639,996 research outputs found

    Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidental Legislation

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    Virtue as the End of Law: An Aretaic Theory of Legislation

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    This paper sketches an aretaic theory of legislation. Such a theory posits the flourishing of humans and their communities as the end or telos of law. The paper argues for a Neo-Aristotelian conception of human flourishing as a life of social and rational activities that express the human excellences or virtues. Because a flourishing life requires the acquisition, maintenance, and expression of the virtues, their promotion is the characteristic goal of legislation. The law can promote the virtues in a variety of ways, including: (1) by fostering peace and prosperity, (2) by encouraging stable and nurturing families, and (3) by creating opportunities for the meaningful work and play. Taking virtue as the end of law does not entail that legislation must require virtuous action and prohibit behavior that expresses human defects or vices. Instead, the law might pursue indirect strategies that encourage (but do not require) virtue and discourage (but do not prohibit) vice

    Expert evidence and the Law Commission : implementation without legislation?

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    Argues that, despite a failure to implement the recommendations in the Law Commission's 2011 report entitled "Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings", many of its proposals on the exclusion of such evidence might be introduced by the judiciary's appropriate exercise of common law powers. Reviews the Commission's proposals, the common law principles determining when expert evidence is not admitted, and how such discretion could be used to exclude evidence failing the Commission's core test. Discusses the drawbacks of such an approach and whether the Commission proposals were too timid

    Voting and Information Aggregation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies

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    This paper investigates legislation in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies where the legislature and the president have formal role in legislation. A proposed law is first voted in the legislature and if it passes, comes to the consideration of the president. I study two prevalent legislative procedures: (i) Single-round legislation where the president's action is final, (ii) Two-round legislation the president's approval enacts the law but after his veto proposal returns to the legislature for rediscussion. In this setup I examine power balance and the efficiency of information aggregation. For this I build a model of strategic voting with incomplete information and analyze different ideological profiles of the president and the homogenous legislature. The president seems powerless in two-round legislation but in equilibrium there are instances he can change the legislation result. Power struggle arises only when the legislature is modernist and the president is conservative. If the legislature is conservative and the president is modernist, the president has no impact on the outcome, but adversely affects informational efficiency. If they have the same ideological bias, the presidential institution is beneficial and the president's existence provides full information aggregation with finite legislature size in single-round legislation. Above results can be generalized to heterogeneous legislature with two types, except full information aggregation is never achieved
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