Designing Institutional Infrastructure for E-Science

A new generation of information and communication infrastructures, including advanced Internet computing and Grid technologies, promises more direct and shared access to more widely distributed computing resources than was previously possible. Scientific and technological collaboration, consequently, is more and more dependent upon access to, and sharing of digital research data. Thus, the U.S. NSF Directorate committed in 2005 to a major research funding initiative, “Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st Century Discovery”. These investments are aimed at enhancement of computer and network technologies, and the training of researchers. Animated by much the same view, the UK e-Science Core Programme has preceded the NSF effort in funding development of an array of open standard middleware platforms, intended to support Grid enabled science and engineering research. This proceeds from the sceptical view that engineering breakthroughs alone will not be enough to achieve the outcomes envisaged. Success in realizing the potential of e-Science—through the collaborative activities supported by the "cyberinfrastructure," if it is to be achieved, will be the result of a nexus of interrelated social, legal, and technical transformations.e-science, cyberinfrastructure, information sharing, research

The future of Cybersecurity in Italy: Strategic focus area

This volume has been created as a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian Nation research community considers essential. The book touches many aspects of cyber security, ranging from the definition of the infrastructure and controls needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the identification of the main technologies to be defended to the proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management

The New Politics of US Health Care Prices: Institutional Reconfiguration and the Emergence of All-Payer Claims Databases

Prices are a significant driver of health care cost in the United States. Existing research on the politics of health system reform has emphasized the limited nature of policy entrepreneurs’ efforts at solving the problem of rising prices through direct regulation at the state level. Yet this literature fails to account for how change agents in the states gradually reconfigured the politics of prices, forging new, transparency-based policy instruments called all-payer claims databases (APCDs), which are designed to empower consumers, purchasers, and states to make informed market and policy choices. Drawing on pragmatist institutional theory, this article shows how APCDs emerged as the dominant model for reforming health care prices. While APCD advocates faced significant institutional barriers to policy change, we show how they reconfigured existing ideas, tactical repertoires, and legal-technical infrastructures to develop a politically and technologically robust reform. Our analysis has important implications for theories of how change agents overcome structural barriers to health reform

Cybersecurity for Infrastructure: A Critical Analysis

Nations and their citizens rely on infrastructures. Their incapacitation or destruction could prevent nations from protecting themselves from threats, cause substantial economic harm, and even result in the loss of life. Therefore, safeguarding these infrastructures is an obvious strategic task for any sovereign state. While the need to protect critical infrastructures (CIs) is far from novel, digitization brings new challenges as well as increased cyber-risks. This need is self-evident; yet, the optimal policy regime is debatable. The United States and other nations have thus far opted for very light regulation, merely encouraging voluntary steps while choosing to intervene only in a handful of sectors. Over the past few years, several novel laws and regulations addressing this emerging issue have been legislated. Yet, the overall trajectory of limited regulatory intervention has not changed. With that, the wisdom of such a limited regulatory framework must be revisited and possibly reconsidered. This Article fills an important gap in the legal literature by contributing to and promoting this debate on cyber-risk regulation of CIs, while mapping out the relevant rights, options, and interests this ‘critical’ debate entails and setting forth a regulatory blueprint that balances the relevant factors and considerations. The Article begins in Part II by defining CIs and cyber risks and explaining why cyber risk requires a reassessment of CI protection strategies. Part III describes the means used by the United States and several other nations to address cyber risks of CIs. Part IV examines a market-based approach with minimal governmental intervention to critical infrastructure cyber-regulation, along with the various market failures, highlighting assorted minimal measures to correct these problems. It further examines these limited forms of regulation, which merely strive to bridge information and expertise barriers, assign ex post liability for security-related harms, or provide other specific incentives—and finds them all insufficient. Part V continues the normative evaluation of CI cyber-protection models, focusing on ex ante approaches, which require more intrusive government involvement in terms of setting and enforcing standards. It discusses several concerns with this regulatory strategy, including the lack of governmental expertise, regulatory capture, compromised rights, lack of transparency, and the centralization of authority. Finally, in Part VI, the Article proposes a blueprint for CI cyber protection that goes beyond the mere voluntary regulatory strategy applied today

Trusting (and Verifying) Online Intermediaries\u27 Policing

All is not well in the land of online self-regulation. However competently internet intermediaries police their sites, nagging questions will remain about their fairness and objectivity in doing so. Is Comcast blocking BitTorrent to stop infringement, to manage traffic, or to decrease access to content that competes with its own for viewers? How much digital due process does Google need to give a site it accuses of harboring malware? If Facebook censors a video of war carnage, is that a token of respect for the wounded or one more reflexive effort of a major company to ingratiate itself with the Washington establishment? Questions like these will persist, and erode the legitimacy of intermediary self-policing, as long as key operations of leading companies are shrouded in secrecy. Administrators must develop an institutional competence for continually monitoring rapidly-changing business practices. A trusted advisory council charged with assisting the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could help courts and agencies adjudicate controversies concerning intermediary practices. An Internet Intermediary Regulatory Council (IIRC) would spur the development of expertise necessary to understand whether companies’ controversial decisions are socially responsible or purely self-interested. Monitoring is a prerequisite for assuring a level playing field online

New Challenges in Critical Infrastructures : A US Perspective

L'émergence d'un plus large spectre de vulnérabilités (terrorisme, sabotage, conflits locaux et catastrophes naturelles) et l'interdépendance croissante de l'activité économique rendent particulièrement vulnérables les grands réseaux vitaux des pays industrialisés. Pour y faire face, des actions importantes doivent être menées à une échelle nationale, en particulier par le développement de partenariats étroits entre le secteur public et la sphère privée.Cet article analyse l'initiative présidentielle lancée dès 1996 aux Etats-Unis -premier pays au monde à inscrire ces questions à l'agenda du plus haut niveau décisionnel- ainsi que la structure nationale de partenariats mis en place depuis lors. Une telle démarche pourrait constituer un point de départ pour d'autres pays désireux d'élaborer leur propre analyse de vulnérabilités et leur stratégie d'amélioration.Les événements du 11 septembre 2001, comme les attaques à l'anthrax, ont néanmoins montré que les avancées américaines ne constituaient qu'une première étape d'un processus plus global de préparation nationale; les infrastructures critiques des Etats-Unis demeurent hautement vulnérables. Enfin, plusieurs idées fausses, par trop souvent récurrentes, doivent être dépassées pour traiter beaucoup plus efficacement ces risques à grande échelle sur un plan international.Partenariats public-privé;Risques à grande échelle;Infrastructures critiques;Nouvelles vulnérabilites;Sécurité nationale;Préparation collective

Sharing Qualitative and Qualitative Longitudinal Data in the UK: Archiving Strategies and Development

Over the past two decades significant developments have occurred in the archiving of qualitative data in the UK. The first national archive for qualitative resources, Qualidata, was established in 1994. Since that time further scientific reviews have supported the expansion of data resources for qualitative and qualitative longitudinal (QL) research in the UK and fuelled the development of a new ethos of data sharing and re-use among qualitative researchers. These have included the Timescapes Study and Archive, an initiative funded from 2007 to scale up QL research and create a specialist resource of QL data for sharing and re-use. These trends are part of a wider movement to enhance the status of research data in all their diverse forms, inculcate an ethos of data sharing, and develop infrastructure to facilitate data discovery and re-use. In this paper we trace the history of these developments and provide an overview of data policy initiatives that have set out to advance data sharing in the UK. The paper reveals a mixed infrastructure for qualitative and QL data resources in the UK, and explores the value of this, along with the implications for managing and co-ordinating resources across a complex network. The paper concludes with some suggestions for developing this mixed infrastructure to further support data sharing and re-use in the UK and beyond

TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES FOR E-SCIENCE: The Scope of the Challenge

The three-fold purpose of this Report to the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) of the Research Councils (UK) is to: • articulate the nature and significance of the non-technological issues that will bear on the practical effectiveness of the hardware and software infrastructures that are being created to enable collaborations in e- Science; • characterise succinctly the fundamental sources of the organisational and institutional challenges that need to be addressed in regard to defining terms, rights and responsibilities of the collaborating parties, and to illustrate these by reference to the limited experience gained to date in regard to intellectual property, liability, privacy, and security and competition policy issues affecting scientific research organisations; and • propose approaches for arriving at institutional mechanisms whose establishment would generate workable, specific arrangements facilitating collaboration in e-Science; and, that also might serve to meet similar needs in other spheres such as e- Learning, e-Government, e-Commerce, e-Healthcare. In carrying out these tasks, the report examines developments in enhanced computer-mediated telecommunication networks and digital information technologies, and recent advances in technologies of collaboration. It considers the economic and legal aspects of scientific collaboration, with attention to interactions between formal contracting and 'private ordering' arrangements that rest upon research community norms. It offers definitions of e-Science, virtual laboratories, collaboratories, and develops a taxonomy of collaborative e-Science activities which is implemented to classify British e-Science pilot projects and contrast these with US collaboratory projects funded during the 1990s. The approach to facilitating inter-organizational participation in collaborative projects rests upon the development of a modular structure of contractual clauses that permit flexibility and experience-based learning.

Pathways to Coastal Resiliency: the Adaptive Gradients Framework

Current and future climate-related coastal impacts such as catastrophic and repetitive flooding, hurricane intensity, and sea level rise necessitate a new approach to developing and managing coastal infrastructure. Traditional “hard” or “grey” engineering solutions are proving both expensive and inflexible in the face of a rapidly changing coastal environment. Hybrid solutions that incorporate natural, nature-based, structural, and non-structural features may better achieve a broad set of goals such as ecological enhancement, long-term adaptation, and social benefits, but broad consideration and uptake of these approaches has been slow. One barrier to the widespread implementation of hybrid solutions is the lack of a relatively quick but holistic evaluation framework that places these broader environmental and societal goals on equal footing with the more traditional goal of exposure reduction. To respond to this need, the Adaptive Gradients Framework was developed and pilot-tested as a qualitative, flexible, and collaborative process guide for organizations to understand, evaluate, and potentially select more diverse kinds of infrastructural responses. These responses would ideally include natural, nature-based, and regulatory/cultural approaches, as well as hybrid designs combining multiple approaches. It enables rapid expert review of project designs based on eight metrics called “gradients”, which include exposure reduction, cost efficiency, institutional capacity, ecological enhancement, adaptation over time, greenhouse gas reduction, participatory process, and social benefits. The framework was conceptualized and developed in three phases: relevant factors and barriers were collected from practitioners and experts by survey; these factors were ranked by importance and used to develop the initial framework; several case studies were iteratively evaluated using this technique; and the framework was finalized for implementation. The article presents the framework and a pilot test of its application, along with resources that would enable wider application of the framework by practitioners and theorists

National Security Space Launch

The United States Space Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, was first established in 1994 by President William J. Clinton’s National Space Transportation Policy. The policy assigned the responsibility for expendable launch vehicles to the Department of Defense (DoD), with the goals of lowering launch costs and ensuring national security access to space. As such, the United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) started the EELV program to acquire more affordable and reliable launch capability for valuable U.S. military satellites, such as national reconnaissance satellites that cost billions per satellite. In March 2019, the program name was changed from EELV to NSSL, which reflected several important features: 1.) The emphasis on “assured access to space,” 2.) transition from the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine used on the Atlas V to a US-sourced engine (now scheduled to be complete by 2022), 3.) adaptation to manifest changes (such as enabling satellite swaps and return of manifest to normal operations both within 12 months of a need or an anomaly), and 4.) potential use of reusable launch vehicles. As of August 2019, Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance (ULA) have all submitted proposals. From these, the U.S. Air Force will be selecting two companies to fulfill approximately 34 launches over a period of five years, beginning in 2022. This paper will therefore first examine the objectives for the NSSL as presented in the 2017 National Security Strategy, Fiscal Year 2019, Fiscal Year 2020, and Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), and National Presidential Directive No. 40. The paper will then identify areas of potential weakness and gaps that exist in space launch programs as a whole and explore the security implications that impact the NSSL specifically. Finally, the paper will examine how the trajectory of the NSSL program could be adjusted in order to facilitate a smooth transition into new launch vehicles, while maintaining mission success, minimizing national security vulnerabilities, and clarifying the defense acquisition process.No embargoAcademic Major: EnglishAcademic Major: International Studie