9,661 research outputs found
A stochastic user-operator assignment game for microtransit service evaluation: A case study of Kussbus in Luxembourg
This paper proposes a stochastic variant of the stable matching model from
Rasulkhani and Chow [1] which allows microtransit operators to evaluate their
operation policy and resource allocations. The proposed model takes into
account the stochastic nature of users' travel utility perception, resulting in
a probabilistic stable operation cost allocation outcome to design ticket price
and ridership forecasting. We applied the model for the operation policy
evaluation of a microtransit service in Luxembourg and its border area. The
methodology for the model parameters estimation and calibration is developed.
The results provide useful insights for the operator and the government to
improve the ridership of the service.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1912.0198
House price momentum and strategic complementarity
House prices exhibit substantially more momentum, positive autocorrelation in price changes, than existing theories can explain. I introduce an amplification mechanism to reconcile this discrepancy. Sellers do not set a unilaterally high or low list price because they face a concave demand curve: increasing the price of an above-average-priced house rapidly reduces its sale probability, but cutting the price of a below-average-priced house only slightly improves its sale probability. The resulting strategic complementarity amplifies frictions because sellers gradually adjust their price to stay near average. I provide empirical evidence for concave demand using a quantitative search model that amplifies momentum two- to threefold
Competing with asking prices
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at
which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is
understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be
accepted if the seller receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real
world markets, asking prices have received little attention in the academic literature. We
construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using
an asking price is optimal: it is the pricing mechanism that maximizes sellers’ revenues and it
implements the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of
this equilibrium and use it to explore the positive implications of this pricing mechanism for
transaction prices and allocations.Ludo Visschers gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Juan de la Cierva Grant; project grant ECO2010-
20614 (Dirección general de investigación cientÃfica y técnica), and the Bank of Spain’s Programa de Investigación de
Excelencia
Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among buyers.Monopoly, dynamic pricing, learning, experience goods, continuous time, Markov perfect equilibrium
A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS
The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing
Principles for Fairness and Efficiency in Enhancing Environmental Services in Asia: Payments, Compensation, or Co-Investment?
The term payments for environmental services (PES) has rapidly gained popularity, with its focus on market-based mechanisms for enhancing environmental services (ES). Current use of the term, however, covers a broad spectrum of interactions between ES suppliers and beneficiaries. A broader class of mechanisms pursues ES enhancement through compensation or rewards. Such mechanisms can be analyzed on the basis of how they meet four conditions: realistic, conditional, voluntary, and pro-poor. Based on our action research in Asia in the Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES) program since 2002, we examine three paradigms: commoditized ES (CES), compensation for opportunities skipped (COS), and co-investment in (environmental) stewardship (CIS). Among the RUPES action research sites, there are several examples of CIS with a focus on assets (natural + human + social capital) that can be expected to provide future flows of ES. CES, equivalent to a strict definition of PES, may represent an abstraction rather than a current reality. COS is a challenge when the legality of opportunities to reduce ES is contested. The primary difference between CES, COS, and CIS is the way in which conditionality is achieved, with additional variation in the scale (individual, household, or community) at which the voluntary principle takes shape. CIS approaches have the greatest opportunity to be pro-poor, as both CES and COS presuppose property rights that the rural poor often do not have. CIS requires and reinforces trust building after initial conflicts over the consequences of resource use on ES have been clarified and a realistic joint appraisal is obtained. CIS will often be part of a multiscale approach to the regeneration and survival of natural capital, alongside respect and appreciation for the guardians and stewards of landscapes
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
- …