79,129 research outputs found
Stochastic network formation and homophily
This is a chapter of the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on the Economics of
Networks
Strategic communication networks
In this paper, we consider situations in which individuals want to choose an action close to others' actions as well as close to a payoff relevant state of nature with the ideal proximity to the common state varying across the agents. Before this coordination game with heterogeneous preferences is played, a cheap talk communication stage is offered to players who decide to whom they reveal the private information they hold about the state. The strategic information transmission taking place in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication network. We provide a direct link between players' preferences and the strategic communication network emerging at equilibrium, depending on the strength of the coordination motive and the prior information structure. Equilibrium strategic communication networks are characterized in a very tractable way and compared in term of efficiency. In general, a maximal strategic communication network may not exist and communication networks cannot be ordered in the sense of Pareto. However, expected social welfare always increases when the communication network expands. Strategic information transmission can be improved when group or public communication is allowed, and/or when information is certifiable.cheap talk ; coordination ; partially verifiable types ; public and private communication
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet
to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions
limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that
the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent
or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are
therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted
to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the
evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies.
We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences
between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions
and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review
fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to
different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations.
The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of
information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on
different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern
formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under
adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and
evolutionary game theory.Comment: 14 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in European
Physical Journal
Bounded Confidence under Preferential Flip: A Coupled Dynamics of Structural Balance and Opinions
In this work we study the coupled dynamics of social balance and opinion
formation. We propose a model where agents form opinions under bounded
confidence, but only considering the opinions of their friends. The signs of
social ties -friendships and enmities- evolve seeking for social balance,
taking into account how similar agents' opinions are. We consider both the case
where opinions have one and two dimensions. We find that our dynamics produces
the segregation of agents into two cliques, with the opinions of agents in one
clique differing from those in the other. Depending on the level of bounded
confidence, the dynamics can produce either consensus of opinions within each
clique or the coexistence of several opinion clusters in a clique. For the
uni-dimensional case, the opinions in one clique are all below the opinions in
the other clique, hence defining a "left clique" and a "right clique". In the
two-dimensional case, our numerical results suggest that the two cliques are
separated by a hyperplane in the opinion space. We also show that the
phenomenon of unidimensional opinions identified by DeMarzo, Vayanos and
Zwiebel (Q J Econ 2003) extends partially to our dynamics. Finally, in the
context of politics, we comment about the possible relation of our results to
the fragmentation of an ideology and the emergence of new political parties.Comment: 8 figures, PLoS ONE 11(10): e0164323, 201
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