Optimizing positional scoring rules for rank aggregation

Nowadays, several crowdsourcing projects exploit social choice methods for computing an aggregate ranking of alternatives given individual rankings provided by workers. Motivated by such systems, we consider a setting where each worker is asked to rank a fixed (small) number of alternatives and, then, a positional scoring rule is used to compute the aggregate ranking. Among the apparently infinite such rules, what is the best one to use? To answer this question, we assume that we have partial access to an underlying true ranking. Then, the important optimization problem to be solved is to compute the positional scoring rule whose outcome, when applied to the profile of individual rankings, is as close as possible to the part of the underlying true ranking we know. We study this fundamental problem from a theoretical viewpoint and present positive and negative complexity results and, furthermore, complement our theoretical findings with experiments on real-world and synthetic data

Who is in Your Top Three? Optimizing Learning in Elections with Many Candidates

Elections and opinion polls often have many candidates, with the aim to either rank the candidates or identify a small set of winners according to voters' preferences. In practice, voters do not provide a full ranking; instead, each voter provides their favorite K candidates, potentially in ranked order. The election organizer must choose K and an aggregation rule. We provide a theoretical framework to make these choices. Each K-Approval or K-partial ranking mechanism (with a corresponding positional scoring rule) induces a learning rate for the speed at which the election correctly recovers the asymptotic outcome. Given the voter choice distribution, the election planner can thus identify the rate optimal mechanism. Earlier work in this area provides coarse order-of-magnitude guaranties which are not sufficient to make such choices. Our framework further resolves questions of when randomizing between multiple mechanisms may improve learning, for arbitrary voter noise models. Finally, we use data from 5 large participatory budgeting elections that we organized across several US cities, along with other ranking data, to demonstrate the utility of our methods. In particular, we find that historically such elections have set K too low and that picking the right mechanism can be the difference between identifying the ultimate winner with only a 80% probability or a 99.9% probability after 400 voters.Comment: To appear in HCOMP 201

People on Drugs: Credibility of User Statements in Health Communities

Online health communities are a valuable source of information for patients and physicians. However, such user-generated resources are often plagued by inaccuracies and misinformation. In this work we propose a method for automatically establishing the credibility of user-generated medical statements and the trustworthiness of their authors by exploiting linguistic cues and distant supervision from expert sources. To this end we introduce a probabilistic graphical model that jointly learns user trustworthiness, statement credibility, and language objectivity. We apply this methodology to the task of extracting rare or unknown side-effects of medical drugs --- this being one of the problems where large scale non-expert data has the potential to complement expert medical knowledge. We show that our method can reliably extract side-effects and filter out false statements, while identifying trustworthy users that are likely to contribute valuable medical information

How reliable are annotations via crowdsourcing? a study about inter-annotator agreement for multi-label image annotation

The creation of golden standard datasets is a costly business. Optimally more than one judgment per document is obtained to ensure a high quality on annotations. In this context, we explore how much annotations from experts differ from each other, how different sets of annotations influence the ranking of systems and if these annotations can be obtained with a crowdsourcing approach. This study is applied to annotations of images with multiple concepts. A subset of the images employed in the latest ImageCLEF Photo Annotation competition was manually annotated by expert annotators and non-experts with Mechanical Turk. The inter-annotator agreement is computed at an image-based and concept-based level using majority vote, accuracy and kappa statistics. Further, the Kendall τ and Kolmogorov-Smirnov correlation test is used to compare the ranking of systems regarding different ground-truths and different evaluation measures in a benchmark scenario. Results show that while the agreement between experts and non-experts varies depending on the measure used, its influence on the ranked lists of the systems is rather small. To sum up, the majority vote applied to generate one annotation set out of several opinions, is able to filter noisy judgments of non-experts to some extent. The resulting annotation set is of comparable quality to the annotations of experts

Voting with Random Classifiers (VORACE)

In many machine learning scenarios, looking for the best classifier that fits a particular dataset can be very costly in terms of time and resources. Moreover, it can require deep knowledge of the specific domain. We propose a new technique which does not require profound expertise in the domain and avoids the commonly used strategy of hyper-parameter tuning and model selection. Our method is an innovative ensemble technique that uses voting rules over a set of randomly-generated classifiers. Given a new input sample, we interpret the output of each classifier as a ranking over the set of possible classes. We then aggregate these output rankings using a voting rule, which treats them as preferences over the classes. We show that our approach obtains good results compared to the state-of-the-art, both providing a theoretical analysis and an empirical evaluation of the approach on several datasets