7 research outputs found
Low-Complexity Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are efficiently computable functions that shrink a long input into a shorter output while achieving some of the useful security properties of a random function.
The most common type of such hash functions is collision resistant hash functions (CRH), which prevent an efficient attacker from finding a pair of inputs on which the function has the same output
Non-Adaptive Universal One-Way Hash Functions from Arbitrary One-Way Functions
In this work we give the first non-adaptive construction of universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs) from arbitrary one-way functions. Our construction uses calls to the one-way function, has a key of length , and can be implemented in NC1 assuming the underlying one-way function is in NC1.
Prior to this work, the best UOWHF construction used O(n13) adaptive calls and a key of size O(n5) (Haitner, Holenstein, Reingold, Vadhan and Wee [Eurocrypt ’10]). By the result of Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz [FOCS ’04], the above implies the existence of UOWHFs in NC0, given the existence of one-way functions in NC1.
We also show that the PRG construction of Haitner, Reingold and Vadhan (HRV, [STOC ’10]), with small modifications, yields a relaxed notion of UOWHFs , which is a function family which can be (inefficiently) converted to UOWHF by changing the functions on a negligible fraction of the inputs. In order to analyze this construction, we introduce the notion of next-bit unreachable entropy, which replaces the next-bit pseudoentropy notion used by HRV
Proving as Fast as Computing: Succinct Arguments with Constant Prover Overhead
Succinct arguments are proof systems that allow a powerful, but untrusted, prover to convince a weak verifier that an input belongs to a language , with communication that is much shorter than the witness. Such arguments, which grew out of the theory literature, are now drawing immense interest also in practice, where a key bottleneck that has arisen is the high computational cost of \emph{proving} correctness.
In this work we address this problem by constructing succinct arguments for general computations, expressed as Boolean circuits (of bounded fan-in), with a \emph{strictly linear} size prover. The soundness error of the protocol is an arbitrarily small constant. Prior to this work, succinct arguments were known with a \emph{quasi-}linear size prover for general Boolean circuits or with linear-size only for arithmetic circuits, defined over large finite fields.
In more detail, for every Boolean circuit , we construct an -round argument-system in which the prover can be implemented by a size Boolean circuit (given as input both the instance and the witness ), with arbitrarily small constant soundness error and using communication, where denotes the security parameter. The verifier can be implemented by a size circuit following a size private pre-processing step, or, alternatively, by using a purely public-coin protocol (with no pre-processing) with a size verifier. The protocol can be made zero-knowledge using standard techniques (and with similar parameters). The soundness of our protocol is computational and relies on the existence of collision resistant hash functions that can be computed by linear-size circuits, such as those proposed by Applebaum et al. (ITCS, 2017).
At the heart of our construction is a new information-theoretic \emph{interactive oracle proof} (IOP), an interactive analog of a PCP, for circuit satisfiability, with constant prover overhead. The improved efficiency of our IOP is obtained by bypassing a barrier faced by prior IOP constructions, which needed to (either explicitly or implicitly) encode the entire computation using a multiplication code
Multi-Collision Resistance: A Paradigm for Keyless Hash Functions
We introduce a new notion of multi-collision resistance for keyless hash functions. This is a natural relaxation of collision resistance where it is hard to find multiple inputs with the same hash in the following sense. The number of colliding inputs that a polynomial-time non-uniform adversary can find is not much larger than its advice. We discuss potential candidates for this notion and study its applications.
Assuming the existence of such hash functions, we resolve the long-standing question of the round complexity of zero knowledge protocols --- we construct a 3-message zero knowledge argument against arbitrary polynomial-size non-uniform adversaries. We also improve the round complexity in several other central applications, including a 3-message succinct argument of knowledge for NP, a 4-message zero-knowledge proof, and a 5-message public-coin zero-knowledge argument. Our techniques can also be applied in the keyed setting, where we match the round complexity of known protocols while relaxing the underlying assumption from collision-resistance to keyed multi-collision resistance.
The core technical contribution behind our results is a domain extension transformation from multi-collision-resistant hash functions for a fixed input length to ones with an arbitrary input length and a local opening property. The transformation is based on a combination of classical domain extension techniques, together with new information-theoretic tools. In particular, we define and construct a new variant of list-recoverable codes, which may be of independent interest
Ligero: Lightweight Sublinear Arguments Without a Trusted Setup
We design and implement a simple zero-knowledge argument protocol for whose communication complexity is proportional to the square-root of the verification circuit size. The protocol can be based on any collision-resistant hash function. Alternatively, it can be made non-interactive in the random oracle model, yielding concretely efficient zk-SNARKs that do not require a trusted setup or public-key cryptography. Our protocol is obtained by applying an optimized version of the general transformation of Ishai et al. (STOC 2007) to a variant of the protocol for secure multiparty computation of Damgrd and Ishai (CRYPTO 2006). It can be viewed as a simple zero-knowledge interactive PCP based on ``interleaved\u27\u27 Reed-Solomon codes.
This paper is an extended version of the paper published in CCS 2017 and features a tighter analysis, better implementation along with formal proofs. For large verification circuits, the Ligero prover remains competitive against subsequent works with respect to the prover’s running time, where our efficiency advantages become even bigger in an amortized setting, where several instances need to be proven simultaneously.
Our protocol is attractive not only for very large verification circuits but also for moderately large circuits that arise in applications. For instance, for verifying a SHA-256 preimage with soundness error, the communication complexity is roughly 35KB.
The communication complexity of our protocol is independent of the circuit structure and depends only on the number of gates. For soundness error, the communication becomes smaller than the circuit size for circuits containing roughly 3 million gates or more. With our refined analysis the Ligero system\u27s proof lengths and prover\u27s running times are better than subsequent post-quantum ZK-SNARKs for small to moderately large circuits
Oblivious Transfer with constant computational overhead
The computational overhead of a cryptographic task is the asymptotic ratio between the computational cost of securely realizing the task and that of realizing the task with no security at all. Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2008) showed that secure two-party computation of Boolean circuits can be realized with constant computational overhead, independent of the desired level of security, assuming the existence of an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol and a local pseudorandom generator (PRG). However, this only applies to the case of semi-honest parties. A central open question in the area is the possibility of a similar result for malicious parties. This question is open even for the simpler task of securely realizing many instances of a constant-size function, such as OT of bits. We settle the question in the affirmative for the case of OT, assuming: (1) a standard OT protocol, (2) a slightly stronger “correlation-robust" variant of a local PRG, and (3) a standard sparse variant of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. An optimized version of our construction requires fewer than 100 bit operations per party per bit-OT. For 128-bit security, this improves over the best previous protocols by 1–2 orders of magnitude. We achieve this by constructing a constant-overhead pseudorandom correlation generator (PCG) for the bit-OT correlation. Such a PCG generates N pseudorandom instances of bit-OT by locally expanding short, correlated seeds. As a result, we get an end-to-end protocol for generating N pseudorandom instances of bit-OT with o(N) communication, O(N) computation, and security that scales sub-exponentially with N. Finally, we present applications of our main result to realizing other secure computation tasks with constant computational overhead. These include protocols for general circuits with a relaxed notion of security against malicious parties, protocols for realizing N instances of natural constant-size functions, and reducing the main open question to a potentially simpler question about fault-tolerant computation