A Monitoring Language for Run Time and Post-Mortem Behavior Analysis and Visualization

UFO is a new implementation of FORMAN, a declarative monitoring language, in which rules are compiled into execution monitors that run on a virtual machine supported by the Alamo monitor architecture.Comment: In M. Ronsse, K. De Bosschere (eds), proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Automated Debugging (AADEBUG 2003), September 2003, Ghent. cs.SE/030902

Adonis: Practical and Efficient Control Flow Recovery through OS-Level Traces

Control flow recovery is critical to promise the software quality, especially for large-scale software in production environment. However, the efficiency of most current control flow recovery techniques is compromised due to their runtime overheads along with deployment and development costs. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel solution, Adonis, which harnesses OS-level traces, such as dynamic library calls and system call traces, to efficiently and safely recover control flows in practice. Adonis operates in two steps: it first identifies the call-sites of trace entries, then it executes a pair-wise symbolic execution to recover valid execution paths. This technique has several advantages. First, Adonis does not require the insertion of any probes into existing applications, thereby minimizing runtime cost. Second, given that OS-level traces are hardware-independent, Adonis can be implemented across various hardware configurations without the need for hardware-specific engineering efforts, thus reducing deployment cost. Third, as Adonis is fully automated and does not depend on manually created logs, it circumvents additional development cost. We conducted an evaluation of Adonis on representative desktop applications and real-world IoT applications. Adonis can faithfully recover the control flow with 86.8% recall and 81.7% precision. Compared to the state-of-the-art log-based approach, Adonis can not only cover all the execution paths recovered, but also recover 74.9% of statements that cannot be covered. In addition, the runtime cost of Adonis is 18.3× lower than the instrument-based approach; the analysis time and storage cost (indicative of the deployment cost) of Adonis is 50× smaller and 443× smaller than the hardware-based approach, respectively. To facilitate future replication and extension of this work, we have made the code and data publicly available

Partial replay of long-running applications

Bugs in deployed software can be extremely difficult to track down. Invasive logging techniques, such as logging all non-deterministic inputs, can incur substantial runtime overheads. This paper shows how symbolic analysis can be used to re-create path equivalent executions for very long running programs such as databases and web servers. The goal is to help developers debug such long-running programs by allowing them to walk through an execution of the last few requests or transactions leading up to an error. The challenge is to provide this functionality without the high runtime overheads associated with traditional replay techniques based on input logging or memory snapshots. Our approach achieves this by recording a small amount of information about program execution, such as the direction of branches taken, and then using symbolic analysis to reconstruct the execution of the last few inputs processed by the application, as well as the state of memory before these inputs were executed. We implemented our technique in a new tool called bbr. In this paper, we show that it can be used to replay bugs in long-running single-threaded programs starting from the middle of an execution. We show that bbr incurs low recording overhead (avg. of 10%) during program execution, which is much less than existing replay schemes. We also show that it can reproduce real bugs from web servers, database systems, and other common utilities

Automated Failure Explanation Through Execution Comparison

When fixing a bug in software, developers must build an understanding or explanation of the bug and how the bug flows through a program. The effort that developers must put into building this explanation is costly and laborious. Thus, developers need tools that can assist them in explaining the behavior of bugs. Dynamic slicing is one technique that can effectively show how a bug propagates through an execution up to the point where a program fails. However, dynamic slices are large because they do not just explain the bug itself; they include extra information that explains any observed behavior that might be connected to the bug. Thus, the explanation of the bug is hidden within this other tangentially related information. This dissertation addresses the problem and shows how a failing execution and a correct execution may be compared in order to construct explanations that include only information about what caused the bug. As a result, these automated explanations are significantly more concise than those explanations produced by existing dynamic slicing techniques. To enable the comparison of executions, we develop new techniques for dynamic analyses that identify the commonalities and differences between executions. First, we devise and implement the notion of a point within an execution that may exist across multiple executions. We also note that comparing executions involves comparing the state or variables and their values that exist within the executions at different execution points. Thus, we design an approach for identifying the locations of variables in different executions so that their values may be compared. Leveraging these tools, we design a system for identifying the behaviors within an execution that can be blamed for a bug and that together compose an explanation for the bug. These explanations are up to two orders of magnitude smaller than those produced by existing state of the art techniques. We also examine how different choices of a correct execution for comparison can impact the practicality or potential quality of the explanations produced via our system

Preventing Code Reuse Attacks On Modern Operating Systems

Modern operating systems are often the target of attacks that exploit vulnerabilities to escalate their privilege level. Recently introduced hardening features prevent attackers from using traditional kernel exploitation methodologies and force them to employ techniques that were originally designed for user space exploitation —such as code reuse— to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. In this dissertation, we present novel protection mechanisms that render such methodologies ineffective and improve the security of today’s operating systems. Specifically, we present solutions that prevent the leakage and corruption of kernel code pointers without employing entities that execute on super-privileged mode (e.g., hypervisors). The leakage of code pointers is an essential step for the construction of reliable code reuse exploits and their corruption is typically necessary for mounting the attack. More concretely, we present the design and implementation of two systems: kR^X and kSplitStack. kR^X is a system that diversifies the code layout to thwart attackers from constructing code reuse exploits statically. It also prevents the leakage of return addresses through XOR- based encryption or by hiding them among decoys (fake pointers to instructions that trap the kernel when executed). Finally, it couples the above with a self-protection mechanism that prevents attackers from leaking the diversified code layout, either by instrumenting every memory read instruction with range checks on x86-64 systems or by imposing limits through the segmentation unit on x86 systems. Evaluation results show that it imposes small runtime overhead on real-world applications when measured on legacy x86-64 systems (~3.63%) and significantly lower on x86 systems (~1.32%) and newer x86-64 CPUs that provide hardware assistance (~2.32%). kSplitStack, on the other hand, provides stronger protection against leaks of return addresses and guarantees both their secrecy and their integrity by augmenting the isolation mechanism of kR^X on x86-64 systems. This is achieved through a split stack scheme: functions use an unprotected stack for their local variables but switch to a protected one when pushing or poping return addresses. Moreover, kSplitStack protects the secrecy and integrity of control data (e.g., the value of the instruction pointer) in interrupt contexts by redirecting them to protected stacks, thus thwarting attackers from leaking or corrupting code pointers by inducing interrupts or other hardware events. Finally, the evaluation of kSplitStack shows that it imposes a small runtime overhead, comparable to the one of kR^X, both on legacy x86-64 systems (~3.66%) and on newer CPUs with hardware assistance (~2.50%)