Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.bounded rationality; genetic algorithms; individual heterogeneitybounded rationality; genetic algorithms; individual heterogeneity

Players with limited memory

This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. We introduce the notion of a Limited Memory Equilibrium (LME) and show that play converges to an LME in every generic normal form game. Our characterization of the set of LME suggests that players with limited memory do (weakly) better in games than in decision problems. We also show that agents can do quite well even with severely limited memory, although severe limitations tend to make them behave cautiously

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.Bounded rationality, Experiments, Common-pool resources, Genetic algorithms

Autonomous Reinforcement of Behavioral Sequences in Neural Dynamics

We introduce a dynamic neural algorithm called Dynamic Neural (DN) SARSA(\lambda) for learning a behavioral sequence from delayed reward. DN-SARSA(\lambda) combines Dynamic Field Theory models of behavioral sequence representation, classical reinforcement learning, and a computational neuroscience model of working memory, called Item and Order working memory, which serves as an eligibility trace. DN-SARSA(\lambda) is implemented on both a simulated and real robot that must learn a specific rewarding sequence of elementary behaviors from exploration. Results show DN-SARSA(\lambda) performs on the level of the discrete SARSA(\lambda), validating the feasibility of general reinforcement learning without compromising neural dynamics.Comment: Sohrob Kazerounian, Matthew Luciw are Joint first author