Learning cognitive maps: Finding useful structure in an uncertain world

In this chapter we will describe the central mechanisms that influence how people learn about large-scale space. We will focus particularly on how these mechanisms enable people to effectively cope with both the uncertainty inherent in a constantly changing world and also with the high information content of natural environments. The major lessons are that humans get by with a less is more approach to building structure, and that they are able to quickly adapt to environmental changes thanks to a range of general purpose mechanisms. By looking at abstract principles, instead of concrete implementation details, it is shown that the study of human learning can provide valuable lessons for robotics. Finally, these issues are discussed in the context of an implementation on a mobile robot. © 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

From locomotion to cognition: Bridging the gap between reactive and cognitive behavior in a quadruped robot

The cognitivistic paradigm, which states that cognition is a result of computation with symbols that represent the world, has been challenged by many. The opponents have primarily criticized the detachment from direct interaction with the world and pointed to some fundamental problems (for instance the symbol grounding problem). Instead, they emphasized the constitutive role of embodied interaction with the environment. This has motivated the advancement of synthetic methodologies: the phenomenon of interest (cognition) can be studied by building and investigating whole brain-body-environment systems. Our work is centered around a compliant quadruped robot equipped with a multimodal sensory set. In a series of case studies, we investigate the structure of the sensorimotor space that the application of different actions in different environments by the robot brings about. Then, we study how the agent can autonomously abstract the regularities that are induced by the different conditions and use them to improve its behavior. The agent is engaged in path integration, terrain discrimination and gait adaptation, and moving target following tasks. The nature of the tasks forces the robot to leave the ``here-and-now'' time scale of simple reactive stimulus-response behaviors and to learn from its experience, thus creating a ``minimally cognitive'' setting. Solutions to these problems are developed by the agent in a bottom-up fashion. The complete scenarios are then used to illuminate the concepts that are believed to lie at the basis of cognition: sensorimotor contingencies, body schema, and forward internal models. Finally, we discuss how the presented solutions are relevant for applications in robotics, in particular in the area of autonomous model acquisition and adaptation, and, in mobile robots, in dead reckoning and traversability detection

Manifold-Based Sensorimotor Representations for Bootstrapping of Mobile Agents

Subject of this thesis is the development of a domain-independent algorithm that allows an autonomous system to process sequences of the sensorimotor interaction with its environment and to assign a geometric interpretation to its motor capabilities. We utilize Lie groups, smooth manifolds endowed with a group structure, that allow for an elegant representation of geometric operations as a central foundation for such a sensorimotor representation. Expressing motor controls with respect to the manifold structure allows us to transform the sensorimotor interaction sequence into a specific set of data points. Finding a manifold and a transformation that minimizes an intrinsic conflict function corresponds to finding a topological structure that is the best fit for expressing the sensorimotor space the entity resides in. Experiments in a virtual environment are conducted that show the applicability of the approach with respect to different sensor and motor configurations

Queering Abstract Concepts. A Grounded Perspective on Gender

Concepts are the building blocks of our cognitive system. Theories of conceptual knowledge have attempted to explain how we acquire master concepts by relying on different assumptions. Among several proposals, theories of Embodied and Grounded Cognition (EGC) submit to the idea that our conceptual system is couched in our bodily states and is influenced by the environment surrounding us (Barsalou, 2008). Chapter 1 reviews and critically discusses the debate on conceptual format as developed in cognitive science. Abstract concepts (ACs) like ethic constitute a major challenge for theories of conceptual knowledge, and for EGC theories. Recently, some EG proposals addressed this criticism, arguing that the category of ACs is multifaced and heterogenous, encompassing exemplars that differ among them with respect of their grounding sources (Borghi et al., 2018). According to the WAT theory (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014), for instance, both abstract and concrete concepts are grounded in our bodily states and linguistic system, to different extents. Specifically, ACs are more influenced by social, cultural and linguistic aspects than concrete concepts, hence activating the mouth effector. In addition, ACs would be more influenced by cultural and linguistic variability. Chapter 2 tackles the issue of ACs from an EG perspective. In an EG approach, gender can be considered as a special kind of AC. In fact, its grounding sources enclose biological and perceptual aspects–related to one’s own sexual embodiment–and social and cultural factors. Whereas previous accounts on gender have stressed one specific aspect over the other (Eagly & Wood, 2013), nowadays the dichotomy opposing sex to gender seems less tenable (Butler, 1990; Hyde et al., 2019). Drawing on the description of ACs offered in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I defend a queer perspective on ACs and gender, that escapes traditional dichotomies such as abstract/concrete and sex/gender

Développement d'un cadre mathématique pour une théorie sensorimotrice de l'expérience sensorielle

Many neurophysiological theories of sensory experience assume that experience is mysteriously generated by specific cortical mechanisms. Other approaches claim that data on sensory experience can be explained from the structure of the rules governing sensory changes produced by various motor actions. The goal of this thesis is to develop a mathematical framework enabling to grasp symetry properties of such rules. In the case of a simplified perceptual system, we show that such an approach leads to distinguish categories of perceptual contexts, and changes of such contexts that coincide with various data on sensory experience, notably on spatiality sensation and the structure of our judgments on color similarities.Plusieurs théories neurophysiologiques de l'expérience sensorielle supposent que l'expérience est une chose mystérieuse produite par des mécanismes corticaux spécifiques. D'autres approches prétendent expliquer le discours que nous tenons sur nos expériences sensorielles à partir de la structure de nos fonctionnements sensorimoteurs, en particulier à partir de la dépendance induites par nos différents systèmes perceptifs entre nos commandes motrices et nos stimulations sensorielles. Le but de cette thèse est de développer un cadre mathématique permettant d'appréhender certaines propriétés de symétries de ces dépendances. En considérant le cas d'un système perceptif simplifié, nous montrons que cette approche conduit à distinguer différentes catégories de situations perceptives, et de changements de situations, qui coïncident avec diverses données sur notre expérience sensorielle, notamment sur la sensation de spatialité et sur la structure de nos jugements de similarité des couleurs

Concepts enacted: confronting the obstacles and paradoxes inherent in pursuing a scientific understanding of the building blocks of human thought

This thesis confronts a fundamental shortcoming in cognitive science research: a failure to be explicit about the theory of concepts underlying cognitive science research and a resulting failure to justify that theory philosophically or otherwise. It demonstrates how most contemporary debates over theories of concepts divide over whether concepts are best understood as (mental) representations or as non-representational abilities. It concludes that there can be no single correct ontology, and that both perspectives are logically necessary. It details three critical distinctions that are frequently neglected: between concepts as we possess and employ them non-reflectively, and concepts as we reflect upon them; between the private (subjective) and public (inter-subjective) aspects of concepts; and between concepts as approached from a realist versus anti-realist perspective. Metaphysical starting points fundamentally shape conclusions. The main contribution of this thesis is a pragmatic, meticulously detailed, and distinctive account of concepts in terms of their essential nature, core properties, and context of application. This is done within the framework of Peter Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces theory of concepts, which is offered as a bridging account, best able to tie existing theories together into one framework. A set of extensions to conceptual spaces theory, called the unified conceptual space theory, are offered as a means of pushing Gärdenfors’ theory in a more algorithmically amenable and empirically testable direction. The unified conceptual space theory describes how all of an agent’s many different conceptual spaces, as described by Gärdenfors, are mapped together into one unified space of spaces, and how an analogous process happens at the societal level. The unified conceptual space theory is put to work offering a distinctive account of the co-emergence of concepts and experience out of a circularly causal process. Finally, an experimental application of the theory is presented, in the form of a simple computer program

Quantum Uncertainty Reduction (QUR) Theory of Attended Access and Phenomenal Consciousness

In this dissertation I defend a theory of perceptual consciousness titled “Quantum Uncertainty Reduction” (QUR[1]) Theory of Attended Access and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Consciousness is widely perceived as a phenomenon that poses a special explanatory problem for science. The problem arises in the apparent rift between an immediate first-person acquaintance with consciousness and our lack of ability to provide an objective/scientific third-person characterization of consciousness. I begin by reviewing philosophical ideas of Ned Block, David Chalmers and Jesse Prinz whose characterizations of consciousness provide a conceptual framework that the proposed theory aims to satisfy. Block and Chalmers argue that consciousness is a mongrel concept combining two distinct aspects: access and phenomenal consciousness, while Jesse Prinz’s argues for the central role of attention in engendering consciousness. Since the proposed solution is an aspect of quantum information processing in a mechanism, I discuss and adopt methodological approach of the use of mechanisms in scientific explanations developed by William Bechtel, Carl Craver and others. I outline a mechanism based on Shannon Communication System and enhanced with Bayesian predictive processing developed by Carl Friston, Jacob Hohwy, and Andy Clark as well as Control Theory by Rick Grush. Based on views of Marcin Miłkowski, Gualtiero Piccinini and others on information processing in physical systems, I argue that the suggested mechanism implements physical information processing or computation. After a brief overview of relevant aspects of quantum theory, I review recent developments that aim to reconstruct quantum theory by using epistemic approach to explain the nature of quantum states vs. the traditional ontic one. I adopt the epistemic approach and argue that by performing a functional analysis of physical computation in the suggested mechanism we can identify a certain process as involving processing/manipulation of quantum and classical information. I further suggest that the central aspect of the process, namely, quantum uncertainty reduction gives rise to qualitative properties of phenomenal and access consciousness. Further, I compare the suggested information processing formulation of Access and Phenomenal consciousness with those of Block and Chalmers, that are, correspondingly, non-functional and non-physical. I argue that my conceptualization is preferable since it gives a functional and physical account of phenomenal and access consciousness while accommodating thought experiments that Block and Chalmers use to argue for their views on consciousness. Finally, while largely agreeing with the where and when of consciousness of Prinz’s AIR (Attended Intermediate Representations) theory of consciousness, QUR theory offers new arguments for an extended where and more nuanced when of phenomenal consciousness. [1] Pronounced as “cure.

Casual Reasoning : A Social Ecological Look at Human Cognition and Common Sense

This thesis promotes a pragmatist and ecological approach to human cognition and concepts. Namely, that our conceptual system primarily tracks affordances and other causal properties that have pragmatic relevance to us as embodied and active agents. The bulk of the work aims to show how various research programs in cognitive psychology naturally intersect and complement each other under this theoretical standpoint, which is influenced by enactivist and embodied approaches to cognitive science as well as linguistic pragmatism. The term ”ecological” in the title refers to an approach that emphasizes the interaction of agents and their environment and ”social ecology” means that this includes social interaction between agents and that our material environment is extensively a cultural product, constantly reproduced and altered through cultural behavior. The extent of the argument is not supposed to be confined to the theoretical psychology and philosophy of science but has somewhat wider motives pertaining to philosophy of language and knowledge. I do not attempt to reform extant theories of cognitive processing and representation (unless arguments against logical computationalism are still considered reformist these days) but to explain the nature of conceptual understanding. I take it that having a concept is principally not having a particular information structure in one’s brain but rather a set of interlocking capacities that support intentional action. In effect, I claim that conceptual understanding should be understood as a cognitive skill and psychological research on concepts should not identify concepts as static information structures but as capacities which are integral parts of procedural knowledge that support skillful know-how in situated action. Conceptual mental representations deal with information but such information structures are active constructs that cannot be understood without pragmatic and ecological perspective on human cognition. I argue for the claim, earlier proposed for instance by Eleanor Rosch, that contexts or situations are the proper unit that categorization research needs to concentrate on. In accordance with Edouard Machery’s well-known claim, I conceive classical category theories of cognitive science, namely prototype, exemplar, and knowledge accounts, to tap real cognitive phenomena; however, pace Machery I aim to show that they do not form distinct conceptual representations but rather participate in human conceptual capacities as interlocking component processes. The main problem with theories that emphasize situated direct interaction with the environment is to explain abstract and symbolic reasoning. One theoretically promising way to resolve the issue is to invoke some version of the dual-process theories of cognition; that is, to explain rule-based, theoretical, and symbolic reasoning by resorting to a distinct cognitive system, which is more or less dedicated to those kind of tasks. While dual-process theories seem to license such a move, they can work only as a partial solution because expert scientific reasoning , for example, necessitates implicit skills just like any area of expertise. Second, commonsense reasoning is partly schematic and utilizes theoretical concepts. As an alternative explanation, I offer a hypothesis influenced by philosophical linguistic pragmatism which posits that discursive reasoning is incrementally learned tacit know-how in cultural praxis, which determines how we understand linguistic concepts. This interactive know-how exploits mostly the same cognitive mechanisms as situated and pragmatic procedural knowledge. The explanation has immediate implications for the analytic philosophy of language. When we interpret a text or engage in conceptual analysis, our conscious conceptual interpretation of the associated contents is a product of implicit processes intimately tied with procedural knowledge; in short, explicit know-that is rooted in implicit know-how

PSA 2018

These preprints were automatically compiled into a PDF from the collection of papers deposited in PhilSci-Archive in conjunction with the PSA 2018