The Immigrant and Miranda

The recent dramatic convergence of immigration and criminal law is transforming the immigration and criminal justice system. While scholars have begun to examine some of the structural implications of this convergence, this Article breaks new ground by examining judicial responses and specifically the lens of Miranda v. Arizona. This Article examines the divergent and largely aberrant approaches that federal appellate courts have taken to determine whether Miranda warnings and rights apply to custodial inquiries about immigration status that have clear criminal and civil implications. Part I of this Article discusses the distinctions between civil and criminal immigration laws and the background principles of Miranda. Part II synthesizes the various and inconsistent tests courts have used to determine whether Miranda applies to dual civil and criminal immigration inquiries and examines how the failure of lower courts to apply Miranda consistently in the immigration context marks an unusual shift in the Supreme Court\u27s jurisprudence. It then explores how the emerging doctrine for immigrants departs (1) from the Court\u27s application of Miranda to dual civil and criminal interrogations in the tax context; (2) from precedent favoring objective tests; and (3) ultimately from the animating principles in Miranda to bring clarity to police, suspects, and courts on the admissibility of statements in custodial interrogations. Part III of this Article describes the broader implications of these doctrinal shifts in light of significantly increasing federal enforcement of criminal provisions of immigration laws and the increasing number of local law enforcement officials who are untrained in immigration law and yet are involved in these prosecutions. It also analyzes the incentive structure created by federal compensation programs for local law enforcement agencies to circumvent procedural protections for immigrants, relying on new data suggesting that the government\u27s aggressive criminal enforcement policy has raised serious constitutional issues. Finally, Part IV explores the ways in which these trends reflect declining procedural protections in the realm of criminal prosecutions for immigration-related offenses and proposes some solutions to ensure that immigrants\u27 rights are protected in criminal immigration enforcement

Questioning Miranda

This Article argues that the Supreme Court should go further and reexamine the basic principles underlying Miranda. Although its impact has been tamed by interpretation and practice, and although the hour is late, a case can be made for overruling Miranda. Miranda was not a wise or necessary decision, nor has Miranda proved to be, as is generally contended, a harmless one. It sent our jurisprudence on a hazardous detour by introducing novel conceptions of the proper relationship between the suspect and authority. It accentuated just those features of our system that manifest the least regard for truth seeking, that imagine the criminal trial as a game of chance in which the offender should always have some prospect of victory, and that ultimately reflect doubt on the rectitude of our laws and institutions. Beyond this, it was decided at a time when effective alternatives for restraining unlawful police conduct were ripe for implementation. This Article is divided into six parts. Part II discusses historical perspectives toward interrogation and confession and explore show Miranda may have influenced these perspectives. Part III traces the Supreme Court\u27s attempt to fashion a means of controlling police misconduct without substantially impairing the effectiveness of criminal investigation. The focus of this section is on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Part IV illustrates through two cases--Gallegos v. Colorado and Escobedo v.Illinois --the erosion of the fourteenth amendment voluntariness test. Part V critiques Miranda. Part VI examines how police have received and adapted to Miranda and attempts to assess the consequences. The final section makes the argument for overruling the decision and suggests alternative ways to limit police misconduct

Miranda in Taiwan: Why It Failed and Why We Should Care

In 1997, the Taiwanese legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to incorporate the core of the American Miranda rule into the legal system. The Miranda rule requires police officers and prosecutors to notify criminal suspects subject to custodial interrogation of their right to remain silent and their right to retain legal counsel. In subsequent amendments, the legislature enacted a series of laws to further reform interrogation practices in the same vein. What happened next is a study in unintended consequences and the interdependence of law and culture. Using ethnographic methods and data sources collected over the past four years from 48 police officers and 99 prosecutors in metropolitan Taiwan, this Article relates a cautionary tale. Under Taiwan\u27s abbreviated Miranda system, suspects are encouraged to cooperate and give statements under the perception that they have been, and will continue to be, treated with politeness, dignity, and respect. Police and prosecutors use the Miranda mechanism (providing dignity, respect, and voice to suspects) to build rapport with suspects and distract them from the actual consequences of their full cooperation. Such concerns were implicated at a high level in the indictment of former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-Jeou in 2018, when prosecutors publicly denounced Ma for his bad attitude in exercising his right to remain silent during prosecutorial interviews. In short, Miranda in Taiwan has become a double-edged sword: it provides dignified and respectful treatment for suspects while simultaneously placing heavy extralegal burdens on them to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Because Taiwan\u27s criminal justice system is a combination of western legal concepts and traditional Chinese social and cultural notions, Miranda and related rules have led to ever-greater discrepancies between what is written in the law books and how police interrogate in practice, and ever-greater gaps between suspects\u27 expectations and prosecutorial realities. Taiwan is not alone: more than one-hundred jurisdictions around the world now require warnings similar to the Miranda rule. It is possible that they suffer similar unintended consequences. I thus explore the effectiveness of alternative innovations beyond Miranda that could potentially reduce false confessions and minimize the risks caused by current interrogation practices

Reyes v. Lewis: A Missed Opportunity for Minors and Miranda

The controversial debate—whether minors understand the complexity of Miranda rights—has prevented lawmakers from producing laws that assist minors in comprehending these warnings. As a protected class, minors should be provided with extra counseling if they are faced with criminal charges in order to save judicial resources and help keep innocent minors out of the criminal justice system. A law mandating that minors consult with a pro tem attorney prior to questioning could reduce the number of cases awaiting adjudication, relieve the court of having to investigate whether the minor was coerced, threatened, intimidated, tricked, or falsely promised, and would create a modified standard for minors and Miranda warnings. Like in Reyes, this issue is not often addressed as there is a preference to avoid constitutional questions if they can be resolved by non-constitutional application. Due to the reality of the judiciary’s prudential doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this Note calls for further legislative action in California to remedy this systemic problem. Section I provides a general background on juveniles in the criminal justice system and how legal standards for minors continue to narrow. Next, Section II reviews Reyes v. Lewis as it traveled from the Riverside Superior Court to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Then Section III examines how the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to address the issue of minors and Miranda warnings, how different courts and states have implemented modern Miranda standards for minors, and how the California Legislature has finally passed a law that orders a mandatory consultation with legal counsel before suspects, aged 15 years or younger, are interrogated by police. Lastly, Section IV concludes that, although the Ninth Circuit correctly found a Seibert violation, the court should have used the Seibert analysis to uncover a Miranda violation and introduce a new standard for minors and Miranda rights

The Distinction Between Physics and Metaphysics in Duhem’s Philosophy

Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science has influenced many philosophers in the twentieth century, and even today. Many of the subjects he addressed are still highly discussed today, especially the distinction between science and metaphysics. My aim in this paper will be to motivate a naturalistic approach where the difference between physics and metaphysics is only a matter of degree. I focus on whether it would be possible to articulate this gradual distinction from a duhemian point of view. Although Duhem thought that metaphysics is an entirely different and more excellent activity than physics, I believe that Duhem’s philosophy of science also supports a naturalistic distinction in terms of degrees. I offer three reasons to justify this conclusion: Duhem’s notion of common sense; Duhem’s holism and his views on the generality of our theories, and Duhem’s notion of natural classification. At the end of the paper I will argue that a naturalistic approach accomplishes must of what Duhem wanted to achieve with his distinction