A PROPOSAL TO REFINE CONCEPT MAPPING FOR EFFECTIVE SCIENCE LEARNING

Concept maps are found to be useful in eliciting knowledge, meaningful learning, evaluation of understanding and in studying the nature of changes taking place during cognitive development, particularly in the classroom. Several experts have claimed the effectiveness of this tool for learning science. We agree with the claim, but the effectiveness will improve only if we gradually introduce a certain amount of discipline in constructing the maps. The discipline is warranted, we argue, because science thrives to be an unambiguous and rigorously structured body of knowledge. Since learning science may be seen as a process where a novice is expected to be transformed into an expert, we use the context of learning science for making the proposal. Further, we identify certain anomalies in the evaluation of concept maps, and suggest that the evaluation should be based on semantics of the linking words (relation types) and not on graphical criteria alone.\u

Removing conceptual blinders: Under what conditions does the ‘democratic deficit’ affect institutional design decisions?

This paper pursues two objectives, one theoretical the other empirical. First, by keeping separate two grand strands in the EU studies literature, one on the design and reform of EU institutions and the other on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, EU scholars are foreclosing the opportunity to address a hitherto unanswered question: When and under what conditions does the ‘democratic deficit’ – as it is perceived by political elites in the member states – carry institutional design implications? Does the ‘democratic deficit’ really matter to political elites, and if this is the case, how does it matter? Will it inform political elites’ preferences and choices for institutional design and change? By conceptualising the ‘democratic deficit’ as a value of the independent variable, we are guided to ask when and under what conditions it informs decisions for institutional design and reform. This paper will develop a set of propositions linking political elites’ perceptions about a ‘democratic deficit’ and their institutional design preferences. Secondly, to test the plausibility of these propositions, they will be subjected to empirical scrutiny. The paper shows that the creation and empowerment of the European Parliament can be accounted for by applying the propositions elaborated in this paper. Hence, a question that has puzzled students of European integration since the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – why national governments have successively bestowed the European Parliament (EP) with powers (supervisory, budgetary, and legislative) – can only be answered by exploring the conditions under which the ‘democratic deficit’ – as perceived by political elites – will carry institutional design implications.constitution building; democracy; ideas; legitimacy; non-majoritarian institutions; treaty reform; European Parliament

The Poss-Ability Principle, G-cases, and Fitch Propositions

There is a very plausible principle linking abilities and possibilities: If S is able to Φ, then it is metaphysically possible that S Φ’s. Jack Spencer recently proposed a class of counterexamples to this principle involving the ability to know certain propositions. I renew an argument against these counterexamples based on the unknowability of Fitch propositions. In doing so, I provide a new argument for the unknowability of Fitch propositions and show that Spencer’s counterexamples are in tension with a principle weaker than the one linking abilities and possibilities

Standard Bayes logic is not finitely axiomatizable

In the paper [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136] a hierarchy of modal logics have been defined to capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in that hierarchy were distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to Medvedev's logic of (in)finite problems it has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. However, the infinite case remained open. In this paper we prove that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by standard Borel spaces (these cover probability spaces that occur in most of the applications) is also not finitely axiomatizable

Relating propositions : subordination and coordination strategies in a polysynthetic language

This paper discusses the relationship between the morphological structure of language and its syntactic structure. Although it is primarily a single language which is analysed in detail, namely, Inuktitut, an Eskimo language of the Canadian Eastern Arctic, the findings seem to be of general relevance