Learning to Crawl

Web crawling is the problem of keeping a cache of webpages fresh, i.e., having the most recent copy available when a page is requested. This problem is usually coupled with the natural restriction that the bandwidth available to the web crawler is limited. The corresponding optimization problem was solved optimally by Azar et al. [2018] under the assumption that, for each webpage, both the elapsed time between two changes and the elapsed time between two requests follow a Poisson distribution with known parameters. In this paper, we study the same control problem but under the assumption that the change rates are unknown a priori, and thus we need to estimate them in an online fashion using only partial observations (i.e., single-bit signals indicating whether the page has changed since the last refresh). As a point of departure, we characterise the conditions under which one can solve the problem with such partial observability. Next, we propose a practical estimator and compute confidence intervals for it in terms of the elapsed time between the observations. Finally, we show that the explore-and-commit algorithm achieves an $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret with a carefully chosen exploration horizon. Our simulation study shows that our online policy scales well and achieves close to optimal performance for a wide range of the parameters.Comment: Published at AAAI 202

Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's payoffs, typically by gathering information from the leader's interaction with the follower. Unfortunately, these approaches rely crucially on the assumption that the follower will not strategically exploit this information asymmetry, i.e., the follower behaves truthfully during the interaction according to their actual payoffs. As we show in this paper, the follower may have strong incentives to deceitfully imitate the behavior of a different follower type and, in doing this, benefit significantly from inducing the leader into choosing a highly suboptimal strategy. This raises a fundamental question: how to design a leader strategy in the presence of a deceitful follower? To answer this question, we put forward a basic model of Stackelberg games with (imitative) follower deception and show that the leader is indeed able to reduce the loss due to follower deception with carefully designed policies. We then provide a systematic study of the problem of computing the optimal leader policy and draw a relatively complete picture of the complexity landscape; essentially matching positive and negative complexity results are provided for natural variants of the model. Our intractability results are in sharp contrast to the situation with no deception, where the leader's optimal strategy can be computed in polynomial time, and thus illustrate the intrinsic difficulty of handling follower deception. Through simulations we also examine the benefit of considering follower deception in randomly generated games

Transferable Control

In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control

The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation

When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the interaction between a learner and agents in a world where all agents are equally able to manipulate their features in an attempt to "trick" a published classifier. In cases of real world classification, however, an agent's ability to adapt to an algorithm is not simply a function of her personal interest in receiving a positive classification, but is bound up in a complex web of social factors that affect her ability to pursue certain action responses. In this paper, we adapt models of strategic manipulation to capture dynamics that may arise in a setting of social inequality wherein candidate groups face different costs to manipulation. We find that whenever one group's costs are higher than the other's, the learner's equilibrium strategy exhibits an inequality-reinforcing phenomenon wherein the learner erroneously admits some members of the advantaged group, while erroneously excluding some members of the disadvantaged group. We also consider the effects of interventions in which a learner subsidizes members of the disadvantaged group, lowering their costs in order to improve her own classification performance. Here we encounter a paradoxical result: there exist cases in which providing a subsidy improves only the learner's utility while actually making both candidate groups worse-off--even the group receiving the subsidy. Our results reveal the potentially adverse social ramifications of deploying tools that attempt to evaluate an individual's "quality" when agents' capacities to adaptively respond differ.Comment: 29 pages, 4 figure

Pensions in the laboratory: the role of commitment and reputation for deferred compensation in multi-period labor contracts

This paper examines the relationship between firms‘ wage offers and workers‘ supply of effort in a multi-period environment. If firms are able to commit to a schedule of wage payments, in equilibrium they will offer deferred compensation: first-period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while last-period productivity is zero and wages are positive. Workers respond to deferred compensation by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. In the absence of commitment, firms pay zero wages and workers supply low effort. The experiment produces strong evidence of these predictions. With commitment, we frequently observe deferred compensation and relatively high worker effort. In the absence of commitment, we observe no deferred compensation, much lower wages, and little worker effort. A third treatment where commitment is not possible, but firms are able to build a reputation, produces an intermediate result. Finally, we also find some evidence of gift exchange, in particular in the absence of commitment when deferred compensation does not work

Analysis, classification and comparison of scheduling techniques for software transactional memories

Transactional Memory (TM) is a practical programming paradigm for developing concurrent applications. Performance is a critical factor for TM implementations, and various studies demonstrated that specialised transaction/thread scheduling support is essential for implementing performance-effective TM systems. After one decade of research, this article reviews the wide variety of scheduling techniques proposed for Software Transactional Memories. Based on peculiarities and differences of the adopted scheduling strategies, we propose a classification of the existing techniques, and we discuss the specific characteristics of each technique. Also, we analyse the results of previous evaluation and comparison studies, and we present the results of a new experimental study encompassing techniques based on different scheduling strategies. Finally, we identify potential strengths and weaknesses of the different techniques, as well as the issues that require to be further investigated