Leadership - Lessons from the Battlefield (Gettysburg)

In these conference notes from the CSA/CEO Conference at the Army War College in Carlisle, PA, Pollard applies lessons from the battle of Gettysburg to the topic of leadership

Going To War with Defense Contractors: a Case Study Analysis of Battlefield Acquisition

The escalating use of contractors on the battlefield in highly critical operational areas is a trend that is increasing across the DoD. Contractors have a vital role supporting CONUS missions, but they are also on the battlefield in defense of our nation, supporting the warfighter and their weapon systems. As the use of contractors on the battlefield continues to gain favor within the DoD, and as contractor s roles continue to expand and become more critical, it is imperative to improve the current way that the DoD, and specifically Air Force acquisition professionals, procure such services. This research analyzes inputs from DoD Policy Experts, Contractor Policy Experts, Army Policy Experts, Air Force Policy Experts, and 13 Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield to support, maintain, and/or troubleshoot their weapon systems. Content analysis and pattern matching were used to determine the current status of battlefield acquisition, draw conclusions, and make recommendations. Several problem areas in this area of acquisition were identified as well as best practices and lessons learned

Point/Counterpoint: The Gettysburg Battlefield Marathon

Jeff: On November 6, the small town of Gettysburg will be swarmed by runners during the first ever Gettysburg Battlefield Marathon. The event has provoked heated discussion from many in the Civil War community, bringing up many questions regarding the use of our most hallowed grounds for recreational use. In this post, Matt and I will engage in a back and forth conversation about the concerns and advantages of the race. I’d like to begin by noting that the views that we each express in this piece may not necessarily be our own and that we may merely be bringing them up to contribute to the conversation surrounding the marathon. [excerpt

Battle of Vellinghausen: Lessons Learnt? A Study of the British army in the closing stages of the Seven Years War in Western Europe as studied through the Battle of Vellinghausen

This is a study of the British military actions in Western Germany during the Seven Years War, investigating the army’s ability in combat and analysing its improvements through the case study of the Battle of Vellinghausen. This will provide a more concentrated scope of the conflict centred on the Western theatre, rather than the general study upon the British army in America or the academic’s attraction with the Battle of Minden. With this in mind the research will be significant as it will open up discussions on how the British army fought in the European style during the mid-eighteenth century, as well as aiming to explore whether the British army learnt from its lessons early in the war to become an efficient fighting machine. The purpose of this thesis is to identify the actions of the British army during the Seven Years War in Western Germany, breaking the army down into its component parts to highlight how the army fought on a European battlefield. By addressing the campaigns during 1758-61, this gives me several key battles with which to analyse whether the army improved its performance. The mid-eighteenth century was a period of shifting tactics in the way European war was fought, with new tactics and doctrine altering warfare, such as the adoption of irregular forces, or the advancement in artillery science. This thesis will identify any changes that were absorbed and whether these improved the army. It is to be noted that Western Europe is important to study, as the historiography studied within the Seven Years War focuses on other theatres of the conflict, chiefly America and Frederick the Greats campaigns in Central Europe. This lack of interest by British historians could possibly be due to the fact that the army in Western Europe was not chiefly a British one; nor was the theatre considered particularly important by the British government or featured any monumental battles such as Leuthen, Kolin or Kunersdorf. These features could be contributing to the lack of academic study within this area, a situation I would like to address. Coupled with this is the fact that enough has already been written on the analyses of the political, social and economic areas of this period in the Age of Enlightenment. Thus I believe it is necessary to return to traditional military history, which has long been neglected, and bring to light the successful actions of the British Army in Western Europe back into study

US assessments of Japanese ground warfare tactics and the Army’s campaigns in the Pacific theaters, 1943-45: lessons learned and methods applied

The article examines the evolution of US intelligence assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army's tactical methods during the Pacific War, and explains how the resulting perceptions influenced the development of American doctrine for fighting the Japanese. It argues that US evaluations of the Japanese were characterized primarily by the need to gain a realistic understanding of enemy fighting capabilities, coupled with a realization of the need to improve the army's techniques for fighting a successful campaign

Dismantling the ‘Lesser Men’ and ‘Supermen’ myths: US intelligence on the imperial Japanese army after the fall of the Philippines, winter 1942 to spring 1943

During the opening stages of the Pacific War, between December 1941 and spring 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared unstoppable. US forces in the Philippines, despite their efforts, could not hold out against the enemy advance, and by April the last vestiges of their resistance at Bataan and Corregidor became untenable. The intelligence obtained during the initial encounters provided the US defense establishment with undeniable reasons to conclude that Japanese ground forces possessed a high level of tactical skill, and assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army tended to exaggerate the latter’s capabilities