15,762 research outputs found

    On the Resilience of RTL NN Accelerators: Fault Characterization and Mitigation

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    Machine Learning (ML) is making a strong resurgence in tune with the massive generation of unstructured data which in turn requires massive computational resources. Due to the inherently compute- and power-intensive structure of Neural Networks (NNs), hardware accelerators emerge as a promising solution. However, with technology node scaling below 10nm, hardware accelerators become more susceptible to faults, which in turn can impact the NN accuracy. In this paper, we study the resilience aspects of Register-Transfer Level (RTL) model of NN accelerators, in particular, fault characterization and mitigation. By following a High-Level Synthesis (HLS) approach, first, we characterize the vulnerability of various components of RTL NN. We observed that the severity of faults depends on both i) application-level specifications, i.e., NN data (inputs, weights, or intermediate), NN layers, and NN activation functions, and ii) architectural-level specifications, i.e., data representation model and the parallelism degree of the underlying accelerator. Second, motivated by characterization results, we present a low-overhead fault mitigation technique that can efficiently correct bit flips, by 47.3% better than state-of-the-art methods.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figure

    Demonstrating Advantages of Neuromorphic Computation: A Pilot Study

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    Neuromorphic devices represent an attempt to mimic aspects of the brain's architecture and dynamics with the aim of replicating its hallmark functional capabilities in terms of computational power, robust learning and energy efficiency. We employ a single-chip prototype of the BrainScaleS 2 neuromorphic system to implement a proof-of-concept demonstration of reward-modulated spike-timing-dependent plasticity in a spiking network that learns to play the Pong video game by smooth pursuit. This system combines an electronic mixed-signal substrate for emulating neuron and synapse dynamics with an embedded digital processor for on-chip learning, which in this work also serves to simulate the virtual environment and learning agent. The analog emulation of neuronal membrane dynamics enables a 1000-fold acceleration with respect to biological real-time, with the entire chip operating on a power budget of 57mW. Compared to an equivalent simulation using state-of-the-art software, the on-chip emulation is at least one order of magnitude faster and three orders of magnitude more energy-efficient. We demonstrate how on-chip learning can mitigate the effects of fixed-pattern noise, which is unavoidable in analog substrates, while making use of temporal variability for action exploration. Learning compensates imperfections of the physical substrate, as manifested in neuronal parameter variability, by adapting synaptic weights to match respective excitability of individual neurons.Comment: Added measurements with noise in NEST simulation, add notice about journal publication. Frontiers in Neuromorphic Engineering (2019

    Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems

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    SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command sequence), or on the state values of the physical process. In this work we present a class of semantic network-based attacks against SCADA systems that are undetectable by the above mentioned anomaly detection. After hijacking the communication channels between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), our attacks cause the HMI to present a fake view of the industrial process, deceiving the human operator into taking manual actions. Our most advanced attack also manipulates the messages generated by the operator's actions, reversing their semantic meaning while causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted human actions. The attacks are totaly stealthy because the message sizes and timing, the command sequences, and the data values of the ICS's state all remain legitimate. We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of our local electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated by a commercial-grade firewall. We developed a real-time security assessment tool, that can simultaneously manipulate the communication to multiple PLCs and cause the HMI to display a coherent system--wide fake view. Our tool is configured with message-manipulating rules written in an ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML) we designed, which may be of independent interest. Our semantic attacks all successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of blackout and possible equipment damage
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