A New PAC-Bayesian Perspective on Domain Adaptation

We study the issue of PAC-Bayesian domain adaptation: We want to learn, from a source domain, a majority vote model dedicated to a target one. Our theoretical contribution brings a new perspective by deriving an upper-bound on the target risk where the distributions' divergence---expressed as a ratio---controls the trade-off between a source error measure and the target voters' disagreement. Our bound suggests that one has to focus on regions where the source data is informative.From this result, we derive a PAC-Bayesian generalization bound, and specialize it to linear classifiers. Then, we infer a learning algorithmand perform experiments on real data.Comment: Published at ICML 201

Does Confidence Reporting from the Crowd Benefit Crowdsourcing Performance?

We explore the design of an effective crowdsourcing system for an $M$-ary classification task. Crowd workers complete simple binary microtasks whose results are aggregated to give the final classification decision. We consider the scenario where the workers have a reject option so that they are allowed to skip microtasks when they are unable to or choose not to respond to binary microtasks. Additionally, the workers report quantized confidence levels when they are able to submit definitive answers. We present an aggregation approach using a weighted majority voting rule, where each worker's response is assigned an optimized weight to maximize crowd's classification performance. We obtain a couterintuitive result that the classification performance does not benefit from workers reporting quantized confidence. Therefore, the crowdsourcing system designer should employ the reject option without requiring confidence reporting.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures, SocialSens 2017. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1602.0057

Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting

We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played). Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b) Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is \emph{some} path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [Kukushkin, IJGT 2011]. In addition, we refute another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.Comment: some of the results appeared in preliminary versions of this paper: Convergence to Equilibrium of Plurality Voting, Meir et al., AAAI 2010; Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting, Meir, COMSOC 201