in VC
Tuples all the way down?
We can introduce singular terms for ordered pairs by means of an abstraction principle. Doing so proves useful for a number of projects in the philosophy of mathematics. However there is a question whether we can appeal to the abstraction principle in good faith, since a version of the Caesar Problem can be generated, posing the worry that abstraction fails to introduce expressions which refer determinately to the requisite sort of object. In this short paper I will pose the difficulty, and then propose a solution
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