Artificial intelligence in government: Concepts, standards, and a unified framework

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in generative language modelling, hold the promise of transforming government. Given the advanced capabilities of new AI systems, it is critical that these are embedded using standard operational procedures, clear epistemic criteria, and behave in alignment with the normative expectations of society. Scholars in multiple domains have subsequently begun to conceptualize the different forms that AI applications may take, highlighting both their potential benefits and pitfalls. However, the literature remains fragmented, with researchers in social science disciplines like public administration and political science, and the fast-moving fields of AI, ML, and robotics, all developing concepts in relative isolation. Although there are calls to formalize the emerging study of AI in government, a balanced account that captures the full depth of theoretical perspectives needed to understand the consequences of embedding AI into a public sector context is lacking. Here, we unify efforts across social and technical disciplines by first conducting an integrative literature review to identify and cluster 69 key terms that frequently co-occur in the multidisciplinary study of AI. We then build on the results of this bibliometric analysis to propose three new multifaceted concepts for understanding and analysing AI-based systems for government (AI-GOV) in a more unified way: (1) operational fitness, (2) epistemic alignment, and (3) normative divergence. Finally, we put these concepts to work by using them as dimensions in a conceptual typology of AI-GOV and connecting each with emerging AI technical measurement standards to encourage operationalization, foster cross-disciplinary dialogue, and stimulate debate among those aiming to rethink government with AI.Comment: 35 pages with references and appendix, 3 tables, 2 figure

The Faculty Notebook, September 2017

The Faculty Notebook is published periodically by the Office of the Provost at Gettysburg College to bring to the attention of the campus community accomplishments and activities of academic interest. Faculty are encouraged to submit materials for consideration for publication to the Associate Provost for Faculty Development. Copies of this publication are available at the Office of the Provost

Critical questions in computational models of legal argument

Two recent computational models of legal argumentation, by Verheij and Gordon respectively, have interpreted critical questions as premises of arguments that can be defeated using Pollock’s concepts of undercutters and rebuttals. Using the scheme for arguments from expert opinion as an example, this paper evaluates and compares these two models of critical questions from the perspective of argumentation theory and competing legal theories about proof standardsfor defeating presumptions. The applicable proof standard is found to be a legal issue subject to argument. Verheij’smodel is shown to have problems because the proof stan-dards it applies to different kinds of premises are “hard-wired” into the system. Gordon’s model overcomes these problems by allowing different proof standards to be assigned to each issue and by supporting arguments about proof standards within the same framework. These differences are minor however compared to the insight gained from these models jointly about the theory of argument schemes and critical questions. They show how schemes can be used to implement tools for constructing arguments, and not just for classifying arguments ex post facto, and help clarify how critical questions confound declarative knowledge about conditions for using argument schemes with procedural knowledge about how to evaluate and criticize arguments made using these schemes

Sustainable and Open Access to Valuable Legal Research Information: A New Framework

This article evaluates the current status of access to foreign and international legal research information, analyzes the challenges that information providers have experienced in providing valuable and sustainable access, and proposes a model that would help create and facilitate effective and sustainable access to valuable foreign, comparative, and international legal information

The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection

A core insight of the legal realists was that many disputes are indeterminate. For example, in many appellate adjudications, respectable legal arguments can be made for both sides of the dispute. A contemporary reaction to the realist insight by critical legal scholars is expressed in the slogan Law is politics. This critical slogan might be elaborated as follows: in openly political activities, such as the legislative process or partisan elections, debate centers on issues of value and social vision that are outside the scope of legal reasoning. Judicial opinions merely dress up political decisions in the garb of legal reasoning. The realist insight and critical reaction challenge conventional notions about the selection of appellate judges on the basis of merit-a combination of legal expertise and judicial temperament. If appellate judges really render decisions on the basis of politics, then why should judges be selected (or elected) on the basis of merit? In his essay, Judging in a Corner of the Law, Professor Schauer has gone so far as to suggest that appellate judges need not be lawyers and certainly need not be experienced or excellent lawyers. Moreover, Schauer maintains, the skills and knowledge desirable in appellate judges are not even taught in law schools