653 research outputs found

    Behind the Curtain

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    [Excerpt] On August 31, 2004, for the first time, the nation’s mutual fund companies reported how they cast their proxy votes at the public companies in which they invest. The disclosure is the result of Securities and Exchange Commission rules adopted in January 2003, rules that the AFL-CIO first petitioned for in December 2000 and that the mutual fund industry strenuously opposed. This report evaluates how the 10 largest mutual fund families voted when presented with the opportunity to curb CEO pay abuses at a dozen S&P 500 companies in 2004. We chose executive compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, “The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation.

    Behind the Curtain: How the 10 Largest Mutual Fund Families Voted When Presented with 12 Opportunities to Curb CEO Pay Abuse in 2004

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    [Excerpt] On August 31, 2004, for the first time, the nation’s mutual fund companies reported how they cast their proxy votes at the public companies in which they invest. The disclosure is the result of Securities and Exchange Commission rules adopted in January 2003, rules that the AFL-CIO first petitioned for in December 2000 and that the mutual fund industry strenuously opposed. This report evaluates how the 10 largest mutual fund families voted when presented with the opportunity to curb CEO pay abuses at a dozen S&P 500 companies in 2004. We chose executive compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, “The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation.” We found that, when it comes to voting proxies on proposals involving CEO pay abuses, there is significant variation among fund families. The scores in our survey ranged from a high of 100% for American Century to a low of 20% for Putnam

    The rise and demise of Lucent Technologies

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    We analyze the rise and demise of Lucent Technologies from the time that it was spun off from AT&T in April 1996 to its merger with Alcatel in December 2006. The analysis, contained in the three sections that form the body of this paper, considers three questions concerning Lucent’s performance over the decade of its existence. 1.How was Lucent, with over $20 billion in sales in 1995 as a division of AT&T, able to almost double its size by achieving a compound growth rate of over 17 percent per year from 1995 to 1999? 2.What was the relationship between Lucent’s growth strategy during the Internet boom and the company’s financial difficulties in the Internet crash of 2001-2003 when the Lucent was on the brink of bankruptcy? 3.After extensive restructuring during the telecommunications industry downturn of 2001-2003, why was Lucent unable to re-emerge as an innovative competitor in the communications equipment industry when the industry recovered?Communications equipment; innovation; global competition; financialization

    Advancement, Spring 2001

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    Advancement, a supplement to Bostonia magazine, provided updates on BU development activities, including major gifts and projects

    CED's 1999 Annual Report

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    Committee for Economic Development's annual report for 1999

    Purchasing Power: The Corporate-White House Alliance to Pass the China Trade Bill Over the Will of the American People

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    The passage of China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) by the U.S. House of Representatives in late May 2000 over the overwhelming will of the American people was the result of the most forceful and aggressive corporate legislative campaign in history. Despite four-to-one public opposition, the bill was passed by the use of unprecedented amounts of corporate money in political contributions, advertising, lobbying and rented "experts," as well as the application of the White House s full resources. To fulfill their own overlapping goals, the corporate coalition and the White House worked in such tight coordination that the General Accounting Office has reported that federal law on Executive branch lobbying practices was violated. Deaf to pleas from even pro-PNTR House Democrats, the administration launched the China PNTR crusade to build a legacy for the President knowing it would damage Democrats chances to regain a House majority. To celebrate the House PNTR vote, President Clinton went out that night to a corporate political fund-raiser boycotted by many Democratic House Leaders. The corporate interest was in eliminating the annual Congressional review of China trade and to obtain unconditional, unlimited access to the U.S. market for goods produced in China. The day after the House vote, the Wall Street Journal and other papers finally reported that the corporations were not so much interested in access to the Chinese market to sell goods there, but rather sought guaranteed U.S. access for goods they could produce in China with its remarkably high-quality, cheap, government-controlled labor and lax environmental controls. Passing China PNTR was an important priority for both players for another important and symbolic reason: the proponents of corporate globalization and corporate managed trade had been defeated for five years by a determined citizen s movement that recognized that the corporate and White House globalization agenda was benefitting narrow corporate interests at the expense of working families and the environment. The Clinton administration and the corporate lobbies had pushed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which established the World Trade Organization (WTO) through the Congress during the administration s first term. While the NAFTA and WTO fights required concerted corporate lobbying and public relations efforts, obtaining political support for expanding existing globalization policies had become much more difficult. Polling showed that people had become aware of the all-too-real down sides of what its proponents dubbed "free trade," but was increasingly revealed to be corporate managed trade. Several years after NAFTA's passage when its negative impacts became apparent, public opinion, never supportive of the corporate-White House trade agenda, turned frosty. Significant relocation of high-wage manufacturing jobs to Mexico, increased border pollution and health problems, and the declining safety of America s increasingly imported food supply made the public increasingly skeptical of the promises and projections made by the "free trade" proponents. The complete executive summary and access to the full report available via the link below

    Crummer Graduate School 2001-2003

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    Rollins College catalogue with list of faculty and students and courses by department

    Crummer Graduate School Catalog 2007

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    Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy?: Business Organization and High-Tech Employment in the United States

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    Lazonick explores the origins of the new era of employment insecurity and income inequality, and considers what governments, businesses, and individuals can do about it. He also asks whether the United States can refashion its high-tech business model to generate stable and equitable economic growth.https://research.upjohn.org/up_press/1029/thumbnail.jp

    Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples

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